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Abstract 
 
This dissertation is rooted in market for technologies theory and 
organizational economics to answer to a call for additional research on the 
processes and organizational mechanisms through which firms implement 
their patent strategies.  
The first chapter investigates the organizational configurations that lead to 
success in granting a patent and capture value from innovation. Using a fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of 20 firms, the chapter 
explores the role of different combinations of centralization of decision-
making, cross-functional involvement, and codification of information on the 
timely ability to secure protection to an invention through patent grant.  
The second chapter provides a micro analysis of the overall management of 
the technology licensing process. Using multiple case studies, the research 
found two configurations to organise the capabilities and governance of 
decision making in technology licensing. In the first configuration, the 
management of licensing is based on a combination of internal flow of 
information, stand-alone coordination mechanisms and inside-out negotiating 
capabilities, which are the capabilities to convince external partners of the 
validity of the technology. In the second configuration, licensing is 
orchestrated through an external flow of information, shared coordination 
mechanisms and outside-in negotiating capabilities, which are the capabilities 
to convince members of the same organization of the validity of the license 
agreement and to moderate the various internal debates related to the 
agreement.  
The last chapter examines the role of indemnification clauses on intellectual 
property (IP) rights in the case of licensing deals and discusses the 
implications for the optimal design of licensing contracts. The study proposes 
that indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights operate as signals 
to share the risk and reduce moral hazard in licensing contracts. Building on 
market for technology literature and contract theory, the research found that 
the inclusion of IP indemnification clauses in technology licensing is 
correlated with a higher likelihood of selecting a payment schemes based on 
a combination of lump sum and royalty rate. Furthermore, the effect is 
amplified when the licensee and licensor operate in distant technological 
domains.  
 
Chapter 1 
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Chapter 1 Introduction  
 
 
 
Over the last decades, intellectual capitalism emerged as a 
combination of a capitalist economy and knowledge economy (Granstrand, 
2000). Since intellectual capital assumed a dominant role in companies’ 
strategies (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2008; Blind et al., 2009; Grindley & 
Teece, 1997), companies started facing increasing competition and 
challenges in protecting their knowledge from leakages, imitation, spillover, 
espionage and counterfeit (Andrea Fosfuri, 2000; Pacheco-de-Almeida & 
Zemsky, 2012; Reitzig et al., 2007). The rise of intellectual capitalism 
required the creation of intellectual property (IP) rights, of which patents are 
a prime exemplar, to protect proprietary knowledge and innovation in order 
to secure competitive advantages (Markman et al., 2004).  
Given the increasing relevance of the strategic management of 
patents, scholars from various disciplines have broadly inquired how firms 
should organize strategic patent-related activities –i.e. the acquisition and 
maintenance of patent rights, licensing, enforcement and litigation. Strategic 
patent-related activities have been viewed and explained through the 
theoretical lenses of signalling and information disclosure (Harhoff & 
Wagner, 2009; Harhoff, Scherer, & Vopel, 2003), real options (Bloom & Van 
Reenen, 2002; Nerkar, Paruchuri, & Khaire, 2007; Ziedonis, 2007) and non-
market strategies (Somaya & McDaniel, 2012b). Within the strategic 
management of patents, the study of the organization of patent-related 
activities and of patent-related capabilities remain an overlooked area. 
Chapter 1 
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Contributions in this area draw mainly from Resource Based View (RBV) 
theory and explained how the combination of legal and technical capabilities 
and cross-functionality across organizational units during the patenting 
process increase the ability to appropriate value from innovation and secure 
rents to sustain the competitive advantage (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Reitzig 
& Wagner, 2010; Somaya, Williamson, & Zhang, 2007). Recent studies 
analysed the role of external law firms as external suppliers of knowledge to 
facilitate patent-related activities (Wagner, Hoisl, & Thoma, 2014). Despite 
some progresses, “more insight is needed into the triggers, processes and 
mechanisms by which firms develop sophisticated patent management 
capabilities” (D. Somaya, 2012, p. 1102).  
The three papers in this dissertation answer to the call for additional 
research on the strategic management of patents and focus on the processes 
and organizational mechanisms through which firms implement their patent 
strategies. Rooted in market for technologies theory and organizational 
economics, my dissertation aims at looking at organizational practices that 
constitute optimal coordination strategies for the patenting process and the 
licensing mechanism. Drawing on organizational design literature, I 
completed a cross-sectional study of large organizations that are highly active 
in patenting (European Patent Office, 2012) to tease out how the patenting 
effort is influenced by the configuration of the R&D organizational structure, 
by formal coordination mechanisms and by interdependent distributed work. 
Turning to the technology licensing practices, I embraced an organizational 
contractual framework to look at (1) the micro-practices and micro-
Chapter 1 
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foundations of technology licensing within the IP departments and (2) the 
influence of IP indemnification clauses on technology licensing price.  
The dissertation contributes to research on the strategic management 
of patents by embracing an organizational perspective and by providing a 
micro-analysis of the practices and capabilities associated with patent-related 
activities. Through an organizational framework, I examine the conceptual 
interdependence between patent-related capabilities and the organizational 
design of patent-related practices to provide a complementary explanation to 
the current understanding of patent-related capabilities based on RBV theory. 
The dissertation also provides an empirical contribution in the field of the 
strategic management of patents, because it triangulates qualitative and 
quantitative evidence on the practices and mechanisms through which firms 
organize their patenting and licensing activities. Based on this comprehensive 
empirical approach, I integrate rich and fine-grained evidence on patent-
related practices and capabilities from case studies with a systematic test of 
secondary data obtained from a large dataset.  
The next paragraphs briefly examine existing contributions on patent 
strategies and the strategic management of patents. I then summarize the three 
papers and explain how the dissertation connects to and expands previous 
research on the strategic management of patents and particularly patent 
management capabilities.  
 
1.1. Patent Strategies and the Strategic Management of Patents 
 
Among IP rights, patents cover an important role in protecting proprietary 
knowledge. Patents are legal instruments that protect inventions. In order to 
Chapter 1 
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be granted such legal protection, inventions must be novel, inventive and 
possess industrial applicability. Patents are exclusive rights that prevent third 
parties to use, sell, or reproduce the invention without the permission of the 
patents’ owner. The legal protection lasts 20 years after the application and 
the patentee has the possibility of either exclusively using the patented 
invention or concluding licensing contracts. In management research, patents 
have been acknowledged as intangible resources crucial for developing firm 
strategy and for scaling up the competitive advantage through the acquisition 
of economic rents (Ceccagnoli, 2009; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013; Nerkar & 
Shane, 2007). To protect or improve their competitive positioning, firms can 
make strategic actions on their patent portfolio. This set of actions can be 
defined as a proprietary, defensive, or a leveraging patent strategy (Blind, 
Edler, Frietsch, & Schmoch, 2006; Somaya, 2012). Firms adopt a proprietary 
strategy when they use patents as offensive blocking instruments to prevent 
competitors from using or copying the invention and related technology 
(Arora & Nandkumar, 2012; Ceccagnoli, 2009; Hsu & Ziedonis, 2013). This 
strategy is aimed at obtaining direct economic rents from the commercial 
exploitation of the innovation protected by IP rights. Alternatively, firms may 
decide to develop a defensive strategy. With a defensive strategy, firms make 
sure not to infringe or violate third parties’ patents to avoid being exposed to 
the risk of being held up for rents. The main goal of a defensive patent strategy 
is maintaining freedom to operate, for instance by creating patent thickets 
(Cockburn & MacGarvie, 2009; Ziedonis, 2004). Finally, firms may adopt a 
leveraging strategy to use patents as a resource to generate additional rents by 
giving the permission to third parties with a license agreement to use the 
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proprietary knowledge protected through intellectual property rights (Kim, 
Vonortas, & Wiley, 2006; Somaya, Kim, & Vonortas, 2010). Through a 
leveraging strategy, firms exercise the bargaining power arising from their 
patent rights to gain licensing fees. When doing so, they need to balance the 
trade-off between rent-appropriation and the reduced market-share implied 
by an increasing competition due to the number of licensees (Andrea Fosfuri, 
2006). In addition, patent licensing as leveraging strategy can be used to settle 
the preliminary phases of litigations (Shane & Somaya, 2007; Somaya, 2003): 
this type of strategy has been extensively used by “patent trolls” in the attempt 
to threaten patent holders with the request of large damage awards for patents 
infringement (Galasso, Schankerman, & Serrano, 2013; Reitzig et al., 2007). 
Given the strategic relevance of patents and IP rights, research has largely 
inquired into how firms manage their patent-related choices and actions 
through the lenses of signalling and information disclosure theory, real 
options, non-market strategies and institutional targeting frameworks. 
Signalling and information disclosure theory helped in understanding how the 
certification of an invention through a patent application provides strategic 
advantages for a firm. The information contained in patents signals the quality 
of innovation and is of particular importance for investors and licensees to 
decrease information asymmetry (A. Agrawal, 2006; Bessen, 2005; J. S. 
Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008; Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000). 
According to real option theory, obtaining and maintaining patent protection, 
licensing and enforcing can be seen as a chain of options that firms decide 
either to exercise or to abandon depending on the value of the patents, 
inventive characteristics, and uncertainty on the future exploitation of the 
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rights (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2002; Clarkson & Toh, 2010; Nerkar et al., 
2007; Ziedonis, 2007). Finally, a recent stream of literature focuses on how 
law and institutions shape firms’ patent strategies. Despite the negotiation of 
patent laws in international treaties, the institutional system is heterogeneous 
and firms have to make discretionary choices on where to file and enforce 
patents. These choices depend on the requirements and duration of the patent 
application process (Graham & Harhoff, 2014; Harhoff & Wagner, 2009), 
and the specialization in patent law for the enforcement of patents (Somaya 
& McDaniel, 2012b).  
Within the strategic management of patents, the study of patent-related 
capabilities and the organizational traits of patent-related activities remain an 
overlooked area. Research in that area built on RBV framework and has 
sought to tease out how firms develop capabilities to manage patent-related 
activities and how they affect firm performance. Patent attorneys contribute 
with their legal knowledge and organize cross-functionally with the technical 
experts to translate patenting into a value appropriation activity (Reitzig & 
Puranam, 2009; Somaya et al., 2007; Somaya & McDaniel, 2012a). 
Furthermore, firms can leverage external knowledge and capabilities when 
implementing their patent strategy by outsourcing parts of their patent-related 
activities, although outsourcing requires careful consideration, because it can 
lessen the ability to develop internal capabilities (Mayer, Somaya, & 
Williamson, 2012; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; Wagner et al., 2014). 
Although those studies explained important dimensions of the strategic 
management of patents and particularly of patent-related capabilities, several 
questions on the way firms manage their patent-related activities and on the 
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implications for patent strategy remain unaddressed. Particularly, researchers 
so far omitted to explore the organizational dimensions through which firms 
organize, control and coordinate patent-related activities and exploit patent 
management capabilities. 
 
1.2. Three essays on the Organizational Dimensions of the 
Strategic Management of Patents  
 
My research contributes in extending existing knowledge on patent-
related capabilities and the organizational traits of patent-related activities by 
looking at the organization of intellectual property departments and how these 
departments strategically manage both patenting and licensing activities to 
protect innovation and extract value from inventive effort. Three papers form 
the pillars of my research and their connecting point lies in the organizational 
dimensions of the strategic management of patents. In the first essay, I draw 
from organizational design literature and analyse how the centralization of 
decision-making on patents strategy, cross-functional involvement and 
formal codification of information jointly impact the capability to appropriate 
value from innovation. In the second essay, I focus on the micro-practices and 
the licensing negotiating capabilities that emerge in the technology licensing 
process. The paper adopts a micro-organizational approach and explores how 
firms can manage technology licensing through internal flow of information, 
and internal coordinating mechanisms. The third essay also analyses 
technology licensing through an organizational framework, but focuses on the 
contractual dimensions and how to decrease behavioural opportunisms in 
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licensing through the inclusion of indemnities on IP. Summaries of the three 
papers follow below.  
 
Configurations of vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms to 
achieve value appropriation from innovation  
The paper investigates how value appropriation from innovation derives from 
different constellations of horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms. 
The research builds on innovation literature and organizational economics 
and uses a fuzzy set theoretical methodology on a sample of 20 firms. The 
paper highlights how different combinations of centralization of decision-
making on patents, cross-functional involvement and codification of 
information lead to configurations associated with fast patent grants. 
Moreover, the research provides an analysis of the ‘chemistry of elements’ 
that induces the occurrence of slow patent grants as incapability to timely 
appropriate value from innovation. The most insightful finding is that it is 
possible observing value appropriation from innovation, because of a 
heterogeneous and equifinal bundle of vertical and horizontal mechanisms. 
Overall, the paper contributes in connecting the complementary research 
streams on micro practices to appropriate value from innovation with the fast 
growing literature on R&D organizational structure. 
 
How can IP Department Manage Technology Licensing? The IP Unit 
Perspective  
The paper adopts a qualitative framework to understand the governance and 
practices of technology licensing. Through multiple case studies of 15 large 
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organizations operating in different industries, it emerges that the technology 
licensing process is organized through two alternative models, which 
underline different systems to transfer internal information and to govern the 
decision making process. Data show that organizations can arrange licensing 
through negotiators or ad-hoc teams, depending upon the overarching goal of 
innovation strategy at the corporate level. On one side, negotiator teams 
manage the technology licensing process through a centralized system that 
concentrates both the management of internal information and the governance 
of the decisional power. On the other side, ad-hoc teams play a brokering role 
in a hybrid system that partially decentralizes the management of information 
and leads the decision making through an on-going alignment of competing 
interests. The paper builds on multiple case studies to develop theoretical 
knowledge on the micro-foundations of patent-related capabilities in the case 
of technology licensing. 
 
Licensing price and indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights: 
An empirical investigation of double side moral hazard  
This study examines the role of indemnification clauses on intellectual 
property (IP) rights in the case of licensing deals. I propose that 
indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights operate as signals to 
share the behavioral risk and reduce moral hazard in licensing contracts. 
Building on market for technology literature and contract theory, I suggest 
that the inclusion of IP indemnification clauses in technology licensing 
explains the prevalence of payment schemes that are based on a combination 
of lump sum and royalty rate. This effect is amplified when the licensee and 
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licensor operate in distant technological domains. Predictions are tested on 
data from the pharmaceutical industry, controlling for technological 
characteristics and discussing implications on the optimal design of licensing 
contracts. 
 
The three essays are based on both qualitative and quantitative 
evidence. I have conducted an exploratory study using an inductive 
methodology based on in-depth multiple cases study. I collected data from 
November 2012 to August 2014 from a total of 23 large-sized companies with 
an internal IP department. Sampling included four cases in the healthcare 
industry, five in the ICT, and eight in the manufacturing and six in the 
pharmaceutical industry. I interviewed 48 key informants who were heads of 
in-house IP units, executives of R&D departments or senior patent attorneys. 
Interviews lasted one hour and were fully transcribed (totalling approximately 
200 pages) and triangulated with personal notes (100 pages), and archival data 
(150 documents). For these companies, data on their patent portfolios were 
retrieved from PATSTAT for a total of 21,119,283 patents, while financial 
measures were obtained from the Orbis database. The first and the second 
essay of the dissertation are based on this data collection. The thesis finally 
analyses the role of indemnification clauses on intellectual property right as 
tools to manage double side moral hazard in technology licensing. From the 
Recap dataset, I collected data of indemnification clauses and warranties in 
technology licensing contracts for firms operating in the pharmaceutical 
industry between 1980 and 2004. In total 151 licensing contracts were used. 
Chapter 1 
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For each contract, patent data were retrieved from the USPTO patent database 
and financial measures from the Compustat dataset. 
 
 
1.3. Contributions  
 
The thesis contributes to the current research on the strategic management 
of patents by providing a comprehensive analysis of the organizational dimensions 
through which firms organize, control and coordinate patent-related activities. As its 
main theoretical framework, the dissertation adopts the organizational design 
literature and organizational economics as complementary lenses to understand how 
firms strategically manage patent-related activities that are connected with efforts to 
enhance the firm’s performance. 
The dissertation provides three main theoretical contributions. First, it 
disentangles the relationship between organizational structure and patent-related 
practices that leads to higher value appropriation from innovation. In doing so, the 
research conceptualizes the organization as whole, where practices and structure 
need to be jointly analysed and explained (Mohr, 1982). Through an organizational 
design framework, the research complements previous contributions on the patent-
management capabilities that rely on RBV framework (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; D. 
Somaya et al., 2007; Wagner et al., 2014). The dissertation also highlights the 
concomitant importance of multiple organizational mechanisms such as 
centralization of decision-making and coordination to effectively implement a patent 
strategy, extending previous studies that focused on the effects of single 
organizational mechanisms, for example cross-functionality in patent-related 
activities (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009).  
Second, the dissertation expands a growing research stream in the field of 
market for technology that studies the organization of technology licensing. Building 
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on a pioneering paper by Arora and colleagues (Arora, Fosfuri, & Rønde, 2013), the 
dissertation provides a conceptual model that connects the organizational design of 
licensing with the management of internal information flow and coordinating 
mechanisms. The dissertation aims at providing the micro-foundations of the 
technology licensing process with an analysis of micro-practices and emerging 
capabilities and connects research on technology licensing with studies on strategy 
framing and internal political negotiations (Kaplan, 2008). 
Third, the dissertation builds on contractual economics and expands our 
knowledge on the contractual clauses that could be inserted into a licensing contract 
to lower behavioural risk and reduce moral hazard (Laursen, Leone, Moreira, & 
Reichstein, 2013; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Somaya et al., 2010). The research 
provides a novel analysis of the effect of indemnification clauses against patent 
infringements on licensing price and sheds light on the optimal design of licensing 
contracts. 
The thesis also combines different methodologies and integrates both 
qualitative and quantitative evidence as well as primary and secondary data. From a 
methodological point of view, research on the strategic management of patents so 
far relied on quantitative investigations based on secondary data. Case studies that 
combine both primary and secondary data are instead scarce (Somaya, 2012), but by 
combining rich and fine-grained qualitative evidence obtained from primary sources 
with rigorous tests of data retrieved from secondary datasets this dissertation 
represents an intriguing example of the approach’s potential. Furthermore, the thesis 
adopts three methodologies –i.e. multiple case studies, qualitative comparative 
analysis and multinomial regressions- to investigate how firms organize the strategic 
management of patents. The synergies among the different methodologies permit to 
unbundle the phenomenological complexity and provide an exhaustive and in-depth 
empirical investigation. 
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Chapter 2 Configurations of Vertical and Horizontal 
Coordination Mechanisms to Achieve Value 
Appropriation from Innovation  
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates how value appropriation from innovation is associated 
with different configurations of horizontal and vertical coordination 
mechanisms internal to the companies that innovate. Building on the 
innovation literature and organizational economics, and using a fuzzy-set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of 20 firms, we argue that 
different combinations of centralization of decision-making, cross-functional 
involvement, and codification of information are associated to high “patent 
grant success” (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). We also analyse the 
configurations of organizational elements associated with low patent grant 
success, intended as a proxy of a firm’s limited capability to timely 
appropriate value from innovation. Our findings show that value 
appropriation from innovation can be facilitated by a heterogeneous bundle 
of vertical and horizontal mechanisms, suggesting structural heterogeneity 
and equifinality in the causal patterns. Our findings contribute to integrate 
research on practices of value appropriation with the fast growing literature 
on R&D organizational structure. 
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2.1. Introduction  
 
The analysis of the antecedents of value appropriation from 
innovation has been proven to be a rich source of insights into the causes of 
interfirm performance difference. A growing research stream focused on 
R&D organizational structure as macro vertical coordination mechanism that 
influences how firms appropriate value from their innovation (Aghion et al., 
2013; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Ashish Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2014; 
Leiponen & Helfat, 2011; Lerner & Wulf, 2007). For example, empirical 
evidence demonstrated that a centralized organizational structure might be 
helpful in setting the governance of long-term investments in R&D projects 
(Aghion et al., 2013; Lerner & Wulf, 2007). Furthermore, previous research 
highlighted the importance of the R&D organizational structure to integrate 
internal and external knowledge to foster innovation and appropriate value 
from this latter (Ashish Arora et al., 2014; Leiponen & Helfat, 2011).  
Building on organizational economics theory, further studies have 
focused on the horizontal organizational mechanisms that foster innovation 
outcomes and value appropriation. Within this research stream, scholars 
explored the internal communication patterns that develop from and within 
the R&D department (Engelen & Brettel, 2012; Paruchuri & Eisenman, 2012; 
Van den Bulte & Moenaert, 1998), the integration of in-house patent law 
expertise and financial investments in R&D (D. Somaya et al., 2007) and 
cross-functionality across intellectual property (IP) generation, protection and 
utilization (Mayer et al., 2012; Moeen, Somaya, & Mahoney, 2013; Reitzig 
& Puranam, 2009; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010).  
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However, despite the common focus on value appropriation from 
innovation, these research streams remain mostly disjoint and separate. Yet, 
organization is an interdependent system where practices, processes and 
structures need to be jointly considered (Ménard, 2009; Mohr, 1982). 
Therefore, if we try to overlay these bodies of studies, it is fair noting that 
little is known on the mechanisms, by which organizations connect R&D 
organizational structure to IP practices to achieve value appropriation.  
For example, Microsoft has a centralized R&D structure that focuses 
on four engineering silos: Operating Systems, Apps, Cloud and Devices. In 
2015 they invested $12billions equal to 13% of their operating revenues in 
R&D, focusing mostly on basic research. As Microsoft stated on its website 
“This investment serves as the foundation for Microsoft’s vast patent 
portfolio of 60,000 issued patents and 35,000 pending applications”. 
However, the management of the patent portfolio is not left to the research 
units, but to the centralized legal team. Within the centralized legal team, 
Microsoft has two distinct groups in charge for the patent portfolio 
management. On one side, a part of the legal team is responsible for patent 
application and prosecution; on the other side, the Intellectual Property 
Licensing group is a dedicated team nested in the legal function specialized 
in inbound and outbound negotiation of technologies. This example shows 
that the maximization of innovation outcome and value appropriation is not 
simply due to the effort of the R&D function. Instead both the centralized 
R&D and legal functions are jointly involved. This joint involvement raises 
two fundamental questions: how do these functions interact and coordinate in 
order to appropriate value from innovation? Is the centralized structure the 
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only organizational form that achieves value appropriation from innovation? 
To the best of our knowledge these questions still remain unresolved. A 
compelling explanation that integrates structure and practice as vertical and 
horizontal mechanisms to achieve value appropriation from innovation is still 
lacking. Similarly, it is yet unclear how vertical and horizontal mechanisms 
work together to form a coherent system to appropriate value from 
innovation. Thus, we aim at tackling the research lacuna and answering which 
configurations of horizontal and vertical mechanisms are associated with 
high value appropriation from innovation?  
We are interested in the chemistry of causal ingredients (Fiss, 2007) 
of both patenting practices and R&D organizational structures that could not 
be disentangled at any single level of analysis, yet understood through the 
comparison of configurations of elements (Ragin, 2008; Ragin & Zaret, 
1983). In fact, effectively designed systems should be composed of different 
organizational attributes interconnected through discrete configurations of 
elements and practices (Grandori & Furnari, 2008, 2009). To explore the 
research gap, we designed a field study and investigate 20 firms operating in 
industries with high patenting rate (EPO, 2012). We build the patent portfolio 
of each firm, retrieving 2,687,331 patents and collecting data on number of 
patent applications, citations and grant dates. To understand the IP practices 
and the mechanisms through which organizations connect R&D structure 
with other functions and patenting practices we collected 41 in-depth 
interviews with patent counsels, scientists and heads of IP departments. We 
use set-theoretic methods to study in detail the potential combinations 
between R&D structures and patenting practices. We find set-theoretic 
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method particularly appropriate to explore the research question, because it 
permits to analyse the cluster of interconnected structure and practice by 
combining multiple levels of analysis (Byrne, 2009; Fiss, 2011). Finally, by 
using a qualitative comparative analysis approach, we provide a 
representation of multidimensional interactions and internal hybrid 
configurations through a systematic cross-case comparison to not lose the 
within-case richness and complexity.  
Our contribution is threefold. First, we contribute by expanding the 
notion of complementarity in innovation literature (Arora et al., 2014; 
Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Moeen et al., 2013; Somaya, 2012) by 
developing a holistic framework that connects both vertical and horizontal 
organizational coordination mechanisms. Through an empirical examination 
we show how it is possible identifying an equifinal ‘gestalt’ of practices and 
structures that define complementarity in inventive and patenting activities. 
Firstly, we find that centralization of R&D structure is a sufficient yet non-
core condition to appropriate value from innovation. Organizations could 
better appropriate value from innovation through the patenting process when 
the centralization of their R&D structure is associated with a high degree of 
cross-functional involvement among organizational units and a mild level of 
formalization of communication. Second, our study sheds light on the 
organizational dimensions that influence the allocation of resources necessary 
to invest in patent filing and maintain patent prosecution (Guellec & van 
Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000; Hegde, Mowery, & Graham, 2009; Peeters 
& Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2006). We claim that organizations should 
carefully plan their investments to increase their ability to appropriate value 
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from innovation and target budgets to sustain R&D capacity without 
dismissing the relevance of the legal function. A second implication consists 
in the increasing relevance of communication mechanisms, tools and internal 
platforms that should be designed in order to maximize value appropriation 
from innovation. Finally, our configurational approach and qualitative 
comparative analysis complements the growing research on configurations in 
organizational design and strategy research (Fiss, 2007, 2011; Greckhamer, 
Misangyi, Elms, & Lacey, 2008; Miller, 1986, 1987). Qualitative 
comparative analysis aims at identifying the combination of factors that 
accounts for a specified outcome instead of isolating single explanatory 
variables. Thus, fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (hereby fs/QCA) 
is a powerful tool that overcomes limitations of regression analysis with 
multiple interaction terms (Fiss, 2008). This methodological advance allows 
us to inquire deeper into the horizontal and vertical organizational 
mechanisms that jointly affect value appropriation from innovation. 
 
2.2. A Configurational Approach to Value Appropriation from 
Innovation through Patent Grant 
 
For many reasons, value appropriation from innovation has held the 
attention of strategy and innovation scholars frequently (Chatain & Zemsky, 
2011; Grimpe & Hussinger, 2013; Jacobides, Knudsen, & Augier, 2006; 
Pacheco-de-Almeida & Zemsky, 2012). The core idea of value appropriation 
from innovation resides in the firms’ capabilities to capture and protect the 
returns from inventive efforts at the origin of value creation. An obvious 
parameter to monitor value appropriation from innovation is the ability to 
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obtain legal protection of invention through patents. Indeed, even though a 
patent is not a perfect gauge of innovation, it has been acknowledged as a 
sufficiently reliable indicator of the efforts to translate R&D productivity into 
commercial products (Jiang, Tan, & Thursby, 2011; Nerkar & Shane, 2007; 
Shane, 2001; Zahra & Nielsen, 2002). With the grant of a patent, all the 
inventive steps and innate novelty are assessed and recognized by a patent 
examiner, who is an official third party that must be convinced of the quality 
of the patent draft provided by the firm in order to confer the exclusivity IP 
rights (Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000). Patent applicants 
negotiate with the examiners the claims to differentiate submitted 
applications from what is already covered by legal protection and highlight 
the increasing sophistication of innovation (Cockburn, Kortum, & Stern, 
2002). However, emphasis is not only on the breadth and novelty of patent 
claims, yet also on the duration of the examination to obtain a patent grant 
and the exclusivity on the technology. In fact, organizations have a strong 
incentive to craft and submit solid patent applications with compelling claims 
in order to secure the grant fast. Only a granted patent gives the right to 
exclude third parties from the use of its protected technology, which can be 
exclusively used in the business development and secure value appropriation 
from innovation. Empirical evidence demonstrated that well-documented 
applications obtain faster patent grant and applicants tend to accelerate grant 
proceedings for innovations considered highly valuable and strategic, while 
controversial submissions correlated with a poor drafting tend to be delayed 
and eventually withdrawn (D. Harhoff & Wagner, 2009).  
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Furthermore, it is possible considering the grant of the patent as the 
ultimate outcome of a complex value chain (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009) that 
integrates formal structure with complementary processes and practices 
related to both IP generation and IP protection (Phanish Puranam & Srikanth, 
2007; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; D. Somaya et al., 2007). Firstly, the R&D 
function is involved with the patent attorneys on the backstage of a patent 
grant process for the disclosure of ideas. In this phase, scientists, doctors, and 
engineers play an important role in the IP generation, providing initial 
information such as sketches, innovation briefings and preliminary outlines 
of a potential patent. Patent attorneys support R&D members through the 
eliciting of patentable innovations, highlighting business and 
commercialization opportunities and legal issues. Secondly, patent attorneys 
are in charge of drafting and filing patents. Albeit patent offices such as the 
European Patent Office, US Patent and Trademark Office and Japanese Patent 
Office differ in some specifics of patent filing, it is fair to state that the main 
stages are common (S. Graham, Marco, & Miller, 2015; OECD, 2009). In the 
phase of IP protection, IP lawyers provide initial information on the scope 
and the claims of the application to the patent officer, who will revise the 
technicalities and reject or approve the application through a grant for 
exclusive legal protection. During this second step, IP lawyers might still ask 
inventors for further specifications and tests to make stronger the request to 
be submitted to the patent officer. Furthermore, research showed that this 
complex set of practices is more efficient if arranged in-house through 
vertical architectures that connect R&D with IP lawyers and other layers of 
the organization involved in IP creation and protection (Reitzig & Wagner, 
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2010). In fact, the more an organization internalizes the process of patent 
filing, the better its capability of leveraging internal knowledge and 
improving its responses towards competitors in the downstream production. 
In sum, research has independently highlighted that IP generation and IP 
protection are carried out through either horizontal (e.g. cross-functionality) 
or vertical coordination mechanisms (e.g. vertical architectures) structured 
throughout different layers of the organization. In the next paragraphs, we 
draw upon important streams in innovation literature and organizational 
economics to better define the vertical and horizontal coordination 
mechanisms identified as pillars to appropriate value from innovation. We 
also justify why these core organizational mechanisms should be analysed 
jointly instead of independent causal antecedents of value appropriation from 
innovation.  
 
2.2.1. Vertical coordination mechanism 
 
The first pillar focuses on centralization of decision making, as this 
construct influences the articulation of the organizational structure and 
resources’ allocation for practices involved in innovation and patenting 
(Mohr, 1982; Williamson, 1991). Centralization of decision making can be 
either concentrated at an integrated hierarchical level or it can be diluted 
across lower positions assuming a decentralized structure (Mansfield, 1973; 
Pugh, Hickson, Hinings, & Turner, 1968). Organizations through 
authoritative centralized mechanisms provide a means for coordinating the 
activities of groups of individuals in way that are not easily achieved by free 
contractual agreements (Ménard, 2009; Simon, 1991; Williamson, 1991). 
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Concentration of decision making enhances the ability to leverage existing 
knowledge through the use of common goals and links artifacts embedded in 
the minds of individuals, leading to the emergence of rich informal 
communications (Puranam & Srikanth, 2007). Theoretical statements on the 
positive impact of centralization of decision making on performance found 
empirical support: there is a positive correlation between centralization of 
decision making in R&D function and high inventive performance and 
patenting activity, meanwhile decentralized R&D structures tend to perform 
poorer (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Ashish Arora et al., 2014). However, 
when the articulation of formal structure is centralized in unique hierarchy, 
the quest for researching in external areas respect to the core is limited and 
inventive activity mostly relies on internal R&D (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; 
Ashish Arora et al., 2014; Leiponen & Helfat, 2011).  Yet, research on 
complementarity in innovation demonstrated that inventiveness could be 
sustained by the combination of internal and external sources (Cassiman & 
Veugelers, 2006). Furthermore, empirical evidence found that decentralized 
organizations are more capable than centralized ones at acquiring knowledge 
to innovate from external sources and exploiting inventions coming from 
complementary fields, especially for those inventive activities that do not 
terminate with a new-to-the-market products (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; 
Ashish Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 2011; Ashish Arora et al., 2014). Therefore, 
organizations with decentralized R&D functions could be able to reach high 
inventive performances in any case, by integrating internal and external 
sources and activities that sustain innovation. In fact, by being decentralized, 
organizations cannot generally benefit from intra-organizational knowledge 
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spillover, as research focus is often different across the organization 
(Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010; D. J. Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007). 
However, decentralized organizations are influenced for each subgroup by 
more diverse external stimuli (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003), which help 
them in selecting among multiple sources in adjunct to those internal to foster 
inventiveness. Indeed, research reports strong inventive performances 
measured by high patenting rate for decentralized organizations, whose 
subgroups highly rely on external funds and more diversified capital sources 
(Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010).  
 
2.2.2. Horizontal coordination mechanism 
 
The second pillar to explain value appropriation in the context of 
obtaining patent protection is cross-functional involvement. Cross-functional 
involvement can be defined as the mechanism that enables coordination 
between interdependent specialists nested in different functions within the 
firm (Puranam & Ravendraam, 2013; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). Through 
cross-functional involvement, the organization is pervaded by an underlying 
structure of interdependencies that are particularly fruitful in the search of 
complementary solutions, especially when surrounding circumstances are 
unclear or in dynamic contexts (Levinthal & Warglien, 1999; Siggelkow & 
Levinthal, 2003). Furthermore, cross-functional involvement helps to avoid 
capabilities traps and being stuck in peculiar domains, because the 
interactions among complementary practices and capabilities across divisions 
enhances experimentation and spawns cross-fertilization (Levinthal & 
Warglien, 1999). However, in the case of obtaining patent protection, 
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research found a negative correlation between patenting performance and 
high cross-divisional involvement of R&D and legal functions (D. Somaya et 
al., 2007). These findings could be explained through the lenses of 
specialization. Activities related to IP generation let engineers and patent 
attorneys work together on the same projects, leveraging reciprocal profound 
knowledge to understand the potential of inventions. However, technologists 
and lawyers have also divergent specialist expertise due to their divisional 
roles. Indeed, technologists have a scientific background, while patent 
attorneys are primarily skilled and trained from a legal perspective in order to 
absolve the law requirements necessary for the IP registration (Somaya & 
McDaniel, 2012). Thus, they might incur in coordination difficulties, because 
those actors belong to two distinct and (partially) incompatible micro-
environments with their own mind-sets, languages and priorities. Yet, cross-
functional involvement requires strong interactions among highly specialized 
employees with specific capabilities either in the technical or in the legal 
fields. Thus, after a certain threshold of specialization, interactions between 
technologists and attorneys could require too much effort in understanding 
and sharing information among functions, loosing therefore the benefits of 
interdependencies. We can therefore argue that high inventive performances 
are achieved for moderate degrees of cross-functional involvement. Indeed, 
empirical research found evidence of the positive relationships between 
intermediate levels of cross-functional specializations and value 
appropriation in the context of patent protection (Engelen & Brettel, 2012; 
Paruchuri & Eisenman, 2012; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). 
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The third pillar refers to codification of information. Through 
codification, chunks of information are structured into pre-established formal 
mechanisms and plans that allow the transmission of notices and instructions 
(Srikanth & Puranam, 2011; Thompson, 1967). The establishment of 
codification permits to generate channels of communication that give clear 
directionality to the workflow and coordinate interdependence through 
modular interfaces (Puranam, Goetting, & Knudsen, 2010). Coordination 
strategies that use codification of information are often opposed to those that 
adopt on-going interactions and unstructured feedbacks (Thompson, 1967). 
In fact, in certain circumstances individuals may circumvent codification and 
transmit information through on-going communication, e-mails, informal 
presentations or phone calls (Srikanth & Puranam, 2011). In this latter case, 
the effective transmission of information is enhanced by the existence of a 
common ground through which expectations and discursive communications 
can converge on a shared framework (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Research 
demonstrated that engagement with the inventors through informal means and 
daily sharing of feedback has positive effects on inventiveness (A. Agrawal, 
2006) and the effect is enhanced in the case of co-location of members (Giuri 
et al., 2007; Van den Bulte & Moenaert, 1998). Furthermore, IP lawyers are 
generally pro-active at bonding with scientists during the disclosure of ideas 
through personal conversations or internal platforms (D. Somaya et al., 2007). 
However, on-going communication might be problematic across different 
divisions and subgroups: members of separate divisions may lack a common 
background, inconsistent conventions and functional differences, so that 
communication will be limited (Camerer & Knez, 1996). Therefore, 
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codification of information and communication through plans fosters the 
sharing of knowledge and data when the organizations present a decentralized 
structure (Srikanth & Puranam, 2011; Tushman, 1978), since the codified 
mechanisms and devices instil more reliability and certainty in the process. 
Furthermore, research provided evidence that high performing R&D projects 
with a high degree of interdependence make intensive use of technical 
services and devices to transfer information (Tushman, 1978). In fact, cross-
functional involvement boosts interdependence among members belonging to 
different contexts, therefore the use of interfaces and codified procedures 
could be considered a more suitable option to coordinate activities and 
members involved in the inventive process.  
 
2.2.3. Combinatory Laws of Complementarity Practices and Structure to 
Appropriate Value from Innovation through Patent Grant 
 
 
The preceding discussion suggests that both vertical and horizontal 
coordination mechanisms related to IP generation and IP protection are 
idiosyncratically interconnected and interdependent in the whole 
organization, creating a complex system of practices and structure to 
appropriate value from innovation. While previous studies have separately 
analysed these coordination mechanisms (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora 
et al., 2014;Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Reitzig & 
Wagner, 2010), our assumption is that R&D organizational structure, cross-
functionality and coordination by plan interdependently contribute to 
appropriate value from innovation through patent grant.  
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To elucidate the gains and implications of the interdependence 
between vertical and horizontal mechanisms to appropriate value from 
innovation through patent grant, we adopt a configurational and 
complementary approach. Organizational economics and strategy research 
have widely demonstrated the joint importance of configurations (Meyer, 
Tsui, & Hinings, 1993; Miller, 1987) and complementarities (Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1990, 1995) to sustain firm’s performance. These two approaches 
are conceptually distinct, yet theoretically synergic. The configurational 
approach postulates that organizational practices interact with each other and 
create multiple combinations along the process of the generation of outcomes 
(Fiss, 2007; Miller, 1987). An important assumption of configurational logic 
is equifinality: through the intersection of bundles of practices it is possible 
noting that there is not a “one-fits-all” solution, but multiple combinations 
can lead to the same outcome (Grandori & Furnari, 2008, 2009). 
Complementarity integrates and enriches the notion of configurations, since 
it is grounded on the concept of internal fit of activities performed at different 
levels in an organizations (Milgrom & Roberts, 1995). The concept of 
complementarity of processes has been extensively studied in innovation 
literature (Cassiman, Di Guardo, & Valentini, 2009; Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2006; Veugelers & Cassiman, 1999). The core idea revolves around the 
intuition that giving two activities A and B, adding the activity B while A is 
already being performed has a higher incremental effect on inventive 
performance than adding the activity in isolation (Cassiman & Veugelers, 
2006; Gatignon, Tushman, Smith, & Anderson, 2002; Reitzig & Puranam, 
2009). In similar fashion, complementarity logic assumes that high firm 
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performance does not arise from a unique combination of activities. However, 
complementarity is set apart from the configurational framework, since it 
assumes that “high performance arises only when particular combinations of 
practices with similar or different attributes interact with each other in a 
positive way” (García-Castro, Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013, p. 392). Thus, 
complementarity permits focusing on the positive interactions among 
practices and structures and understanding how their configurations might 
lead to firms’ high performance. 
 
2.3. Empirical Analysis 
 
 
Drawing on our theoretical development, we designed an 
investigation to understand how firms interconnect vertical organizational 
structures with horizontal practices in their IP departments to achieve a high 
rate of success in obtaining patent grants, which is our ultimate measure of 
value appropriation through innovation. We focused on the organizational 
features of IP departments and their intersection with inventive performances, 
because we believe that this research setting provides a suitable context for 
understanding the impact of organizational structure on performance (Gulati, 
Puranam, & Tushman, 2012; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). Furthermore, we 
want to expand our general understanding of organizational traits of 
innovation (Ashish Arora et al., 2011, 2014). On the basis of high patenting 
activity (EPO, 2012), we selected 20 corporations in four sectors. This mid-
sized sample allowed us to combine in-depth knowledge of individual cases 
and variation across contexts (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012).  
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2.3.1. Data 
 
The research uses a comparative analysis of multiple case studies. We 
collected data in years 2012-2014 from 20 large and very large sized 
companies that have an internal IP department. Cases were selected because 
they operate in industries where patenting activity is intense (EPO, 2012). 
Furthermore, cases were comparable according to industry and technological 
domain. Sampling followed the saturation logic and included four cases in the 
healthcare industry, four in the ICT, six in the manufacturing and six in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Furthermore, the 20 firms in our sample were 
responsible for approximately 5% of all patent applications at the US Patent 
Office in the years 2011 and 2012. Thus, our sample covers cases very active 
in patenting and for which patent grant is an important outcome. We collected 
41 interviews from 26 key informants who covered relevant roles in the IP 
units and were notably heads of in-house IP unit, executives of R&D 
departments and senior patent attorneys. Interviews lasted between 50 to 90 
minutes and were fully transcribed and triangulated with personal notes, 
archival data from Nexis database and corporate web pages.  
However, our data collection is more exhaustive. In fact, we relied on three 
data sources: (1) interviews with heads of in-house IP unit, executives of 
R&D departments and senior patent attorneys of the companies; (2) patent 
data for each of those firms and (3) archival data.  
Interviews with members of IP departments  
From September 2012 to August 2014, we conducted 41 semi-structured 
interviews. At each firm we interviewed heads of in-house IP unit, executives 
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of R&D departments and senior patent attorneys. When possible we also 
interviewed senior scientists and researchers of the organizations. We 
conducted interviews on site and over the phone. Interviews were lasted 
between 50 and 90 minutes and were fully transcribed. Detailed notes were 
made on a side to integrate and triangulate the analysis. Interviews addressed 
understanding the organizational structure of both IP departments, their 
relationship with research and development units, their role in the corporate 
strategy and in the design of intellectual property portfolio. When it was not 
possible interviewing more than two members of the same organizations, we 
collected further primary evidence through emails and confirmatory cases 
with additional internal members of IP departments. 
 
Patent data 
For each company we built the patent portfolio following the procedure 
implemented by Belenzon and Berkovitz (Belenzon & Berkovitz, 2010). 
Based on ownership chains, we firstly built the patent portfolio of each 
company from Orbis database. We retrieved 2,687,331 patents from Orbis 
and through a unique identifier we linked them to PATSTAT. This process 
was crucial to complement the dataset with additional information on 
innovative variables such as the degree of diversification of the patent 
portfolio, patent citations, families in which the patents has been allocated, 
application and grant dates, amendments on the submitted patent applications.   
 
Archival data 
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We collected extensive documentary evidence, including public press 
retrieved by Nexis database, conference presentations, webinars and 
webpages. We used this evidence to triangulate the interview data and 
confirm the representation of the 20 case studies. 
 
 
2.3.2. Research Method: A Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis  
 
A configurational approach demands a detailed understanding of the 
causal relationships. Therefore, we opted for a fuzzy set qualitative 
comparative approach (fs/QCA). The fs/QCA method is ideal to detect 
combinatory effects and equifinality of different combinations in reaching the 
same outcome. There is an increasing interest in the application of qualitative 
comparative analysis in strategic management and organization studies (Bell, 
Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2013; Crilly et al., 2012; Grandori & Furnari, 2008) 
because of its advantages in finding causal patterns (Fiss, 2007) and 
condensing the complexity of qualitative analysis through Boolean 
minimization (Ragin, 2008). One of the main features of fs/QCA consists in 
treating cases as configurations of conditions that jointly produce an outcome, 
typically distinguishing which conditions are necessary and/or sufficient for 
an outcome to occur. A condition is associated with a set membership and 
every case is treated depending upon the degree of inclusion in the set. Every 
organization is treated as a member of multiple sets (e.g. the set for high 
patenting performance), so that fs/QCA is employed to identify consistent 
patterns among set membership.  
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This type of analysis has a number of advantages for the present study. 
The method allows for theory elaboration for middle N-samples that would 
not produce statistically relevant results and would be too large to 
accommodate the procedure of a purely qualitative research design (Fiss, 
2011; T. Greckhamer et al., 2008). By identifying the ‘chemistry’ of 
conditions that causally lead to an outcome, fs/QCA is particularly suitable 
for advancing theories that are nested at different levels (Fiss, 2011). 
Therefore, its usage is consistent with our aim of understanding the interplay 
between factors at the structural and process levels. Furthermore, fs/QCA 
allows for equifinality in the minimal causal solutions that lead into an 
outcome. This enables to have a parsimonious and nuanced analysis of factors 
that contribute in generating high patenting performance.  
The transformation of variables into sets requires calibration, which 
consists of the specification of full membership, full non-membership and 
cross-over points of ambiguity. Indeed, a fuzzy set scales degree of 
membership (e.g. membership in the set of organizational centralization) in 
the interval from 0.0 to 1.0, with 1.0 indicating full inclusion and 0.0 full 
exclusion. In between this spectrum, qualitative anchor points are used as 
crossover from which deviation scores are calculated respect to full 
membership. For instance, levels can be 1 (full membership), 0.67 
(intermediate membership), 0.33 (partial exclusion) and 0.0 (exclusion). 
Alternatively, levels of inclusion and exclusion can be based on a more 
nuanced scale: 1 (fully in), 0.9 (mostly in), 0.6 (more in than out), 0.4 (more 
out than in), 0.1 (mostly out), 0.0 (fully out). For the construction of the fuzzy 
sets, we used both the anchor points specified above and we have followed 
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the “direct method” basing on iterations of theoretical wisdom and in-depth 
knowledge of the cases.  
Following our theoretical framework, we consider one outcome –i.e. 
the success in obtaining fast patent grant achievements- to capture a firm’s 
ability to capture value from innovation. To depict the organizational 
dimensions, we then consider three causal conditions: (1) the degree of 
centralization of the IP department respect to the organizational structure; (2) 
the degree of cross-functionality of IP departments with other units; (3) the 
adoption of a structured plan in the processes related to patenting. To capture 
the breadth of innovation produced by each firm and controlling past 
performances in the patenting process, we rely on two conditions: (1) the 
average number of patent citations that compose the patent portfolio (2) and 
lags between the application and granting dates. We discuss here below our 
conditions and their calibration. Our analysis and results are computed with 
R using the QCA package recently developed by Thiem and Dusa (Thiem & 
Dusa, 2013a, 2013b) 
 
 
Fast grant achievement 
A patent represents an advance in technology and it is a useful indicator of 
value-creation activities by the firm. In a first instance, a patent confers the 
exclusive right to the owner to use and exploit the technology. Therefore, the 
grant of a patent represents the ability of an applicant to convince a patent 
examiner of sufficient novelty, inventive improvements and industrial 
applicability when judging the application. Therefore, a very crude indicator 
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of success of achieving patent protection is simply whether or not a patent 
was granted in an application. The duration of the application process is a 
more refined criterion. In fact, well-documented applications are approved 
faster and they have lower probabilities of being withdrawn (Harhoff & 
Wagner, 2009). Applicants have more incentives in accelerating patent 
application process for those patents that are considered valuable. At least two 
advantages are associated with a fast patent grant: certainty on the status of 
the patent portfolio and the possibility of using legal instruments to prosecute 
infringers. Furthermore, obtaining rapid patent protection through compelling 
applications could guarantee the applicants an advantage in excluding 
competitors from the adoption of a certain technology to exploit commercial 
opportunities. It is particularly important in industries such as 
pharmaceuticals or biotech, where innovation cycles are short. Thus, we 
create the condition ‘fast grant achievement’ based on the capability of 
obtaining fast patent grants. Following previous research (Reitzig & 
Puranam, 2009), for each organization in our sample we firstly create a 
dummy variable ‘grant’ equal to one if a patent in the firm’s patent portfolio 
was granted in the study window. In order to control for technology specific 
effects, we divide the dichotomous variable ‘grant’ by the average granting 
ratio of the relevant technology sector. Finally, we multiply the ratio by the 
average time between the filing and grant in its technological sector. The 
measure can be formalized as follows. 
 ݂�ݏݐ ݃ݎ�݊ݐ �ܿℎ݅݁�݁݉݁݊݁݊ݐ =  ݃ݎ�݊ݐ ∗ ݈�݃ݐ݅݉݁ ݃ݎ�݊ݐ௜௡ௗ௨௦௧௥௬݃ݎ�݊ݐ ݎ�ݐ݅݋௜௡ௗ௨௦௧௥௬  
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Through this measure we were able to capture the effectiveness of the IP 
department in the patenting process. In our analysis we referred to US patent 
data. The US patent system is one of the strongest and best-acknowledged 
frameworks to obtain legal rights on a registered innovation. Finally, we 
limited the effect of institutional factors by referring to patent rights from only 
one jurisdiction instead of analysing for example both USPTO and EPO data.  
To build the measure, we decided to refer to applications filed up to year 2011 
because on average patents take more than one year to be granted. Thus, when 
we started our data collection in 2012 interviewees might have referred to the 
process that involved the grant of patents filed at least in 2011. Therefore, we 
decided to take year 2011 as starting reference point to construct our measure 
of fast patent grant. While other contributions in the literature adopted a four-
year window to measure patent grant (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009), we decided 
to opt for an even more conservative time frame from 2011 to 2014 to limit 
to a minimum potential biases from retrospective analysis. We transformed 
the measure in a fuzzy set by taking the average and using the first, third and 
fourth quintile for full membership, crossover point of maximum ambiguity 
and full non-membership, respectively. 
 
Explanatory conditions 
We consider three conditions that might influence patent grant success at 
organizational level. These conditions were based on qualitative evidence 
from the interviews and archival data. 
 
Centralization 
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The first condition, centralization, measured the degree of centralization of 
decision making. Through iterations of coding, we created a systematic 
classification of the centralization of decision-making. On one side, decision-
making can be totally centralized for both R&D units and IP department. On 
the other side, decision making for both R&D and IP is decentralized to 
peripheral units. In between we can find some intermediate situations in 
which: i. Decision-making is mostly centralized for both the IP and R&D, but 
this latter has also some minor decentralized entities; ii. IP unit maintains a 
centralized decision making structure, while the R&D follows an hybrid 
structure, but overall there is a partial predominance of centralized decision 
making; iii. Both IP and R&D follows a hybrid decision making structure; iv. 
Decision-making referable to both R&D and IP is partly decentralized apart 
a minor form of decisional power coming from a superior unit. We perform a 
fuzzy set calibration ranging from 1, for high degrees of centralization, to 0 
when decision-making is decentralized. We calibrated intermediate levels of 
decision making as depicted in table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Criteria Used for Calibrating the Condition ‘Centralization’ 
 
Calibration Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
Fully out 
(0.0) 
R&D is decentralized and IP is 
decentralized. Decision making power is 
decentralized to the single units. 
(11) "Decentralized; separation": The R&D is decentralized. The IP department works as separate stand-
alone unit. At the corporate level they have two main IP departments, one for pharmaceutical and the other 
one for performance materials;  
(13) "Split; IP mirrors R&D": R&D is built on separate and independent units for each stage of research. 
Each R&D centre has its own IP department. It is the R&D that has decisional power on technological and 
patenting directions. The decentralized IP department has control of the IP budget;  
(16) "Nested structure; separation": The R&D is decentralized in three main units. The IP department is 
organized in two decentralized units: one that advises the first research unit and the other one for the other 
two R&D departments 
Mostly but 
not fully out 
(0.2)  
R&D and IP are partly decentralized, but 
there is a minor form of decisional 
power coming from a superior unit 
(6) "Separation; centralization": The R&D has a matrix structure while the IP department has a centralized 
organization that supports the entire group. R&D has a central corporate centre and then it is organized on 
a decentralized structure. IP is a separate group respect to R&D and it is centrally directed with some 
activities managed centrally and others (for example, patent registration) at decentralized level;  
(8) "Autonomy; matrix; exclusive control; internal hybrid": Both the R&D and the IP of the Healthcare 
division are disconnected from the headquarter. In the subunit, the IP mirrors the structure of the R&D: in 
the sub-unit the main activities are centrally located while implementing and development tasks on local 
sites with a dedicated IP centre connected to support locally. 
More or less 
out (0.4)  
R&D and IP have an hybrid structure 
Some decisions are taken at 
decentralized level 
(1) "Hybrid; separate control; matrix": The R&D is divided into multiple technological platforms that 
handle the development while pure research is mostly at corporate level. The IP department has a hybrid 
structure, in which some functions are either held centrally (almost the majority of the ownership) or into 
the business units (e.g. decisions concerning the technological directions), which in some cases can be 
also the owners of technologies and patents. Filing is performed locally, while prosecution is centralized. 
(3) "Matrix:" The R&D is based on three main corporate platforms that then separate into dedicated 
research subunits. The IP department is organized in a common shared platform for all the units.  
(19) "Matrix; hybrid; global for several": R&D has a hybrid structure with 6 main geographical centres. 
The IP unit has an hybrid structure with two main corporate centres and then decentralized centres closed 
to main research centres. 
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More or less 
in (0.6)  
R&D has an hybrid structure and IP is 
centralized. There is a partial 
predominance of centralized decisional 
power 
(2)"Centralization; corporate department; authority at divisional level": The R&D is centralized but 
business divisions have their own research centre with decisional power. IP is nested into the corporate 
R&D. Key decisions are taken by CTO;   
(4)"Local and central; centralized structure": The R&D has a matrix structure while the IP department has 
a centralized organization that supports the entire group. R&D has a central corporate centre and then it is 
organized on a decentralized structure. IP is a separate group respect to R&D and it is centrally directed 
with some activities managed centrally and others (for example, patent registration) at decentralized level;  
(5) "Local and central; centralized structure": R&D has a hybrid organizational structure based on 
geographical dimensions, while IP is centrally organized;  
(9)"hybrid; sister organizations; decision making at the headquarter": The R&D has a hybrid structure 
based on technology platforms with the main research function at the headquarter; The IP department is 
centralized at the headquarters and serves all the departments; Decisions concerning the IP management 
are taken centrally;  
(10)"hybrid; centralization; pyramid": R&D has a hybrid structure based with corporate basic research and 
thematic decentralized labs in geographic areas. The IP is organized at corporate level;   
(12) "Global for several; general responsibilities": The R&D has an hybrid structure based on three main 
platforms, while the IP is centrally organized with global responsibilities;   
(17)"tension global/local; IP structure in response to R&D structure; hybrid; moving from vertical to 
horizontal framework":  R&D is built on a matrix based global/local dimensions. Research programs are 
global, but there is global staffs that is decentralized locally. The IP department follows the same logic by 
patenting locally and cross-sectional.   
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Mostly but 
not fully 
in(0.8)  
R&D is mostly centralized with minor 
decentralized entities. IP is centralized. 
Decision making is mostly central. 
(7)"hybrid; centralization ": R&D is organized mostly centrally with some decentralized units. IP unit is 
centrally located and it is fully independent from all other unit with autonomy over IP budget;   
(14) "matrix; centralization of IP; top executives on decisions": The R&D has a hybrid structure based on 
technology platforms with the main research function at the headquarter and then ; The IP department is 
centralized at the headquarters and serves all the departments; Decisions concerning the IP management 
are taken centrally; 
(15)"Hybrid; individual programs; centralization": The R&D is based on three main corporate platforms 
with basic research centralized and decentralized units at the business levels. The IP department is centrally 
organized and totally autonomous;  
(18) "Separation; matrix; central group": R&D works with both a centralized unit, which provides general 
research with a mid-long term horizon, and minor research units that are in charge to develop projects 
locally and to specific needs in the short term. IP is centrally organized with local presence of IP attorneys 
for patent drafting. Decision making is taken centrally by the head of IP for both the IP and R&D. 
Fully in (1)  R&D is centralized and IP is centralized. 
Decision making power is centrally 
located. 
(20) "Proximity; centralization; stand-alone": The R&D is centralized and is in the same building of IP, 
which is a centralized and stand-alone unit. The CEO, Head of R&D and Chief IP executive take decisions 
at central level. 
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Cross-functionality 
The second measure, cross-functionality, was based on evidence that relates 
to the degree of interactions among different functions in the patenting 
process. On one side, it emerged that companies segregate the IP and R&D 
into two separate functions that communicate through the establishment of an 
internal cross-functional board, where scientists and patent attorneys jointly 
monitor the patenting process. On the other side, companies organize R&D 
and IP into the same function and the process is internally managed without 
any interaction with other functions such as legal or finance. In between, 
companies might present intermediate degrees of cross-functionality: i. R&D 
and IP are maintained as two separate but highly interacting functions, 
without the intervention of a cross-functional board; ii. R&D and IP are two 
functional silos and interactions with other functions can occur on demand; 
iii. R&D and IP are two different functions, which interact based on case-to-
case necessity, but involvement with other functions such as business or legal 
is very limited; iv. R&D and IP are in the same functions and involvement 
with other functions is very limited on necessity when internal information 
and knowledge is not sufficient. We performed a fuzzy set calibration ranging 
from 1, for high degrees of cross-functionality, to 0 when R&D and IP are in 
the same function without any external interaction. We calibrated 
intermediate levels of decision making as depicted in the table 2.2.
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Table 2.2 Criteria Used for Calibrating the Condition ‘Cross-functionality’ 
 
 
 
Calibratio
n 
Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
Fully out 
(0.0)  
R&D and IP are in the same 
functions. Patenting practices do not 
include any involvement with 
members from other functions 
(2)"embedded IP; local head of IP is in between": IP is nested in the R&D and works on the 
objectives designed by the R&D. The process is coordinated by a divisional IP manager that needs 
to keep the contacts with the central IP group and the business division;  
(10)"divisional patent committee; there to file": IP is nested in the R&D function. Scientists submit 
the invention to a patent board internal to his or her research function;  
(18) "Dedicated group; no interaction; tension corporate/local; personal scope": IP is a unique thing 
with R&D and they rarely interact across business divisions, while there is a strong interaction 
within the same division between scientists and patent attorneys. 
 
Mostly 
but not 
fully out 
(0.2) 
R&D and IP are in the same 
functions. Involvement with other 
functions is very limited and induced 
by necessity when internal 
information and knowledge is not 
sufficient 
(3)"co-location; complement each other": IP is a centralized legal platform that serves the three 
research centres. Interaction is generally between the dedicated attorney and the scientist who are 
co-located. Interaction with the business unit is limited to the final stages and it is rare; 
(15)"different functions; autonomy; discretionary request for coordination": Patenting and Research 
are two different functions. After the submission of the idea to patent attorney, assigned IP attorney 
is totally in charge of the process and has the discretionary power to ask for additional consultation. 
Interactions with other functions are generally developed in a strategic phase (with the definition of 
patent strategy document) instead of application stage. Scientists and attorneys are in two different 
locations;  
(16)"nested; dedicated members; 1-to-1; co-location": IP department is nested in the research unit 
that is supporting. Relationship mainly remains in the same function where attorney and scientist 
collaborate in a one-to-one basis. Interactions with other functions are limited to spotted cases that 
require more information;  
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Calibratio
n 
Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
(19)"internal coordination; coordination through local presence": IP is nested in the R&D function. 
Involvement among functions relate members of research with product categories' managers, patent 
attorneys support this interaction as members of research; 
(20) "R&D pushes into IP; forced to coordinate": IP is nested in the R&D. The R&D is required to 
engage with the IP. Coordination is induced. IP department nested in the R&D and there is any 
integrated interconnection with marketing or business side. The R&D demands to engage with the 
IP. Coordination is induced; 
 
More or 
less out 
(0.4)  
R&D and IP are two different 
functions. Involvement with other 
functions different from research and 
IP is very limited. 
(14) "R&D asks to IP depending on common sense; R&D pushes into IP": IP and R&D are two 
separate functions. Both the R&D development and the discovery team are required to engage with 
IP function. The IP function interacts with business entities for troubles. Both the Head of R&D 
and the Chief IP Officer report to the CEO. It is the R&D that decides when to interact with IP and 
then the IP can proceed by itself in the process; 
 
More or 
less in 
(0.6)  
R&D and IP are two different 
functions. Involvement of the IP is 
not rare but on demand from other 
functions 
(1)"supporting; on demand involvement": Patenting function is part of the legal department at it is 
mostly at the corporate level. R&D function and business development function are focused on 
innovation pipeline. During the developmental stage, engineers and business managers interact with 
the patent attorney. IP department is kept informed of all the on-going projects and asked to 
intervene when needed in case they have the sensation that they would have to solve a patenting 
issue;  
(5)"Problem in disclosure; technical language; isolation of IP unit; tricky bridge with scientists and 
businesses; patent attorney needs to know a little bit of everything": IP department is part of the 
legal function. IP department is isolated and responsible of patenting filing activities; they serve the 
patent filing activity through a legal perspective; interaction with the business side through 
gatekeepers on demand; the interaction is mostly internal in the IP department between the Chief 
IP Officer -who has both a technical and legal background- and the patent attorneys -who have legal 
background;  
(11)"temporary membership; by invitation; driven by": IP department is a separate function that 
align and follows other divisions of the organization: research, commercial team, marketing, etc. 
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Calibratio
n 
Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
Interactions are limited to the extent to which is necessary and it is based on temporary membership. 
Further interaction might be requested for specific purposes and it is always on demand;  
(13) "IP mirroring R&D; supporting; we are legal": The IP department is part of the legal unit, but 
works very close to the R&D as supportive function. Despite the fact that IP is nested into the legal 
function, they do not have connections with other lawyers (for instance trademark). The senior 
management of these departments sit on the same Legal Leadership Teams to coordinate what their 
departments are doing. Scientists start patent process. Within the organization, patent attorney 
support scientists depending on particular disease area. Business units do not interfere in the patent 
process but just in the portfolio revision; 
 
Mostly 
but not 
fully in 
(0.8)  
R&D and IP are two different 
functions. Interaction is very intense 
and continuous but the involved 
groups never bond in a cross-
functional team 
(4)"internal negotiation; internal reporting; patent common activity": IP department is a separate 
division respect the R&D, but the process is highly integrated. In each division they have co-located 
IP employees that work together with R&D personnel. Every research centre has to report to the 
corporate head of IP;  
(12) "Multiple functions in the IP department; forecasting; squeezing ideas; extracting ideas from 
R&D programs": Patenting function is part of the legal department but works very close to R&D 
and has a proactive role in harvesting innovation. They make a pre-filter on where to look for ideas 
through a search function and they do estimate where good ideas come from. Patenting teams are 
separated by technologies and they do not interact with each other. Members in the patenting 
functions are lawyers with a technical background;  
(17) "Supporting R&D; multiple functions in the IP department; look for applications depending 
upon expertise": The IP department is part of the legal unit, but works very close to the R&D as 
supportive function. Despite the fact that IP is nested into the legal function, they do not have 
connections with other lawyers (for instance trademark). Patent filing derives from a back and forth 
process between the scientist and the local attorney, who is supported by the global team, which 
supervises the areas. Patent attorney discusses the patent filing with the R&D project leader and 
product manager; 
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Calibratio
n 
Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
Fully in 
(1.0)  
R&D and IP are two different 
functions. Involvement is 
maintained through the process with 
the definition of a an internal cross 
functional board. 
(6)"work with one group; jump between groups; input of scientist": IP department is separate from 
the R&D, but the process in highly integrated with a close interaction between the scientist, the 
dedicated lawyer and members of the R&D and IP who attend the scope meeting. There is an 
internal senior IP manager that makes sure there is a proper coordination among groups;   
(7)"case core responsible; involvement; joint responsibilities": Research and IP are two separate 
functions. Main patenting trajectories are decided by an executive team formed by R&D, business, 
IP and CEO. Patenting application is a process inserted in a research project. Patenting project has 
a project leader and it needs to be discussed in front of committee with attorneys and scientists;  
(8)"Complementary disclosure; Board; closeness to technology; close to marketing; cross-unit 
involvement": IP department works with R&D members in the process of patent harvesting and 
registration through a Board. The IP department interacts with business managers and marketing 
managers for the development of design patents;  
(9)"ad-hoc team; technology matrix; mutual objects": Patenting and Research are two different 
functions. In the patenting process, organizational experts from different fields interact from the 
disclosure up to the registration. 
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Coordination by plan 
The third measure, coordination by plan, was based on the degree of adoption 
of formal channels, structured procedures and tools to communicate during 
the patenting process. On one side, companies can decide to process all the 
patenting steps through the use of platforms, standardized communication 
channels, software and tools. Therefore, the sharing of information follows a 
structured and planned approach. On the other side, coordination and 
communication on patenting process can develop exclusively through 
informal and unstructured channels. Alternatively, companies can adopt 
intermediate degrees of structured coordination: i. the patenting process is 
mediated by formal communication but occasional and unstructured sharing 
of personal information might occasionally occur; ii. Coordination develops 
through formal channels, which are integrated in some occasions with some 
forms or informal sharing of information and informal mechanisms; iii. 
Coordination develops mostly through informal channels, but the preliminary 
phases of patent application are structured through a lean form of formal 
mechanisms; iv. Coordination develops mostly through informal channels 
and means, apart for patent dismissal, which make use of formalized 
procedures and tools. We performed a fuzzy set calibration ranging from 1, 
for high degrees of coordination by plan, to 0 when coordination is mostly 
unstructured and unplanned and communication occurs through informal 
interactions. We calibrated intermediate levels of decision making as depicted 
in table 2.3 
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Table 2.3 Criteria Used for Calibrating the Condition ‘Coordination by Plan’ 
 
Calibration Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
Fully out 
(0.0) 
Coordination and communication 
develops exclusively through 
informal channels. 
(4)"interaction on the board; personal talk; daily conversation": Coordination and communication develop 
through personal interactions and daily face-to-face meetings;  
(5)"speaking with clients; pendulum; informal means": Coordination is based on personal interactions, 
mails, and meetings. There is not a clear formalized plan;   
(16)"meeting to reach consensus; discussion": Coordination and communication develop through meetings 
and unstructured conversations. Through meetings they formalize their strategy and future actions;  
(20)"no tools; speaking with clients; culture of IP": No platform but communication through personal 
interactions. 
Mostly but 
not fully out 
(0.2) 
 Coordination and communication 
develops mostly through informal 
channels and means, apart for patent 
dismissal, which make use of 
formalized procedures and tools. 
(1)"internal conversation; discussion": Once the strategy document is approved, coordination is achieved 
mostly through internal discussion and local patent attorneys can file patents on the behalf of central IP 
unit.  
(6)"talk and discuss; memos of invention; ask to people": Coordination and communication develop 
through personal channels and informal conversations. People sit and talk. Formal documents are the 
outcomes of an informal communication that develops through different meetings.  
(11)"face-to-face": Coordination and communication develop through personal interactions and daily face-
to-face meetings. Once per year there is an official report that conveys main strategic directions and plans   
(13)" informal and interactive communication; no IP plans": Interactions are maintained through personal 
communication. The Head of IP meets regularly with the executive management either in ad hoc meetings 
to discuss key issues or in regular meetings. They have an internal platform just to post dismissing patents.  
More or less 
out (0.4) 
Coordination and communication 
develops mostly through informal 
channels, but the preliminary phases 
on patent application are structured 
through a lean form of formal 
mechanisms. 
(2)"seat together; formal and informal; mix of tools": Coordination and communication is based on 
personal interactions between the scientists and the IP manager, but since the process is highly outsourced 
they have an internal IP tool to keep track of the process, communicate and coordinate; 
(3)"multiple layers; support; track KPIs; library": Coordination and communication is mostly through 
persona interaction at the lowest level, which means between scientist and lawyer. Yet on the corporate 
level they try to coordinate and make sense through internal formalized reports on research KPIs. 
(7)"no tools; proximity; personal informal channels": There is a general plan to develop patenting and 
technological trajectories, but then practical implementation is developed through informal communication 
channels.  
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Calibration Criteria Cases with codes and explanation of the context 
(8)"coordination through calls; always the same written information": General platform to access to state 
of art across groups. Sharing of unique formalized documents. Communications through monthly calls and 
personal meetings.  
(12)"multiple coordination mechanisms; formal tools; informal and personal interaction; chatting": 
General platform to access to state of art across groups. Sharing of unique formalized documents. 
Communications through monthly calls and personal meetings. 
(14)"informal and interactive communication; no IP plans": Interactions are maintained through personal 
communication. The Head of IP meets regularly with the executive management either in ad hoc meetings 
to discuss key issues or in regular meetings. They have an internal platform just to post dismissing patents.  
More or less 
in (0.6) 
 Coordination and communication 
develops through formal channels, but 
those latters are combined in some 
occasions with some forms or 
informal sharing of information and 
informal mechanisms. 
(19)"on line tools; automation; meeting and talking": Coordination and communication is firstly 
transmitted through platforms and structured channels that can be benchmarked with KPIs. On a side, they 
develop also personal communication and informal coordination. 
Mostly but 
not fully in 
(0.8) 
 all the process is mediated by formal 
communication and personal informal 
communication is rare 
(10)"submission; feedback": Coordination is mostly based on submission mechanisms through internal 
platforms and formal feedbacks. They use also phone calls when it is not possible organizing personal 
meetings with decentralized inventors.  
(15) "Separation; formalization": Patenting process is based on formalized plan. Patenting process is 
transmitted through separate functions located in different geographical areas.  
(17)"formal interactions; boundaries; formal rules": All the process is mediated by a formal procedure that 
patent attorney needs to follow. Face to face interaction with scientists is rare.  
(18)"on line tools; automation; meeting and talking": Coordination and communication is transferred 
through platforms and structured  channels that can be benchmarked with KPIs. In addition, they develop 
also personal communication and informal coordination. 
Fully in 
(1.0)  
Coordination and communication in 
the patenting process develops 
exclusively through formal channels, 
structured procedures and tools 
(9)"tools; highly automated process": Patenting process is transmitted through the use of internal platforms 
and tools only.  
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We consider two conditions to control how characteristics of the technology 
portfolio that might influence the achievement of fast patent grants: forward 
patent citations and past patent lags (Conti, Gambardella, & Novelli, 2013; 
Giuri et al., 2007; Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2001; Somaya, 2012). We based 
these conditions on USPTO patent data. 
 
Patent citations  
Citations received from subsequent patents and examination reports are an 
indicator of the influence of the underling inventions to the state of art in a 
certain technological industry. Previous literature demonstrated that a larger 
number of patent citations reflects a valuable patent portfolio (Harhoff, 
Scherer, & Vopel, 2003). Furthermore, patents with higher citations tend to 
have a lower duration in the process of patent grant (D. Harhoff & Wagner, 
2009), because applicants are more inclined in submitting well-written and 
complete applications for those inventions that are considered core to protect 
or penetrate a strategic market. Thus, taking into account the incentives of the 
applicants, we can infer that companies with higher patent citations have a 
more valuable patent portfolio and conscious approach towards IP generation 
and protection, and submit strong applications, which have better chances to 
have a positive outcome in the patent granting process. For each firm we 
measured the average number of patent citations from years 1991 to 2014. 
We selected 1991 as starting point because of data availability. We then 
transformed the variable into a fuzzy set using the first, third and fourth 
quintile for full membership, crossover point of maximum ambiguity and full 
non-membership.  
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Patent lag 
We relied on patent lags to monitor past patenting capabilities. The main idea 
is that if a patent is the outcome of a well-designed process, integrating 
technical knowledge with legal capabilities and business awareness, it might 
be particularly well-drafted, leading to a stronger application that is less likely 
to be rejected or undergo lengthy revision. Therefore, minimizing the time 
from filing to grant is generally in the interest of patent applicants (Harhoff 
& Wagner, 2009; Jaffe, 1986; Reitzig, Henkel, & Heath, 2007). Accordingly, 
for values of patent lag closer to zero we might expect a more efficient 
patenting process, which then should be reflected in a positive outcome. For 
each firm we estimated the average patent lag from years 1991 to 2011. We 
selected 2011 as the final year to avoid overlapping with the measure fast 
grant achievement. We then transformed the variable into a fuzzy set using 
the first, third and fourth quintile for full membership, crossover point of 
maximum ambiguity and full non-membership. 
 
2.3.3. Analysis  
 
After the calibration of fuzzy sets, the second step in performing an 
fs/QCA involves the construction of the truth table. The truth table lists all 
the 2k possible configurations of conditions, where k is the number of causal 
conditions used in the analysis. Following previous research (Greckhamer, 
2011; Ragin, 2006; Ragin, 2008), we specified a consistency threshold equal 
to 0.9 to select the configurations reliability associated with one of the 
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outcomes. Consistency refers to “the degree to which instances of an outcome 
agree in displaying the causal condition” (Ragin, 2008: 44). 
The next step involves the Boolean minimization of the truth table 
through the Quine-McClutskey algorithm in order to obtain both the 
parsimonious and intermediate solutions. This procedure is based on the 
analysis of counterfactuals and has the advantage of reducing the complexity 
of resulting configurations by distinguishing between “easy” and “difficult” 
counterfactuals (Ragin, 2008). Counterfactual analysis is justified in 
situations of limited diversity and small sample size (Fiss, 2011; Soda & 
Furnari, 2012), therefore it perfectly suits our study. Indeed, the analysis is 
grounded on the comparison of “parsimonious” and “intermediate” solutions. 
Parsimonious solutions include all simplifying assumptions independently 
from easy or difficult counterfactuals, while intermediate solutions are based 
only on easy counterfactuals. On one side, easy counterfactuals refer to 
situations, in which a redundant causal condition is included in a set of causal 
conditions that already lead to the outcome in question. On the other side, 
difficult counterfactuals refer to situations in which a condition is removed 
from a set of causal conditions leading to an outcome on the assumption that 
this condition is redundant. The selection of simplifying assumptions follows 
the general recommendation of using both an in-depth comprehension of 
cases and theoretical knowledge to craft intermediate solution terms 
(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, 2013; Soda & Furnari, 2012). The appendix 
documents how we established easy counterfactuals in the intermediate 
solutions. Drawing from counterfactual analysis, we were able to identify 
core and peripheral conditions that lead to high and low membership of fast 
Chapter 2 
59 
 
patent grant achievement. Core conditions are included in both parsimonious 
and intermediate solutions, while the peripheral conditions are eliminated in 
the parsimonious solutions. This approach permits to highlight the strength of 
the evidence relative to the outcome. 
 
2.4. Results 
 
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics, while table 2.5 displays the 
results associated to fast patent grant achievement. We also performed 
analysis on the negation of outcome –i.e. slow patent grant achievement- and 
related configurations are displayed on table 2.6.  
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Table 2.4 Descriptive statistics 
Conditions Cases mean sd median trimmed mad min max range skew kurtosis se 
centralization 20 0.515 0.3232646 0.6 0.525 0.37065 0 1 1 -0.25223386 -1.1930658 0.07228416 
cross_functional 20 0.52 0.3577709 0.6 0.525 0.59304 0 1 1 -0.05031153 -1.4965625 0.08 
plan 20 0.39 0.3007009 0.4 0.375 0.29652 0 1 1 0.34491008 -1.0132539 0.06723877 
past_lag 20 2.3 1.3416408 2 2.375 1.4826 0 4 4 -0.15155572 -1.3000926 0.3 
citations 20 2.1 1.4473206 2 2.125 1.4826 0 4 4 -0.16426125 -1.4321282 0.32363072 
fast_grant_achievement 20 1.9815 0.5485893 1.975 1.95625 0.704235 1.18 2.94 1.76 0.19446428 -1.3556114 0.12266831 
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In displaying our results, we follow the approach of Ragin and Fiss 
(2008) by presenting the intermediate solutions consisting of core and 
peripheral conditions. The peripheral conditions are represented by smaller 
symbols than the core conditions. Finally, the presence of condition is 
indicated with a black circle, while a while circle signals the absence of a 
condition.  
In searching for configurations associated with fast and slow patent grant 
achievement, we ran two separate analyses. We firstly examined how fast 
patent grant achievement derives from the combination of organizational 
configurations and a highly valuable technology portfolio, measured by the 
citations received by the patent portfolio. This analysis aims at controlling for 
the joint effect of organizational dimensions and innovative characteristics of 
the patent portfolio on the outcome. We then inspected how fast grant patent 
achievement is the outcome of the combinatory effect of organizational 
configurations and past patent process performance, measured by patent lags. 
This analysis is aimed at controlling the effect of past performance in the 
patenting process. We then evaluated how these configurations lead to slow 
patent grant achievement.  
 
2.4.1. Configurations that achieve fast patent grant as proxy for value 
appropriation from innovation 
 
The results in table 2.5 show that the overall solution that explains the 
joint effect of organizational configurations and of the value of patent the 
portfolio has a consistency of 0.975 and a coverage equal to 0.683. The 
solution that unfolds the combinatory action of organizational configurations 
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and patent lags has a consistency of 0.88 and coverage equal to 0.678. Both 
those consistency thresholds are higher than the cut-off point suggested by 
literature (Fiss, 2011). In addition, coverage thresholds gave us confidence 
that the obtained solutions can find strong empirical exemplifications. We 
also report consistency and coverage for each individual configuration.  
 
The impact of organizational configurations and value of patent portfolio on 
fast grant achievement 
We found two configurations, 1 and 2, that explain the combinatory effect of 
centralization of decision making, cross-functionality, and coordination by 
plan and highly valuable patent portfolio. Configuration 1 (consistency 0.791) 
implies that when the portfolio does not have a high number of citations, 
centralization of decision-making of R&D is a sufficient yet non-core 
condition to achieve patent grant in a limited amount of time. This 
configuration holds regardless the presence or absence of cross-functionality 
of coordination by plan. Interestingly, this configuration partially revises 
previous studies that defined cross-functionality as an antecedent of fast grant 
achievement (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009). Companies 15 and 18 belong to this 
configuration. Configuration 2 (consistency 0.89) demonstrates an alternative 
pattern that leads to fast patent grant achievement. It includes the presence of 
both centralization of decision making on R&D and cross-functionality and 
the absence of coordination by plan. All these conditions are core to the 
attainment of the outcome. Particularly, configuration 2 highlights how 
vertical and coordination mechanisms need to be jointly present to be 
effective in appropriate value from innovation, confirming our theoretical 
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speculation. It is also noteworthy that when cross-functionality is present, 
coordination by plan must be absent, stressing therefore the antithetic effect 
of these two horizontal coordination mechanisms to integrate distributed 
work and optimize interdependencies (Puranam, Raveendran, & Knudsen, 
2012; Srikanth & Puranam, 2011). Finally, configuration 2 holds regardless 
the number of citations received by the patent portfolio. Company 4 
represents this configuration. 
 
The impact of organizational configurations and patent lags on fast grant 
achievement 
We found configurations that lead to fast grant achievement through the 
integration of centralization of decision-making, cross-functionality, 
coordination by formal plans and past patent lags. These configurations aim 
at including the effect of past patenting performance in the cross-sectional 
analysis to understand if there is any systematic effect in the patenting process 
that should be considered across years. 
Configuration 3 (consistency 0.88) resembles on the presence of centralized 
decision-making and coordination by formal plans and the absence of cross-
functionality, regardless of patent lags. While centralization of decision 
making on R&D is a sufficient yet peripheral condition, the absence of cross-
functionality and the presence of coordination by plan are core to the 
outcome. This configuration holds independently of past performances in 
protecting inventions through intellectual property rights. As for 
configuration 2, the fast attainment of patent grant is based on the contribution 
of both vertical and horizontal coordination mechanisms. However, 
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configuration 3 highlights that if coordination by plan is present, then cross-
functionality must be absent. Thus, configuration 3 provides further insights 
on how coordination by plan and cross-functionality operate as substitutes 
rather than as complementary horizontal mechanisms. Two companies – 
notably, company 15 and 18- are represented by this configuration. 
We also found configuration 4 (consistency 0.89), which implies that fast 
grant achievement can be obtained through the presence of centralization of 
decision making on R&D and cross-functionality and the absence of 
coordination by plan. All of them are core and sufficient conditions to 
appropriate value from innovation. It is remarkable that configurations 2 and 
4 overlap with identical raw coverage scores (0.439), implying the uniqueness 
in their causal effect. It suggests that this configuration offers a sort of reliable 
recipe for reaching the outcome. Surprisingly, this configuration emerges as 
a causal pattern for fast grant achievement, regardless of every condition 
referable to innovation. In this sense, our results suggest that the joint 
presence of centralization of R&D and cross-functionality and the absence of 
coordination by plan play a core role in explaining the causal conditions that 
lead to value appropriation from innovation through the protection of 
intellectual property rights and independently of previous patenting 
performance and technological characteristics of patent portfolio. Company 
4 belongs to configuration 4. 
In sum, configurations 1 to 4 strongly emphasize how value appropriation 
from innovation through fast grant achievement depends on the joint effect of 
vertical and horizontal mechanisms. These configurations confirm previous 
studies on the relevance of the organizational structure of R&D as sufficient 
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causal mechanism to appropriate value from inventive effort through fast 
grant achievement (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Ashish Arora et al., 2014), 
yet the overall picture is more complex, as our findings highlight the 
complementary relevance of horizontal coordination mechanisms such as 
cross-functionality and coordination by plan. These latter do not operate as 
complements rather as substitutes to coordinate interdependencies. We found 
that companies 15, 18 and 4 are representative of the explained 
configurations. Given the small N-sample, it is worth highlighting that there 
are configurations that are partially overlapping in terms of cases covered, 
meaning that there are cases that adopt more than one configurations 
depending upon the inclusion of either citations or past patent lags as 
controlling conditions. Finally, we found that configuration 2 and 4 present 
the same combination of conditions, having both an overlapping raw 
coverage (0.439) and consistency (0.89) and being both represented by 
company 4. These findings let us believe that company 4 is a unique yet 
consistent example on how to obtain fast grant achievement and appropriate 
value from innovation. 
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Table 2.5 Fast patent grant achievement 
 
 
Analysis with 
citations 
  
Analysis with past patent 
lag 
 
1 2 
  
3 4 
centralization    centralization   
cross_functional 
   cross_functional   
Plan 
   plan   
Citations    past_lag   
Consistency 0.791 0.89 
 
Consistency 0.88 0.89 
Raw coverage 0.551 0.439 
 
Raw coverage 0.401 0.439 
Unique coverage 0.244 0.133 
 
Unique coverage 0.239 0.277 
Overall solution consistency 0.975 
 
Overall solution consistency 0.88 
Overall solution coverage 0.683 
 
Overall solution coverage 0.678 
Number of cases in the 
configuration 
9 
 
Number of cases in the 
configuration 
9 
 
Cases with positive outcome 15,18 4 
 
Cases with positive outcome 15,18 4 
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2.4.2. Configurations leading to slow grant achievement as proxy for low 
value appropriation from innovation 
 
 
Interestingly, in fuzzy set analysis the set of causal conditions leading 
to the presence of the outcome might differ from a set of conditions leading 
to outcome with not-high or low performance. These differences demonstrate 
the need to shift towards an asymmetric understanding of causality. We 
conducted fuzzy set analysis by modelling the negation of fast patent grant 
achievement. Results of the analysis are available in table 2.6.  
 
The impact of organizational configurations and citations on slow grant 
achievement 
We found two opposing configurations that explain the slow achievement of 
patent grants and thus a potentially low return from inventive activities when 
citations are included as condition for fuzzy set analysis. On one side, 
configuration 5 (consistency 0.964) predicts that the concomitant absence of 
cross-functionality and coordination by plan and the presence of a high 
number of patent portfolio citations are sufficient conditions of being 
ineffective in protecting the efforts on innovation, regardless the structure of 
R&D. Thus, configuration 5 implies that an organization might be ineffective 
in appropriating value from innovation if it fails at implementing at least one 
of the horizontal coordination mechanisms. Both the absence of cross-
functionality and coordination by plan are core sufficient conditions, while 
the presence of citations as condition is peripheral. In our sample, companies 
16 and 20 are representative cases for this configuration. On the other side, 
configuration 6 (consistency 0.886) offers an opposite explanation of low 
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value appropriation from innovation. In fact, when both the two horizontal 
coordination mechanisms are present in conjunction with high number of 
patent portfolio citations, the organization does not achieve fast patent grant, 
regardless the structure of the R&D. While cross-functionality and 
coordination by plan are core conditions, having a high number of citations 
in the patent portfolio is a peripheral condition for the achievement of the 
outcome. Company 9 is a representative case for this configuration.  
 
The impact of organizational configurations and patent lag on slow grant 
achievement 
Our analysis revealed two pathways that explain how companies are slow in 
obtaining patent grant when previous patent lags are taken into account. 
Configuration 7 (consistency 0.944) highlights that slow patent grant 
achievement is the outcome of the combination of both lack of cross-
functionality and coordination by plan, regardless the structure of the R&D 
and past patenting performance, measured by past patent lags. As for 
configuration 5, the lack of both horizontal coordination mechanisms is core 
for obtaining the outcome in configuration 7. Companies 16 and 20 are 
included in this configuration. We also found a second configuration –
configuration 8 (consistency 0.876) - associated with slow patent grant 
achievement. In this case, the presence of both cross-functionality and 
coordination by plan is core and sufficient for the realization of the outcome, 
while past patent lags are a peripheral condition. In this last configuration, 
company 17 features all the combination of conditions and achieves slow 
patent grant ratios.  
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Summarizing previous findings, our analysis suggests that slow patent grants 
as a measure for low value appropriation from innovation is generally due to 
the concomitant presence or lack of both horizontal coordination 
mechanisms, regardless of the organizational structure of R&D. These 
conditions hold also when the patent portfolio is considered valuable and after 
having controlled for past patenting performances. It is interesting noting that 
vertical horizontal mechanisms don’t need to be considered as antecedents of 
slow patent grant. Furthermore, we found that companies 9, 16, 17 and 20 are 
consistently associated to configurations leading to slow patent grant. 
Particularly, companies 16 and 20 emerge as exemplary cases of how to 
achieve slow patents grant due to lack of cross-functionality and coordination 
by plan when we included either the average number of citations or past patent 
lag in the analysis. It suggests that the absence of horizontal coordination 
mechanisms is a core antecedent to explain low capabilities to appropriate 
value from innovation. Moreover, companies 9 and 17 provide 
complementing configurations where the presence of both cross-functionality 
and coordination by plan are considered as core forerunner of incapability of 
appropriating value from innovation through a very slow process to obtain 
legal protection through intellectual property rights. This findings lead us 
assuming that cross-functionality and coordination by plan are not effective 
as complementary processes to appropriate value from innovation, yet they 
need to be adopted as substitutes as shown in configuration 1 to 4.  
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Table 2.6 Slow patent grant achievement 
 
 
Analysis with 
citations 
  
Analysis with past patent 
lag 
 
5 6 
  
7 8 
centralization 
   
centralization 
  
cross_functional    cross_functional   
Plan    plan   
Citations    past_lag   
Consistency 0.964 0.886 
 
Consistency 0.944 0.876 
Raw coverage 0.37 0.402 
 
Raw coverage 0.505 0.411 
Unique coverage 0.198 0.231 
 
Unique coverage 0.314 0.22 
Overall solution consistency 0.902 
 
Overall solution consistency 0.909 
Overall solution coverage 0.601 
 
Overall solution coverage 0.725 
Number of cases in the 
configuration 
9 
 
Number of cases in the 
configuration 
9 
Cases with positive outcome 16,20 9 
 
Cases with positive outcome 16,20 17 
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2.4.3 Firm-level illustration of the findings  
 
To further substantiate the different paths of causal combinations 
leading to both fast and slow patent grant achievement, we made a step further 
in trying to back up our configurational analysis with cases from our data 
collection. In particular, we describe cases 15 and 18 and then case 4 as 
examples to obtain fast patent grant to appropriate value from innovation. We 
contrast those cases with the example of cases 16 and 20 and then 9 and 17. 
Table 2.7 provides qualitative evidence on the cases.  
 
Cases 15 and 18 in configurations 1 and 3. Case 15 operates in the 
manufacturing industry in the production of small electronics, white goods, 
and communication appliances and over the last twenty years has been known 
as one of the most progressive companies in the organization of their IP 
departments, which has for example direct reporting lines to the corporate 
level. Case 18 operates in the information and media communication 
technology industry. It has been recently going through a major re-
organization where the leadership for R&D and IP functions has been merged 
in one pole with a high patenting background. Both cases work on patent 
processes through dedicated groups, which do not need any interaction with 
other functions because information and knowledge are extremely clustered 
in the IP department. Furthermore, these departments sustain a high degree of 
automation in the communication have developed formalized coordination 
channels and tools to create benchmarks. They also opted for a high degree 
of centralization in the decision-making process of R&D projects. Finally, it 
is worth noting that cases 15 and 18 operate in two different sectors: 
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manufacturing and information and communication technology. Thus, it is 
fair assuming that the configurations underlying the cases might be 
generalized across industries. 
Case 4 in configurations 2 and 4. Case 4 operates in the manufacturing 
industry with a leading position in the production of cameras and optical 
appliances and over the last ten years increasingly sustained the role of IP 
within the main organizational chart and clearly assigned role and 
responsibilities to IP department, which has a direct reporting line to the 
corporate level. Even if company 4 has a strong separation between the IP 
and R&D functions, the patenting process benefits from the co-location of 
personnel assigned to every single invention. Given such close physical 
proximity, company 4 decided not to implement any structured 
communication scheme or to adopt any tool to formalize the sharing of 
information related to the patenting process within the organization. Yet, a 
strong informal patenting culture and intense interaction facilitate the process, 
which remains highly centralized. 
Cases 16 and 20 in configurations 5 and 7. Cases 16 and 20 in configurations 
5 and 7 have been associated with slow patent grant achievement and low 
capability to appropriate value from innovation. Case 16 is a leading company 
in the pharmaceutical industry and divided its production lines into three main 
silos to develop dedicated research streams. The IP department does not 
follow the same organizational structure, yet is split according to 
geographical units. For each R&D unit, the IP department has an ancillary 
role. In fact, specialized patent attorneys are assigned to projects to assist 
scientists. Interestingly, cross-functionality and connections with the business 
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units are very limited, particularly for those patents that are still far from the 
commercialization phase. Given the very strong interaction between patent 
attorneys and scientists within the same function, company 16 did not develop 
any structured or formalized communication plan. Yet, the sharing of 
knowledge and information develops mostly through unstructured 
conversations and informal meetings. Company 20 operates in the healthcare 
industry and is leader in the production of hearing aids appliances. Case 20 
decided to organize the IP and R&D in the same function and limit the 
interactions with other functions, such as business or marketing. In addition, 
company 20 decided not to adopt any tool or platform to foster 
communication between scientists and patent attorneys or personnel 
connected to the patenting process.  
Case 9 in configuration 6 and case 17 in configuration 8. Case 9 and case 17 
are very similar and have been associated with slow patent grant achievement. 
While case 9 is one of the principal competitors in the ICT industry, with a 
specialization in software, case 17 is one of the leading companies in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Despite the huge importance given to the IP 
department and patenting process in general, both case 9 and 17 suffer from 
an automated and formalized coordination mechanism and a strong use of 
cross-functionality in the patenting process. For instance, in company 9 the 
patenting process is managed through a strong interaction among IP attorney, 
scientists and the business manager. Cross-functionality relies highly on face-
to-face interactions and personal feedback. However, attorneys and scientists 
are also asked to formalize all the information that they generate into an 
internal platform that transmits and organizes the network of various projects. 
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Precise standards enforce the criteria through which attorneys and scientists 
should coordinate through the use of formal platforms. Standards are set at a 
corporate level and are based on general planning. The simultaneous use of 
both cross-functionality and coordination by plan might have a detrimental 
effect as some spontaneous conversations might be lost once the parties are 
required to coordinate through standardized tools designed according to 
hierarchical planning. In case 17, the organization of the IP department is 
tailored according to geographical reach and scope of the R&D units. 
Scientists and patent attorneys tend to be co-located depending on research 
needs to foster personal communication and interactions, the patenting 
process is executed according to a ‘patent strategy document’, where junior 
attorneys are asked to execute the strategy, and the agreement of the global 
IP team, that supervises the different areas of research that need to be covered 
by legal protection. Also in case 17 we spot the tension between two 
conflicting coordinating mechanisms: cross-functionality at the decentralized 
research unit level and coordination by plan in the IP department. All in all, 
the concomitant existence of conflicting processes might slow down the 
patent application process and as a result decrease the capability of 
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Table 2.7 Qualitative evidence from cases 
 
ID case Centralization Cross-functionality Coordination by plan 
4 "The TC centre has 280 people that are 
divided into each R&D group or business 
units. Business units also have R&D 
functionalities, plus centralized R&D group 
is also like this, we are assigned to one 
central division to treat IP activity on each 
R&D group, so for example, basic or 
fundamental research is done in the 
centralized R&D unit and we assign 
something to the local IP head, for example 
the head of Malaysia, to discuss with the 
head of R&D to track down IP and R&D 
services, then simply in couples of business 
units we create the counterpart of the IP 
group in each business unit". (Head of IP 
Corporate Department) 
"A particularly unique initiative is the Patent 
Grade-Up Activity (PGA). Inventors, as well as 
other engineers, work together with intellectual 
property division personnel to thoroughly discuss 
a single invention; This not only improves the 
quality of patents but also can lead to the creating 
of new inventions. Thanks to collaboration 
between the technology division and the 
intellectual property division, the company 
consistently ranks among the top U.S. patent 
recipients" (Company web site).  
"In each research centre they are all IP people and 
they have some rules to discuss with research 
engineers how to make patent strategy and then the 
centre needs to report to me" (Head of corporate 
IP department) 
"Mainly I try to talk with the responsible of 
patents in each business unit; fortunately the 
head of IP in the company is a board member, 
then other business units people are also 
board members, so therefore we have almost 
daily meetings with them in the morning and 
I would talk with them and confirm my 
strategy and my problems with them or not" 
(VP corporate IP department) 
15 "We are probably closer to the hybrid 
structure. We have central research and the 
product develop is with business 
division...For that (i.e. patenting activity) 
we have the organization I am part of, the 
IP&S, which is a stand-alone organization." 
(Senior IP attorney) 
"Each group, each R&D group would normally 
have one or more people responsible for it within 
the IP organization. It is part of the job of the IP 
to work out what is coming out, what level of 
protection is needed and make sure that the 
research is aware of what can be patent and how 
to go about it. They do not actually work in the 
research group but they have their own 
responsible for IP. They would meet with 
inventors and have discussion with management 
and so on, but it is physically a separate 
organization. The offices of the IP people are in 
the IP building and not mixed." (Senior IP 
attorney) 
"Decision to patent a particular invention 
rests with IP counsel assigned to handle that 
invention. In taking the decision, IP counsel 
consults relevant people within the company 
taking into account the overall filing plan of 
the field to which the invention pertains. The 
relevant IP manager makes the filing plan 
every year. The filing plan is based on the IP 
strategy which in turn is based on the 
business strategy." (Senior in-house IP 
attorney) 
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ID case Centralization Cross-functionality Coordination by plan 
18 "We have a global R&D that scans the 
global R&D opportunities and then we have 
a decentralized R&D structure based upon 
regional expertise and subject matters 
expertise within the overarching 
umbrella…In response to hybrid (R&D) 
organization, we have hybrid (IP) system" 
(Chief IP Officer for America.) 
"We have a matrix design: one access is 
geographical location and another array on 
the matrix is functional responsibility of the 
particular group". (VP patent department for 
emerging markets) 
"The are separate, they are not silos, but you 
know, the very business groups are very different 
and there is not so much interaction between the 
dedicated R&D group in each business division, 
apart some very specific cases. […] Patent 
attorneys you know have a kind of personal 
scope, that is that each patent attorney is 
dedicated to work with one R&D team mainly, 
this is how it works, so it is an R&D community 
that knows who is the patent controller in charge 
for the area" (Senior IP manager) 
"We have set up an online tool for meetings 
and inventions, so it is totally automated, so 
there is the portal, the inventor portal, the 
inventor goes to that portal, there is a form 
to be completed, a document to be attached 
and then later you have a workflow, so it is 
automatically addressed to a patent manager. 
[...] so, there is a process automated, we 
have KPIs on each quarter and during the 
disclosure we look at where they are, where 
they do come fro, what they are related to so 
we can transform this into the patent 
project...[...] there other initiatives that I 
would say, have been launched, because it is 
difficult to stay on top of everything, that it 
why it is important to meet with people and 
to talk and  always having the idea that you 
want to know more about projects" (Senior 
IP manager) 
16 "Even if the company is worldwide, there 
are two major quarters: one in diagnosis and 
one is pharmaceutical. I work for the 
pharma group and I have really nothing to 
do with the diagnostic, which is an 
organization on its own, so we are like two 
groups" (Head of IP department in pharma 
division) 
"For example, you have 8 patent people in charge 
for a certain area or research and they are doing a 
patent in a specific area, then the other patent 
people might work on sub-projects in that area 
[...] because you have separate patent attorneys in 
that particular area of research. [...] We have 
pretty much one to one relationship, so if the 
scientists come up with some inventions or if the 
scientist on the other side is worried about 
freedom to operate, and we want to know if I 
want to patent something, can I do that?...so, you 
need a person from the patent group that needs to 
go through what they ask and work together to 
generate patent application, look for prior art" ( 
Head of IP department in Pharma division) 
"We actually have maybe a meeting to get 
approval every months and so the patent 
attorney would come and say 'ok, I have 2 
applications that I want to write' and they 
would discuss what the applications would 
deal and the general technology. And then 
they would discuss 'ok, we are fine with that' 
or 'we can use it for something else?' 
sometimes you have multiple inventions at 
the same time and you need to shift 
resources to cover everything or you need to 
give priority to the others and it would be 
decided by this group meeting that they have 
every month" (Head of IP department in 
Pharma division) 
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ID case Centralization Cross-functionality Coordination by plan 
20 "Basically we are stand alone...We handle all 
the R&D at the headquarter, where the patent 
department is based too and we are not too 
far." Chief IP Officer 
"The IP department is embedded in the R&D 
department so we have the head of R&D managing 
the patent activity. Of course, sitting next door 
does not mean that you speak easily, but you have 
the opportunity. We are acting on R&D people 
innovation, we are not setting targets to them, they 
are coming to us and we are dealing from there. 
We are not really communicating (with other 
departments) and the reason is: it regards 
something that is just involved in the way we are 
dealing with inventions and patent prosecutions, 
so it is not really necessary involving externals" 
Chief IP Officer 
"Connections are more or less informal. We 
do not have any tool for doing the innovation 
harvesting. We had one Head that was 
honoured by EPO because they are very 
sensible to patents" Chief IP Officer. 
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ID case Centralization Cross-functionality Coordination by plan 
9 "We have centralized research and 
distributed development. Then we have a 
corporate team for patenting and licensing, 
then there is a legal team and a business 
team. We are separate but I call them “sister 
organizations” within corporate headquarter, 
they work very closely in particular with the 
centralized research, but we also work very 
close very closely with all the business units 
that generate patents and are responsible for 
business strategy. We have this ability to 
bring the appropriate decision makers from 
the business units together to talk to us when 
we have to make a decision" Chief IP Officer 
"We work rather close with the R&D team... we 
work out mutual objects...when we get an 
invention, we have teams within the company that 
are assigned to evaluate the invention that is 
submitted people are assigned to teams based upon 
on where in the business they work and by 
technology breakout for this is a kind of matrix. So 
a typical team would have a small digit number of 
people, usually they are not fixed but they would 
represent different parts of the business with 
expertise in the particular field of technology and 
on side with patent attorneys, and they will 
typically meet with the invents make sure that they 
understand what the invention is and they do some 
prior art search before or during that discussion" 
Chief IP Officer 
"We have our own set of tools that we 
developed in-house for managing our 
inventions’ pipeline and so our inventors are 
able to submit their inventions to us using our 
tools, and our tools automatically rout the 
description of the invention to the appropriate 
attorney and to an evaluation team, which 
includes tech and business evaluators, collect 
the feedbacks from that team and facilitates 
prior arts’ searching and for those which we 
automatically define to file patent application 
then facilitates drafting the description for 
patent application and monitor and the 
exchanges back and forth with the USPTO or 
with the other patents offices depending upon 
what feedback we obtained, and to keep track 
of our pipeline and to manage the 
maintenance fees. So, we have a highly 
automated process to go back and forth with 
our technical team to value their inventions, 
to file patents applications, to manage the 
portfolio after the patenting issues and so on." 
Chief IP Officer 
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ID case Centralization Cross-functionality Coordination by plan 
17 "We have a global R&D that scans the 
global R&D opportunities and then we have 
a decentralized R&D structure based upon 
regional expertise and subject matters 
expertise within the overarching 
umbrella…In response to hybrid (R&D) 
organization, we have hybrid (IP) system" 
Chief IP Officer for America.  
"We have a matrix design: one access is 
geographical location and another array on 
the matrix is functional responsibility of the 
particular group". VP patent department for 
emerging markets. 
"We organize ourselves by function and by there 
I mean that we have patent attorneys who are 
dedicated to the basic components of getting 
patents, so handling invention disclosure, 
working with scientists that come up with 
invention but we may see the patents, we have 
litigators and we have few people involved in 
licensing...There is a constant interaction. We 
have a document based on a form that we 
developed that guide the attorney though a 
discussion with a project leader for a particular 
project or the product managers for a product that 
is already on the market and for which there is 
continuing research" VP IP Officer, emerging 
market. 
"If you make a spectrum where you have 
completely informal and formal interactions, 
our case would probably falls 2/3 formal and 
1/3 informal. That is the basic relationship 
that patent attorneys have with scientists 
they serve...We have a relatively formalized 
process based on our overall patent strategy 
design, which we execute for each 
individual project." VP IP Officer, emerging 
markets. 
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2.5. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
This article seeks to build a bridge between the research on internal 
capabilities and practices to achieve value appropriation from innovation 
(Moeen et al., 2013; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; D. Somaya et al., 2007) with 
the fast growing literature on R&D organizational structure and its impact on 
innovation output (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Ashish Arora et al., 2011, 
2014). Previous literature explored horizontal coordination mechanisms such 
as cross-functionality and internal practices in the patenting value chain as 
antecedents of value appropriation from innovation (Mayer et al., 2012; 
Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; Somaya, 2012). An 
emerging stream of studies focused on the organization of the R&D and how 
this latter is a vertical coordination mechanism that influences the capability 
to appropriate returns from inventive efforts (Ashish Arora et al., 2014; 
Leiponen & Helfat, 2011). However, the organization is an interdependent 
system, where practices and structures need to be jointly considered as they 
are part of a coherent arrangement (Ménard, 2009). This study contributes to 
the extending body of literature by focusing on the complementarities of 
internal organizational practices as horizontal coordination mechanisms and 
the organizational structure as vertical coordination mechanisms as 
antecedents of value appropriation from innovation.  
We relied on comparative qualitative analysis of 20 cases operating in 
industries where obtaining patent protection is crucial to appropriate value 
from innovation, and focused on the organizational capabilities and 
architectures that allow to secure timely legal protection of the inventive 
efforts. Following a complementary logic, we found that organizations adopt 
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three different patterns to secure value from innovation by achieving a fast 
patent grant. Therefore, the first important finding consists in observing 
equifinality in the causal patterns that lead to fast patent grants achievement 
as proxy for value appropriation from innovation. This conclusion represents 
the pitfalls of reality, illustrates the complexity that arises from the 
intersection of organizational structures and practices, and it allows to 
perceive clearly that there is not a single recipe according to which companies 
should organize to be effective in value appropriation. In the three successful 
configurations of causal elements, centralization of R&D is a sufficient yet 
peripheral condition for obtaining fast patent grants. This finding is in line 
with previous evidence (Argyres & Silverman, 2004), yet challenges the 
importance of centralization of R&D, as it is not a core element for the 
achievement of fast patent grants. What is more, centralization of R&D could 
be complemented either by cross-functionality of different units or by 
coordination by plan, which are both core but disjoint conditions to achieve 
fast patent grants. Thus, horizontal and vertical mechanisms jointly intersect 
to appropriate value from innovation. Furthermore, our analysis depicts the 
antagonisms between cross-functionality and formal planning as coordination 
mechanisms. Thus, our study offers contribution to the literature on 
organizational design and innovation management (Puranam & Srikanth, 
2007; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; Srikanth & Puranam, 2011) by demonstrating 
another tension between cross-functionality and coordinating mechanisms in 
the design of interdependent tasks. What we observed is that companies that 
successfully obtain timely patent grant adopted cross-functionality and 
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coordination by plan as (perfect) substitutes instead of complementing 
coordinating mechanisms.  
Furthermore, we explored the causal conditions that are the origin of slow 
patent grants as proxy of incapability to appropriate value from innovation in 
a timely manner. This is a new perspective to tackle the problem of how to 
appropriate the value of innovation. Indeed, literature focused mostly on the 
attainment of positive performance in patenting and inventing, but researchers 
and practitioners can learn also from failures and errors of non-performing 
cases. We derived two theoretical configurations that explain low patent 
grant. In fact, we provided a minimized model and empirical evidence of at 
least one case, which demonstrated that the centralization of decision making 
is not a relevant condition and that the configuration failed to generate a 
positive outcome, despite a high degree of cross-functionality and 
coordination by use of platform and structured practices. We suggest that 
further studies can pursue this direction and explore more what are the causes 
of failure of value capture from innovation. 
Beyond theoretical implications, the research offers useful insights 
from a managerial perspective. Understanding the organizational 
implications of the patent processes is important for the world of practice, 
because of the high costs involved in patent granting (J. S. Gans et al., 2008; 
Guellec & van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000) and the threat of 
competitors benefiting from the disclosure of innovation in the time gap 
between the application and the grant (Graham & Hegde, 2015; Graham et 
al., 2015; Harhoff & Wagner, 2009). Interestingly, IP advisors highlight how 
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critical is uncertainty in patent grant and how companies must plan a strategic 
timeline in the patent applications process: 
 
 “I explain it as an “IP calendar”, where you sign what vegetables 
and other stuffs are missing from the kitchen. Companies need to understand 
that if their IP calendar were full of holes, it would drill down their time. So, 
for example, if you file an application, and you need to publish it but you do 
not obtain a patent, then you have published information that now is public 
and get nothing from it. You are basically disclosing your intellectual 
property; you are sharing information with suppliers, other companies, and 
manufacturers. So, a lot of companies do not fully understand and appreciate 
how devastating having a meeting with someone during the time when your 
invention is still pending”. Interview with Dr Sant, founder and managing 
director of White Light Consulting (IP consulting firm listed in 
IAMStrategy300), 11 July 2013 
 
While scholars highlighted some coordination mechanisms that link research 
units with business and legal experts in the process of IP generation, 
practitioners so far acknowledged that there is a number of models that 
organizations can adopt in order to appropriate value from innovation. 
 
“There is no one-size fits-all. They vary greatly in terms of how they organize 
their IP, how do they structure, how do they report, whether they are 
centralized or decentralized. I’ve seen a lot of different examples and there 
are lots of facts that you have to take into account when to organize your IP 
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department.” Interview with Mr O’Connell, founder and managing director 
of Chawton Innovation Services Limited (IP consulting firm listed in 
IAMStrategy300), 19 July 2013) 
 
We believe that our research can potentially shed light in this direction. On 
one side, it fair stating that there is a natural gap between normative 
explanation for managerial audience and empirical evidence on the vertical 
and horizontal coordination mechanisms to fast achieve patent grant. On the 
other side, the paper presents a methodological inquiry on the organizational 
dimensions that enforce patent generation process at the organizational level. 
Managers can benefit from a simplified yet exhaustive depiction of IP 
generation and protection and by the disclosure of three important dimensions 
–centralization of R&D, cross-functionality and coordination by plan- as 
cardinal mechanisms through which orient the actual practices related to 
patent granting. Forcing companies in making a conscious effort on their 
organizational design in terms of architectures and practices that are effective 
for IP strategic management should be encouraged, particularly in those 
industries such as pharmaceutical and ICT, where freedom to operate and 
prevention from infringement are guaranteed by the exclusive ownership of 
intellectual property rights. Furthermore, organizations should be aware that 
not all the configurations of mechanisms are effective in achieving a timely 
legal protection. Particularly, companies must be sensitive in fostering cross-
functional interactions among different units and the application of formal 
tools and procedures to coordinate scientists, legal experts, business 
management and other parts of the organization such as finance or corporate 
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levels. In fact, these two horizontal coordination mechanisms work through 
antithetic logics and redundancies or delays might arise.  
A final contribution of our study consists in highlighting how a 
qualitative comparative analysis can be useful to understand 
complementarities between practices and structure. In particular, we explore 
and map complementarities from a configurational perspective using a fuzzy 
set method. Research on organizational design and innovation management 
to date focused on econometric techniques and linear or curvilinear 
relationships between variables and the outcome. However, those techniques 
proved to be limited in the exploration of the interaction among multiple 
parameters (Fiss, 2007; Fiss, Sharapov, & Cronqvist, 2013). Instead, with 
fs/QCA it is possible analysing relationships and combination of causal 
mechanisms that go beyond for instance three-way interactions. Furthermore, 
for our research we relied on both quantitative features retrieved from a large 
sample of patents and rich qualitative evidence on the cases, which enabled a 
full speculation on the processes behind the coordination between R&D and 
IP units. Together with Somaya and colleagues (2007), our research is one of 
the few examples that triangulate quantitative and qualitative evidence 
despite this being quite powerful to tease out the mechanisms and associate 
these to performances. In fact, to the best of our knowledge previous studies 
on the organizational design and innovation management of intellectual 
property rights have mainly relied on single case studies (Reitzig, 2004), 
survey data (Pitkethly, 2001) or large datasets. In light of intriguing results 
obtained with fs/QCA, we would encourage future research on micro 
interdependencies in the structure and practices related value appropriation to 
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complement more systematically qualitative evidence with large quantitative 
studies.  
Finally our study is bounded by some limitations. First, we do not 
claim that the observed configurations are exhaustive or cover all 
contingencies. We ran sensitivity analyses with alternative specifications of 
causal conditions -for instance, the average number of patent families or 
standard deviations from the average number of families to measure the value 
of the patent portfolio. Indeed, patents included in the patent families are 
usually of greater value, because the patentee only takes the additional costs 
and delays of extending patent protection to other countries if it is 
prospectively worthwhile. Previous literature found a positive correlation 
between family size and the likelihood of a patent being granted (Guellec & 
van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2000). Fs/QCA analysis indicates an absence 
of a clear set-theoretical relationship when organizational configurations and 
patent families are used to explain fast patent grant achievement. In other 
words, there are many ways of positively performing depending on those 
conditions, but no consistent pattern. Thus, despite the effort of covering 
exhaustively the main causal mechanisms at the basis of value appropriation 
from innovation in the context of IP generation, we believe that a more 
comprehensive and extensive classification of practices and structures should 
be developed in future research and we hope to stimulate further studies in 
this direction. The second limitation of our study also relates to the 
configurations. In fact, we rely on the empirical analysis of a sample of 20 
cases. Given this number of cases, general theory on configurational analysis 
suggests analysing between three to four conditions (Greckhamer, Misangyi, 
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& Fiss, 2013; Ragin, 2008). In our study, we consider four conditions for a 
total of 24 configurations. If we were adding more conditions, the degree of 
complexity in the analysis and in the representation of results would increase, 
meaning that the number of counterfactuals –i.e. configurations not observed 
in reality yet still theoretically possible- would also increase, creating 
difficulties in the resolution of simplifying assumptions. A straightforward 
solution would be to increase the number of cases under investigation and to 
explore the role of additional categories. As for previous research (Reitzig & 
Puranam, 2009), we faced the difficulties of collecting rich and exhaustive 
data on the internal organization of IP generation and IP protection, so we 
limited our analysis once reached the sample saturation. In that regard, it is 
important to acknowledge our sample as representative both in terms of 
industry coverage as well as in terms of number of patent applications (on 
average 5%) filed at the US Patent Office in the study period. However, we 
hope that future research will take up this challenge. For instance, an 
interesting line of investigation would be the understanding the intersection 
between architectural structure and processes and practices after changes in 
the organizational structures and mergers, as this phenomenon is common 
especially in the pharmaceutical industry. This area of research would 
contribute to expand our understanding of interdependencies among different 
layers and how organizational changes trigger value appropriation from 
innovation in the case of IP generation and protection.  
In conclusion, despite some limitations, we believe that our study 
presents an interesting and innovative understanding of the configurations of 
horizontal and vertical coordination mechanisms at the ground of value 
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appropriation in the case of IP generation and IP protection. Furthermore, the 
research offers a novel and unique combination of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence and well as methodological contribution.  
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Chapter 3 Managing Technology Licensing: The IP Unit 
Perspective 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the management of the technology licensing process. 
Using multiple case studies, I found that capabilities and governance of 
decision making in technology licensing can be organized through two 
alternative configurations. In the first configuration, the management of 
licensing is based on a combination of internal flow of information, stand-
alone coordination mechanisms and inside-out negotiating capabilities, which 
are the capabilities to convince external partners of the validity of the 
technology. In the second configuration, licensing is orchestrated through an 
external flow of information, shared coordination mechanisms and outside-in 
negotiating capabilities, which are the capabilities to convince members of 
the same organization of the validity of the license agreement and to moderate 
the various internal debates related to the agreement. The difference in the 
two configurations can be traced back to the establishment of a nested 
licensing unit in the organizational structure, which highlights an overarching 
strategic intent of capturing value from innovation. This paper provides a 
micro analysis of the overall management of the technology licensing process 
and complements previous models for the organizational design of 
technology licensing decision making. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Activities in and attention to technology licensing are increasing. 
Recent statistics demonstrate that since the mid-1990s (Zuniga & Guellec, 
2009) the number of licensing agreements struck and the amount of revenues 
generated have risen across industries and countries: the annual value of 
transactions ranges from $25 to $35 billion in the United States and from $35 
to $50 billion globally (Ashish Arora, Fosfuri, & Gambardella, 2001). In 
parallel, researchers examined the motivations that prompt decisions to 
license with a particular focus on patent characteristics (Gambardella, Giuri, 
& Luzzi, 2007; Kim et al., 2006), expectations from commercialization 
(Nerkar & Shane, 2007), contractual characteristics (Anand & Khanna, 2000; 
Oxley, 1997), knowledge flow among parties (A. Agrawal, 2006; J. Oxley & 
Wada, 2009) and the creation of technological standards (Joshi & Nerkar, 
2011). 
Recently, scholars shifted their attention to organizational traits that 
might influence the decision to license technology. A first dimension that has 
been investigated is firm size. Researchers found that compared to large 
organizations, small firms with limited production capabilities are more likely 
to license out technology because they benefit from royalties while having 
inadequate possibilities for commercial exploitation (Gambardella et al., 
2007; Kollmer & Dowling, 2004). However, in a recent OECD survey, 
Zuniga and Guellec (Zuniga & Guellec, 2009) showed that the distribution of 
firms that license their patents is bimodal: both small and very large 
companies are willing to license their patents, while medium-sized enterprises 
are reluctant. Therefore, organizational size does not provide a clear-cut 
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explanation for the decision of large organizations to license, as empirical 
evidence presents unsystematic and complex patterns. One way to disentangle 
ambiguity would be to adopt a more fine-grained approach in order to 
understand whether these differences in the willingness to license can be 
explained by the management of technology licensing. On this count, 
Pitkethly’s seminal paper provided evidence that a greater involvement of top 
management in the licensing process increases the odds of establishing an 
agreement (Pitkethly, 2001). Recently, Arora, Fosfuri and Rønde (Arora, 
Fosfuri, & Rønde, 2013) enquired into the organizational structure behind the 
decision to license technology. They developed a theoretical argument that 
explains how differences in incentives and difference in information impact 
the decision to license a technology either at central corporate level or within 
the business divisions. 
Previous contributions devoted scant attention to how members of in-
house Intellectual Property (IP) units engage in the management of 
technology licensing and mobilize information and power in the attempt to 
reach a final consensus. This is surprising since research had analysed how 
in-house IP units manage the decision to patent an invention through cross-
functional practices with the R&D and the integration of technical and legal 
capabilities (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; D. Somaya 
et al., 2007). Nonetheless, there is still limited knowledge of the contributions 
of members of the IP-units to manage the decision to license technology. To 
tackle the lacuna this research adopts a processual perspective and examines 
the following research question: how do IP units manage the licensing 
process?  Gaining insights into the process by which in-house IP units manage 
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and organize technology licensing can provide a deeper understanding of the 
practices and characteristics of the decision to license technology, particularly 
for large organizations. 
In approaching the research question, I conduct an exploratory study 
using an inductive methodology based on an in-depth multiple cases study. 
Case studies are well-suited for this type of research, because they can address 
questions about processes and organizational contexts that lead to frame 
decisions (Bidwell, 2009; Kaplan, 2008). My research focus is on large and 
very large organizations and data are collected in 15 cases that have an 
internal IP department. Within each case, I examine the micro-practices of 
individuals engaged in technology licensing. From the comparison of these 
cases, a detailed picture of the key influences at the process level that affect 
the decision to license technology emerges. 
The results of this study suggest that decentralization and delegation 
of authority versus centralization are not the only organizational traits that 
impact the management of technology licensing and shape decision making. 
Two factors appear to be particularly important: the management of 
information and the internal coordinating mechanisms. Furthermore, internal 
coordinating mechanisms can be reinforced by both the existence of an 
internal supportive parallel structure and the enforcement of the decision by 
other layers of the organization. The resulting combination of the 
management of information and internal coordinating mechanisms manifests 
in different negotiating capabilities to manage the technology licensing 
process. 
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This study contributes to an emerging stream of market for technology 
literature that aims at exploring the role of organizational traits in technology 
licensing (A. Arora et al., 2013; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013; Pitkethly, 2001). 
By adopting the IP unit perspective this paper elucidates the practices and 
organizational dynamics through which actors frame the decision to license 
technology. This approach aims at grounding the micro-foundations of 
technology licensing and at explaining the role of internal management of 
information and internal coordinating mechanisms. Explicit emphasis is put 
on the process through which members of IP units develop negotiating 
capabilities to mobilize knowledge, information and decisional power. In that 
respect, the role of individual cognition as well as internal frictions in 
licensing practices are highlighted. Finally, the paper provides fine-grained 
qualitative evidence of the organizational capabilities that in-house IP 
departments develop to interact with other units in the organization for the 
strategic management of intellectual property rights (Reitzig & Puranam, 
2009; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; D. Somaya et al., 2007). 
The paper is organized into four sections. In the beginning, I review existent 
literature on the organizational dimensions of technology licensing. Then, I 
describe the research method and present the data, which is followed by the 
analysis and interpretation of the multiple case study. Finally, I discuss the 
results and the implications of the research.  
 
3.2. Conceptual Background 
 
The paper is an inductive, explorative study that started as an 
investigation of in-house licensing practices and mechanisms. Its theoretical 
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framework emerged through a cycling process that knits together data and 
literature. To orient readers, I start off with a brief overview of concepts and 
literature that informed the research (Pratt, 2009; Suddaby, 2006). 
Licensing is an essential strategic activity that corporations carry out in order 
to commercialize their technologies, to pre-empt their technological domain 
and to block competitors' (illegal) use of innovation (Arora & Fosfuri, 2003; 
Ceccagnoli, 2009; Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008). Important clues as to what 
drives the decision to license technology may be encountered at the patent 
level. Research found that the size of a patent portfolio (Kim et al., 2006), its 
innovative characteristics (Nerkar & Shane, 2007) and its efficient legal 
enforcement through timely patent grants (J. S. Gans et al., 2008) increase the 
probability to license proprietary technology.  
The expected appropriation of the economic rents (A Arora & Fosfuri, 
2003) is another important objective that stimulates the decision of licensing 
an IP. Bargaining power of the licensor over the licensee fosters the 
probability of establishing arm’s length relationships with direct rivals and of 
leveraging the technological leadership in order to gain from royalties and 
fees, despite the possibilities of using exclusively the technology in the 
downstream market (Gallini & Winter, 1985). However, in this case the 
licensor needs to find an optimal number of licensees without eroding 
business profits and allowing competitors to enter into the competitive space 
(Andrea Fosfuri, 2006). Given these economic motivations, contingencies 
may moderate the attitude towards licensing. For instance, literature showed 
that market volatility (Andrea Fosfuri, 2006; Gallini & Winter, 1985) and 
information asymmetry between licensor and licensee have a negative impact 
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on the propensity to license (Anton & Yao, 2002; Kale & Singh, 2009; Zuniga 
& Guellec, 2009).  
Finally, organizational characteristics are important pre-conditions of 
the decision to license. Earlier literature focused on firm size and found that 
small firms are more likely to license than large organizations because they 
benefit from royalties and fees, given the limited production capabilities for 
commercial exploitation (Gambardella et al., 2007; Kollmer & Dowling, 
2004). Subsequent research found mixed results for large corporations. 
Zuniga and Guellec (2009) more recently analysed 600 European and 1600 
Japanese firms and showed that both small and large organizations are willing 
to license while medium-sized firms are more conservative. Thus, empirical 
evidence appears to depict complex patterns, which suggests that beyond firm 
size further organizational dimensions might influence the decision license.  
A recent research stream (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013; K. Laursen, 
Leone, & Torrisi, 2010) drew from absorptive capacity literature and showed 
that the decision to license is enhanced by licensee’s stock of knowledge and 
its capability of exploring and monitoring complimentary technological 
domains. Consequently, a licensee’s high absorptive capacity fosters the 
decision to license (K. Laursen et al., 2010). Ceccagnoli and Jian (Ceccagnoli 
& Jiang, 2013) complemented these findings and claimed that the licensor 
develops knowledge transfer capabilities when the licensee has weak 
absorptive capacities. Indeed, when the licensee has weak absorptive capacity 
it might not be able to recognize the full potential (disclosed) in licensed 
technology, and in turn likelihood to license technology might decrease. To 
avoid this situation, a licensor leverages its knowledge transfer capabilities, 
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which are competences in establishing licensing transactions, gathered 
through past experience in the industry. 
In an emergent research stream on organizational structure of 
innovation and R&D (Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Arora, Belenzon, & Rios, 
2011; Miller, Fern, & Cardinal, 2007), Arora and colleagues (A. Arora et al., 
2013) lately developed an argument on the benefits and drawbacks of either 
a centralized or decentralized structure to manage technology licensing. They 
mathematically formalized that centralized headquarters are more prone to 
establish outbound licensing agreements, because monetary incentives from 
licensing fees generally counterpoise searching costs for potential licensees. 
On one side, even if centralized headquarters have less information 
concerning the competitive outcomes in the downstream market, they tend to 
license aggressively and for revenue-oriented deals to counterbalance the risk 
of accepting value-destroying agreements or rejecting favourable ones. On 
the other side, business units (usually) have more complete and extensive 
information on profitable opportunities. In spite of that, decentralized 
subsidiaries chronically under-license, because they fear losing their market 
share (rent dissipation) and they slant towards total production benefits and 
long-term rewards from business profits rather than licensing fees. 
Although these contributions identify the licensor’s knowledge transfer 
capabilities and the organizational structure of decision-making as 
organizational traits that explain the decision to license technology, still 
missing is an adequate recognition of the contribution of the members of the 
internal IP department. Scholars have already acknowledged the role and 
competences of in-house IP members in the process of patent generation 
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(Grindley & Teece, 1997; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; D. Somaya et al., 2007) 
and the enforcement of intellectual property rights (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010). 
Concerning technology licensing, Pitkethly (Pitkethly, 2001) found that on 
average IP staff are mostly dedicated to activities around patent filing and just 
a minority of IP members are acquainted with either litigation, patent 
information management or licensing contracts. Furthermore, a propensity to 
license out technology appears to be higher in UK, where top management is 
more frequently involved in the deals. Despite the importance of internal IP 
members for a broad range of activities that concern the strategic management 
of intellectual property rights and Pitkethly’s (2001) evidence for a potential 
correspondence between technology licensing behaviour and the composition 
of in-house IP units, we are still missing holistic empirical insights and the 
perspective of in-house IP units in the licensing process remains poorly 
understood. In fact, there is strong reason to believe that a better 
understanding of the tasks and roles of in-house IP members in the process of 
technology licensing would provide us a better grasp of the overall 
management and complement previous research on the organizational 
dimensions of technology licensing. 
The study expands on these insights by examining how in-house IP 
units manage technology licensing through micro-practices and internal 
organizational dynamics among their members. A key to understanding the 
impact of micro-patterns of IP unit on licensing process is found in the 
cognitive frames as a means through which agents shape their own agendas 
and control information flow to steer decision making processes towards a 
certain, preferred outcome (Bower, 1970; Kaplan, 2008). In fact, research in 
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the organizational domain suggests that actors make use of cognitive frames 
to make sense of uncertainty and ambiguous signals from the environment 
(Bower, 1970). During strategic decision making, actors adjust their attention 
and integrate cognition and political actions to establish the legitimacy and 
authority of their claims and reach an agreement (Burgelman, 1994; Kaplan, 
2008; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). However, actors involved 
in strategic decision making generally depend on each other in their 
interactions and might experience interpersonal conflict and contrasting 
motivations. Therefore, actors should establish empirical credibility of their 
frame by building coalitions and interrelating disconnected practices (Snow 
et al., 1986). Through the integration of cognition and politics, agents can re-
align the scope of the decision and converge self-interests towards a common 
a shared goal that maximizes the overall outcome (Bower & Doz, 1979; 
Burgelman, 1994).  
Applying this view to an analysis of in-house IP units shifts the analytical 
focus from the organizational structure to the practices necessary to manage 
technology licensing as a decision-making process. In fact, if we transpose 
previous arguments into in-house IP department, such a department might be 
seen as a unit that interfaces with other organizational units – e.g. scientists 
or business managers to discuss and seek for information. Furthermore, it 
might be possible to identify multiple actors even in the same IP unit that need 
to interact and reach consensus. Therefore, technology licensing might be 
described as an organizational process in which multiple members of the 
organization participate at different organizational levels and intervene 
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through complex intersections of cognitive frames and of powerful coalitions 
to shape the final decision. 
As little is known about how IP departments manage the licensing process 
through their micro-practices, when I began this study, I choose to pursue my 
investigation inductively, relying on a qualitative interpretative approach. 
Interpretative research focuses on building an emergent theory from a 
perspective that gives voice to the explanations and storytelling of those who 
are embedded in the process (Siggelkow, 2007), which in this case is the 
licensing process. Thus, I developed my study through a multiple case study 
that relies on qualitative data drawn from members of internal IP departments 
of very large and large sized organizations. In doing so, I aim at providing the 
ground for the organizational micro-foundations of technology licensing. 
 
3.3. Method 
 
In order to formulate an inductive model (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 
2009) of how organizations make decisions about licensing, this study utilizes 
15 companies as cases to zoom in on the micro mechanisms of the licensing 
process. The cases are treated as multiple experiments, each helping to 
confirm or disconfirm the findings drawn from the others (Yin, 2009). A 
preliminary pilot study was performed to acquire informative hints on the 
empirical problem. It was followed by a complete and intensive analysis. 
 
Stage 1: Pilot Study 
 In order to grasp a more practical view on the research question and 
to familiarize with the language and mentality of people involved in IP 
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management and licensing, I performed a series of preliminary pilot 
interviews with IP managers of large corporations and with IP experts. These 
cases were chosen according to three criteria. Firstly, the corporations must 
be highly active in patenting, so the management of intellectual property is a 
relevant issue within the corporate and business governance. Secondly, 
patenting strategies and IP management logics might differ from industry to 
industry. Therefore, to understand the emergence of different behaviours and 
strategic approaches towards patenting I selected firms that registered their 
innovation in the following fields: medical technology, electrical machinery, 
digital communication, measurement, organic chemistry, pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology, and engines. I chose those technological domains because 
patent filing and granting happen with high intensity (EPO, 2012). The 
heterogeneity among technological fields for patenting allows interrogating 
the data for possible industry patterns and facilitates generalizability. I 
counted the number of patent applications per applicant and the number of 
applications of each applicant with respect to each field: this double check 
captured the relative importance of patenting within the industry. Finally, and 
most importantly, corporations present a complex organizational structure in 
terms of R&D and units responsible for patenting, geographical locations and 
business lines. The complexity of the organizational structure allows querying 
organizational differences in the way IP strategy and licensing are developed 
within the firms in the sample. Seven companies took part in the preliminary 
study. Data were gathered through semi-structured interviews with individual 
respondents between November 2012 and April 2013. I selected and 
contacted participants that have direct experience within IP management and 
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licensing: interviewees were either Chief Technology Officers, heads of 
patent department or chief IP counsels. Moreover, personal interviews with 
three external IP consultants complemented the first pilot round of the project. 
External experts are generally patent attorneys that operate in law firms 
specialized either in patent filing, litigation, licensing and IP strategic 
advisory. It is important to notice that the roles covered by interviewees allow 
them to have a clear view of the scope and processes of IP management, the 
organizational structure of IP units and of the antecedents and outcomes of 
technology licensing. Interviews were conducted either personally or over the 
phone always using an interviews’ guideline, they were recorded and then 
transcribed. Detailed notes complemented the transcripts. During the pilot 
study I adopted an in-vivo coding scheme: this approach is helpful to extract 
main themes and concepts, which could then applied in the main study 
(Saldaña, 2009). Therefore, I developed analytical tables to navigate into the 
emerging themes (Eisenhardt, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Table 3.1 
here below summarizes the pilot interviews sample. 
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Table 3.1: Summary of interviews conducted for the pilot case study 
 
ID 
Interviewe
e 
Industry Role in the Company Experience in the 
Industry 
1 Law and IP 
consultancy  
vice president more than 20 years 
2 IP brokerage vice president for 
Europe 
more than 20 years 
3 IP consultancy director more than 20 years 
4 Electronics global chief patent 
counsel 
more than 20 years 
5 Electronics chief patent officer more than 20 years 
6 Medical chief patent officer for 
the medical division 
between 15 and 20 years. 
7 Electronics patent attorney in the 
global IP division 
between 15 and 20 years. 
8 Pharmaceutical global chief patent 
officer 
between 15 and 20 years. 
9 Food and healthcare chief patent officer more than 20 years 
10 IT services chief executive officer more than 20 years 
 
 
Stage 2: Multiple cases study 
Once the pilot cases had determined the general outline of the 
phenomenon, a multiple case study design was chosen to deepen the 
understanding on the relationship between organizational structures of IP 
departments and the licensing process. Multiple case study design is a suitable 
method to compare how different types of organizations organize the 
licensing of their technologies. Indeed, each case enables replication logic to 
confirm or disconfirm the patterns of evidence depicted in the other instances, 
providing compelling results and associations of facts at multiple levels (Yin, 
2009). The successive replication and comparison of the phenomenon 
through multiple cases allows establishing a more stable theoretical 
framework (Eisenhardt, 1989; Siggelkow, 2007). 
In the multi case study, I employed 15 cases to demonstrate the emergence of 
organizational aspects of IP management influencing the licensing process. 
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After the pilot study with the initial sample of 7 organizations, I contacted 
additional cases, following a saturation logic (Yin, 2009). A first dimension 
that drives the sampling construction is the technological domain of IP 
portfolio. The pilot study analysed organizations from heterogeneous 
technological fields to provide general patterns and findings. Since each 
industry may be affected by its own peculiar logic, the comparison of cases 
that operate in heterogeneous technological fields might be weak in providing 
stable patterns. In order to overcome this potential impediment and strengthen 
the analysis, I enlarged the preliminary pilot sample to have at least pair-wise 
comparisons among the IP portfolios of organizations in the following 
patenting areas: medical technology, electrical machinery, digital 
communication, measurement, organic chemistry, pharmaceutical, 
biotechnology and engines. From an industrial classification, those 
organizations are active in the pharmaceutical, manufacturing, healthcare and 
ICT sectors. Through this first dimension I sought to include theoretical 
sample cases with similarities that would aid comparison and replication, yet 
with sufficient heterogeneity to help assess potential generalizability 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). A second dimension through which I 
developed the theoretical sampling is the organizational structure of IP 
departments. Indeed, the pilot study showed that the IP departments could 
either work at centralized level or operate through decentralized units. I used 
this specification for comparing and combining polar cases within the 
technological domains. As a result, companies included in the theoretical 
sample are multinational, multi-business organizations, with comparable IP 
portfolios and active players in technology licensing. To increase 
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generalizability, I adopted a purposive sampling technique for the mentioned 
parameters (Silverman, 2006). To access insider knowledge about how IP 
departments manage the licensing process, I secured an independent expert (a 
former Head of the IP unit of one of the biggest patenting organizations). On 
the basis of discussions with him, I selected cases that varied in the 
dimensions mentioned before.  
 
Case Description 
I first selected 120 companies that met the criteria above and that 
could be contacted through institutional1 or personal relationships. Of these 
companies, 30 agreed to participate, including three that participated in the 
pilot study. However, at an early stage of the interview process, 15 decided 
to drop out because they believed that the issue discussed was too sensitive 
and strictly confidential. This caution was not surprising, as companies refrain 
to divulge data on patenting and particularly licensing, which reflects 
strategic choices with very limited public disclosure (Reitzig & Puranam, 
2009). The final sample consisted of 15 companies. Three companies work 
in the pharmaceutical industry. They are globally active in a vast range of 
research areas such as oncology, diabetes, vaccines, animal health, and 
generic consumer health. Three companies belong to the healthcare sector. 
Those organizations are worldwide players in producing biopharmaceutical 
manufacturing technologies and patient systems, which are areas where there 
is urgency for innovation protection. Five companies operate in the ICT 
                                                     
1
 Companies selected for initial contact were members of the Licensing Executive Society. 
This fact further re-assured the researcher that licensing was a relevant phenomenon to 
engage with for the company.  
Chapter 3 
105 
 
industry. This industry plays an important role in fostering technological 
evolution and firms are widely active in patenting their innovations. 
Companies in this industry are software and information systems producers, 
hardware manufacturers, and communication and media providers. Four 
companies operate in the manufacturing industry. Companies included in this 
cluster are active players in the production of electric machinery, power 
systems and robotics. Table 3.2 summarizes the final sample. It is worth 
stressing that such a heterogeneous sample in terms of industry classification 
permits the finding of patterns that do not depend on a singular industry and 
therefore this study might provide a wider generalizability of results.   
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Table 3.2: Summary of Characteristics of Firms in the Final Sample 
  
ID 
Compan
y 
 
Company 
Core Business 
Industry Employe
e 
number 
(2013) 
Geographi
c 
location 
structure of 
R&D unit 
structure of  
IP unit 
1 Robotics and 
Oil conducts 
Manufacturi
ng 
146100 Europe centralized hybrid 
2 Information 
systems 
ICT 76417 Europe hybrid centralized 
3 Chemicals and 
Pharma 
Pharmaceuti
cal 
113200 Europe centralized centralized 
4 Telecom, 
manufacturing 
ICT 110255 Europe Decentralize
d 
centralized 
5 Computer HW ICT 434246 USA centralized centralized 
6 Robotics  Manufacturi
ng 
39312 Europe centralized centralized 
7 Beauty and 
personal health 
Healthcare 72637 Europe centralized centralized 
8 Communication ICT 97798 Europe Decentralize
d 
decentraliz
ed 
9 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuti
cal 
135696 Europe Decentralize
d 
decentraliz
ed 
10 Hearing devices Healthcare 9063 Europe centralized centralized 
11 Electronics, 
manufacturing 
Manufacturi
ng 
118087 Europe Decentralize
d 
centralized 
12 Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuti
cal 
111974 Europe hybrid hybrid 
13 Media, 
communication 
ICT 14000 USA hybrid centralized 
14 Manufacturing Manufacturi
ng 
172000 USA hybrid hybrid 
15 Hearing devices Healthcare 3080 Europe centralized centralized 
 
 
3.3.1. Data Collection 
 
My data collection was intensive, extending over the years 2013-2014 
in which I proceeded through the collection and analysis of records (Locke, 
2001). I adopted multiple sources of evidence, primarily interviews 
supplemented with archival data and expert validations to encourage 
convergent lines of inquiry. The first data access started in the mid of June 
2013 and it lasted until the mid of August 2013. A second round of interviews 
and field research took place between May 2014 and early September 2014. 
 
  
Chapter 3 
107 
 
Interviews 
Interviews were the major source of data for the project. My principal 
informants were Chief Technology Officers and Heads of intellectual 
property divisions. Indeed, persons in charge for the mentioned roles have 
senior positions, which allows them to have a broad view of the overall 
initiatives that concern intellectual property rights (IPR) –i.e. the filing, 
prosecution, protection and monetization of IPRs. Moreover, Chief 
Technology Officers and IP executive managers have crucial roles in 
matching and harmonizing the corporate strategy with the needs of their 
divisions and coordinate with the R&D laboratories and the business unites. 
For each selected organization, interviews were conducted in person or, when 
that was not possible, over the phone, always using an interview guideline. 
Interviews lasted between 50 and 90 minutes, were tape-recorded and then 
fully transcribed except for one case. Notes taken during the interviews were 
transcribed within the following 24 hours. An interview protocol was 
designed and interviewees were asked to describe their involvement in the IP 
management of the organization, their relative competences, the frequency 
and topics of their meetings; therefore, I asked them to describe a typical 
process of licensing-out and its time line, how they collaborate within the IP 
department and with other organizational units, what are their incentives in 
licensing-out and whether they might have experienced any problems in 
dealing and designing a license agreement. Finally, some respondents were 
contacted a second time for a follow-up. Second-order interviews are useful 
not just to deepen some aspects, but they strengthen research by mitigating 
Chapter 3 
108 
 
cognitive biases and impressions in retrospective data collection (Huber & 
Power, 1985). 
To ensure that the theoretical sample includes the most 
knowledgeable informants, I used a “snowballing technique” (Eisenhardt & 
Graebner, 2007). I usually asked the focal interviewees to introduce me to 
another crucial colleague who usually takes part in the licensing process. 
Persons that cover these roles are often senior patent attorneys with a mandate 
to operate in crucial jurisdictions -either the USA or Europe- and they have 
both a technical and a legal background, which are essential for designing 
licensing contracts. Indeed, the pilot study highlighted that IP management 
and technology licensing are areas where law, scientific and business logics 
co-exist. Having multiple interviewees from the IP department allowed me to 
juxtapose and compare stories and impressions on licensing process and IP 
management, controlling for the emergence of different or complementary 
versions and minimizing biases in respondents’ perception.  
During the data collection it became clear that the participating 
organizations would not allow me to interview everybody at will, as people’s 
time was considered a scarce resource. Furthermore, the pilot study indicated 
that licensing decisions usually are made by a very small set of people, 
typically the senior members of the IP departments and eventually other key 
executives or board members. Other individuals in the organization have 
limited if any awareness of the whole chain of events taking place during 
licensing process. This pattern reflects the sensitive nature of licensing and is 
consistent with other prior evidence that awareness of an organization’s 
strategy declines rapidly below the core management teams in similar 
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strategic settings such as acquisitions or spin-offs (Graebner & Eisenhardt, 
2004; Souitaris, Zerbinati, & Liu, 2012). Thus, when I was refused to 
interview two principal informants per IP department, I agreed to access a 
second member via e-mail to confirm my findings and to minimize single 
informant’s bias (Locke & Ramakrishna Velamuri, 2008; Yin, 2009). 
 
Public speeches 
Informal, nonparticipant observations were made in the research 
during practitioners’ conferences. During these conferences, I attended and 
recorded the speeches of representatives of the organizations included in my 
sample. I attended four major world-wide conferences in the field of 
intellectual property management held in Europe between November 2012 
and May 2014. Conferences were organized by leading chartered institutions 
and organizations; they covered presentations and round tables on managerial 
and financial aspects of intellectual property rights. During the conferences, 
I also shadowed practitioners discussing on the most relevant topics that 
concern the management and the monetization of IPs and the challenges that 
they face in different countries and legal jurisdictions. 
Overall, this study relies on 38 interviews and 10 public speeches from 
27 individual respondents. Table 3.3 provides a summary of the semi-
structured interviews with the principal informants. 
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Table 3.3: Data source: Interviews, presentations and evidence via email 
ID 
Company 
 Industry Interviewees and number of relative interviews Public 
presentations 
Emails  
(Validating 
Evidence) 
1 Manufacturing Business development manager (2): senior IP attorney (1) 
 
2 
2 ICT Head of IP department (2); senior IP attorney (1) 1 1 
3 Pharmaceutical Senior IP attorney (2); VP of IP department (1) 1 
 
4 ICT Head of IP department (2); VP of IP department (1) 
  
5 ICT General Counsel of IP (2); Director of IP Strategy (1) 
 
1 
6 Manufacturing Head of IP department (1) 
 
1 
7 Healthcare VP of R&D unit (2) 1 1 
8 ICT Director of Legal & Intellectual Property for Device Concepts & 
Technology (1); Director of Licensing (1) 
1 
 
9 Pharmaceutical Senior licensing manager (1); Senior patent attorney (1) 1 
 
10 Healthcare Head of IP department (2); senior scientist (1) 
  
11 Manufacturing Head of IP department (1); senior licensing attorney (2) 2 1 
12 Pharmaceutical Head of IP (1); VP of IP department (1) 1 
 
13 ICT Head of IP department (2); VP of IP department (1) 
  
14 Manufacturing Head of IP department (2); VP of IP department (1) 2 1 
15 Healthcare Head of IP department (2) 
 
1 
Total  Number of Interviewees: 27; Number of Interviews: 38 10 8 
 
Notes: Numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of interviews for each interviewee 
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External and Internal Documents 
External and internal documents are another important source of 
information and data triangulation. For this purpose, I collected contents from 
corporate web pages of the 15 cases. Moreover, I searched on the database 
Nexis for business press related to both IP management and license 
agreements of companies included in the theoretical sample. External 
documents may contain descriptions of licenses established by the selected 
organizations and of positive or negative results achieved through licensing. 
After the interviews, I used the retrieved documents to “triangulate” the 
interview data and to identify confirmatory or dissenting evidence. 
 
3.3.2. Analysis 
 
My analytical approach was open ended (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) and 
driven by a broad interest in how in-house IP members frame and then make 
decisions on technology outbound licensing. As is typical of inductive 
research, I iteratively explored my data going back and forth between the 
described phenomena and the emerging theoretical arguments (Locke, 2001; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). I analysed data by firstly building individual cases 
that synthesized interviews and archival materials (Eisenhardt, 1989). As a 
check, an independent researcher2 was asked to compare the original 
interviews and the summary and to comment on these to provide an unbiased 
view on each case. 
                                                     
2
 It is worth to mention that for all the interviews it was agreed that the study included a third 
external researcher with an advisory role on the analysis of the cases. To motivate informants 
to provide accurate data, confidentiality was promised (Huber and Power, 1985). 
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Following exemplar inductive studies (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2008; 
Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Souitaris et al., 2012) and analytical techniques 
to move from raw data to theoretical framework (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 
2012; Pratt, 2007; Pratt, 2009), I progressed through a three-step process, 
which is depicted in Figure 1. 
In the first step of data analysis, I compiled separate cases for each IP 
department embedded in the observed organization. The within-case histories 
were the basis to develop constructs and relationships to describe the 
licensing process experienced by each single IP department. Thus, by 
examining all interview transcripts I identified patterns and differences in the 
descriptions of the IP management and licensing processes using open and in-
vivo coding to better understand how IP actors describe their world (Locke, 
2001). For example, I identified several data segments related to 
“communication”, “advice”, “negotiation”, and “framework”. I then 
reviewed the data to countercheck whether assigned codes fit with chunks of 
texts: when the match was poor or weak, I revised or abandoned the first-
order concepts (Silverman, 2006). Examples of preliminarily abandoned 
codes are “propensity to license” or “relation between R&D and Business”. 
I proceeded in the analysis by consolidating categories, which became 
more theoretical and abstract. Particularly, I looked for links among first order 
concepts, so that categories could be grouped into second order themes. Thus, 
I moved from open to axial coding (Gioia et al., 2012; Locke, 2001). For 
instance, I noticed that the theme “seeking for information” consolidates 
issues concerning the means and tools, roles and timing of activities 
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accomplished to gather information for the licensing process. Particularly, the 
second-order themes encompassed constructs that exist in the literature. 
In the third step, I moved from a within-case analysis to a cross-case 
comparison (Eisenhardt, 1989) and I looked for relationships and similarities 
in second-order constructs among cases (see Figure 3.1). Similar second-
order themes were grouped into aggregate dimensions, which either refer to 
established constructs in the literature (e.g. “information flow”) or to 
abstracted concepts (e.g. “inside-out negotiating capabilities”). Aggregate 
dimensions that emerged formed the ground for the theoretical framework. 
For instance, I noticed that when cases were ordered according to the degree 
to which each second order theme was present (e.g. “inside-in information 
flow” and “stand-alone coordinating mechanisms”), they clustered into two 
groups that were comparable and fitted into a coherent picture, which could 
be described through unique theoretical lenses.  
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Figure 3.1 Data structure: from first-order concepts to aggregate dimensions 
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3.4. Results 
 
3.4.1. The design of licensing units and the strategic framing of technology 
licensing 
 
During cross-case analysis, I observed that IP units tend to cluster into 
two main groups, depending on the organizational functions they are 
supposed to cover. With functions I mean the systems of homogeneous 
activities and relationships, in which members of organization are embedded 
at a certain time (Fischer, 1974). As we may see from Table 3.4, all cases 
highlighted that IP departments cover the patenting3 function, which consists 
in the systems of activities that are necessary to harvest innovation and that 
guarantee the right level of legal protection. Consistently with previous 
studies (D. Somaya et al., 2007), I found that members involved in the 
patenting function are grouped into patenting teams according to their 
technological background and generally assist scientists from the disclosure 
of ideas to patent application and prosecution in the various jurisdictions. 
Typically, the head of IP department supervises patenting teams in the 
execution of patenting strategy, which derives from a joint discussion with 
the executive members of both research and development and business 
strategy divisions. However, evidence highlights that in seven cases IP 
departments introduced licensing as a complimentary function with respect to 
patenting and created dedicated units for the exploitation of licensing as a 
strategic activity. For instance, Company 12 mentioned that the IP department 
                                                     
3
 In the appendix I provide additional comparative cross-case evidence (proof quotes) to 
bolster points mentioned in the paper. Indeed, empirical evidence in the paper is presented 
through vivid “power quotes” that might be integrated by the reader through “proof quotes” 
in the comparative table (Pratt, 2008). 
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is formed by three main groups: a patenting team, litigators and a licensing 
team. In the same industry –i.e. pharmaceutical- also Company 3 maintains 
separate the patenting and the licensing teams. The same evidence is 
observable in both the ICT industry for companies 4, 5, 8 and 13 and in the 
manufacturing industry for company 11. For example, an IP representative of 
Company 4 explained that: “In that IP organization, which consists of 200 
people, we have these 10 patent units and we call them patent development 
parts. Then, there is one group working with licensing (…), they are about 10 
people.” (Company 4). Also the representative of Company 5 commented that 
“We have a corporate team for patenting and licensing (…), we are separate, 
but I call them “sister organizations” within corporate headquarter. We work 
very closely.” (Company 5). Therefore, in all those cases licensing emerges 
as a relevant function that organizations decide to create in conjunction with 
patenting activity and to enforce with a dedicated nested unit. It is also worth 
noting that IP and licensing units exist both at centralized and decentralized 
organizational level. This finding is noteworthy, because it partially revises 
the theoretical assumptions of Arora and colleagues (A. Arora et al., 2013) 
according to which licensing units tend to be centralized at the corporate 
level, while if licensing is decentralized then business units take the 
governance.  
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Table 3.4 Organizational dimensions of R&D and IP unit and functions of 
IP unit  
 
ID 
Company 
 Industry structure of R&D 
unit 
structure of IP 
unit 
Functions of IP 
Unit 
    
patent
ing 
licensin
g 
3 Pharmaceutical centralized centralized X X 
12 Pharmaceutical hybrid hybrid X X 
4 ICT decentralized centralized X X 
5 ICT centralized centralized X X 
8 ICT decentralized decentralized X X 
13 ICT hybrid centralized X X 
11 Manufacturing decentralized centralized X X 
9 Pharmaceutical decentralized decentralized X  
2 ICT hybrid centralized X  
1 Manufacturing centralized hybrid X  
6 Manufacturing centralized centralized X 
 
14 Manufacturing hybrid hybrid X  
7 Healthcare centralized centralized X  
10 Healthcare centralized centralized X  
15 Healthcare centralized centralized X 
 
 
In correspondence with cases where licensing units are nested into IP 
units, we can observe the emergence of a specific framework assigned to 
technology licensing. In fact, technology licensing is part of the corporate 
culture and the IP unit identifies itself with the specific task of licensing: one 
representative of Company 4 reported "We are called ‘IPR and Licensing’, 
so, it is quite obvious to have such a unit. It is a very specific task. We have 
started our licensing program 20 years ago at a high level". Licensing is part 
of the unit’s identity and members acknowledge the duality of their role. 
Furthermore, technology licensing is a “tradition”, as reported by Company 
8, and current deals are based on successful heritage as stated for instance by 
a representative of Company 13: "There is a long story of very successful 
patenting licensing business in our company". Furthermore, technology 
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licensing is framed as a business activity that contributes to income 
generation. For example, one representative of Company 13 stated “we are 
not an IP company but we have an IP business, which is well-known and 
which is organized like any other business in the group". Therefore, when 
technology licensing becomes prominent in the organizational culture and 
serves as one of the overarching strategic goals, then the organizational 
structure is arranged accordingly with the creation of a nested licensing unit. 
In contrast, when technology licensing does not have a strategic 
connotation within an organization, they avoid designing dedicated licensing 
units within their IP department. For example, the head of IP unit of Company 
15 reported “We do not have any specific licensing competence in the patent 
department. But if we have to negotiate a license with the competitor, the team 
set up and the role of the top manager is typically of the CEO or the R&D 
head, the head of the legal department and one of the people in the patent 
department. So, it is an ad-hoc set-up”. 
The emergent dichotomy between IP departments with and without a 
licensing function organized in a nested unit is intriguing and adds more 
complexity to the existing models of the organizational design of technology 
licensing (Ashish Arora et al., 2013). Indeed, it appears that allocating the 
authority to license to either a centralized licensing unit or to de-centralized 
business divisions is not the only relevant dimension to disentangle 
differences in the management of technology licensing. In fact, technology 
licensing can be organized as a complementary function thanks to dedicated 
nested unit in the IP unit that could operate either at centralized or 
decentralized level and that mirrors a strategic frame. Furthermore, during the 
Chapter 3 
120 
 
data analysis additional conditions emerged as core for the management of 
technology licensing. These conditions are i) the management of information 
flow, ii) the governance of decision making through coordinating 
mechanisms, hierarchical enforcement and the existence of a supportive 
parallel structure, and iii) licensing negotiating capabilities. Interestingly, 
these dimensions are different depending on the existence of the nested 
licensing function as represented in table 3.5. Below, I report the empirical 
evidence to illustrate each of these conditions.  
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Table 3.5 Organizational Configurations Emerging from the Analysis 
 
 
ID  
Compan
y 
 Industry Information Flow Coordinating 
Mechanisms 
Enforcement Supportiv
e Parallel 
Structure 
Licensing Negotiating 
Capabilities 
 
  
internalize
d 
externalize
d 
stand-
alone 
share
d 
ex-
ante 
on-
going 
 
inside-
out 
outside-
in 
IP units 
with 
nested 
licensin
g units 
3 Pharmaceutica
l 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
12 Pharmaceutica
l 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
4 ICT X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
5 ICT X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
8 ICT X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
13 ICT X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
11 Manufacturing X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
IP units 
without 
nested 
licensin
g units 
9 Pharmaceutica
l 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
2 ICT 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
1 Manufacturing 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
6 Manufacturing 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
14 Manufacturing 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
7 Healthcare 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
10 Healthcare 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
15 Healthcare 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X X 
 
X 
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3.4.2. The management of information flow 
 
Depending on the existence of a nested licensing unit, we might 
observe different patterns of information flow during the licensing process. 
With information flow I mean the sharing of data and knowledge relative to 
the environment, competitors, potential licensees, products and technologies 
available in the portfolio and on the market. 
On one side, when technology licensing is organized through a 
dedicated function and a nested licensing unit, information is shared through 
channels that are internal to the IP unit. Members of the licensing unit receive 
information directly from a competitive intelligence nested in the IP unit. For 
example, a representative of Company 8 reported “We have had a large 
group in Company 8 which has been following our competition, so lot of the 
information has been created in house by that group; we have also one person 
in the licensing team who is specialized in the data collection for licensing 
purposes and working on creating data for our licensing purposes. I would 
say, yes, we do lot of it in house”. Moreover, members of the nested licensing 
unit perform their own personal search on competitors and technologies in 
addition to the relevant internal information that they receive. A 
representative of Company 3 described this process as follows “You need to 
do one big exercise, you need to look at the whole universe of opportunities 
and licensing. And if you do the filter process correctly is not that you see so 
many opportunities, you would narrow down to 5-10 potential options. [...]  It 
is really fast and you need brain power...the main intellectual work is setting 
the filter right, ok, and then go back and forth and do that to see if it makes 
sense”. The shared information resides within the licensing unit and remains 
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concentrated among the members. In fact, licensing members do not need to 
disclose information to the other members of the IP department, for example 
to the patent attorneys involved in patenting. Therefore, it is possible 
describing the flow of information through an internalized pattern that 
concentrates data and relevant hints in the licensing unit. 
On the other side, when the nested licensing unit is not present, 
members in charge of licensing tend to rely on sources of information external 
to the IP unit. For instance, a representative of Company 9 said "For example 
if we see a license opportunity -and they come us quite regularly- we would 
do full due diligence investigation on the products from...all the scientists 
from R&D organization would be looking at the scientific perspective but it 
would be also looked at the patent perspective, so a patent attorney would be 
assigned to that license opportunity to do the due diligence evaluation." 
Members of the IP unit involved in licensing decision-making have to go 
through a collage of information available from other departments, for 
instance production or R&D. In this process, representatives from 
interviewed cases highlighted that creating a personal network in the 
organization with the other departments in order to access the relevant 
information timely is very important. A representative of Company 6 
commented on this point: "I mean, what you do need to make a successful 
patent licensing is having enough information about competitors’ products 
and you have it through sales; then we need to have a proper technical 
analysis, so we need R&D from the laboratory, and finally we need financial 
data such as margins for that kind of products and we get them in our case 
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from sales, because when they do products they do price calculations for 
products." 
Therefore, through the comparison of cases it is possible to show that 
the management of information is a crucial aspect of the management of 
technology licensing. Through the management of the flows of information 
the licensor acquires relevant data to decrease information asymmetry on the 
licensee and competitors (Beggs, 1992; Danneels, 2007; Katz & Shapiro, 
1985). Previous research assumed that access to better information for the 
licensor depends on the decentralization of decision making to business units 
(A. Arora et al., 2013). Yet, data suggest the internalization versus 
externalization of information flow with respect to the IP unit as another 
dimension that decreases information asymmetry. Depending upon the design 
of a nested licensing unit, the management of information flow can either be 
internalized within an IP unit or externalized to other units within the 
organization. When technology licensing is managed through a nested 
licensing unit, an internalized information flow is set up to transfer directly 
relevant information to licensing decision-makers.  
 
3.4.3. Coordinating mechanisms 
 
Through empirical evidence it emerged that different internal 
coordinating mechanisms are associated with cases where technology 
management is orchestrated through a separated nested unit. 
When licensing is managed through a nested licensing unit, members 
involved harmonise their tasks and practices through internal and stand-alone 
coordinating mechanisms. Since licensing is independently organized with 
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respect to the other functions of the IP unit, members involved in the nested 
licensing unit meet separately and seek advice among themselves. A 
representative of Company 8 commented that "We have in-house licensing 
teams, so we know our licensing contracts and questions on our licensing 
contracts are direct we internally advice our businesses when they have 
questions concerning licensees and otherwise we focus on making deals." 
Internal meetings within the nested licensing unit serve to check that there is 
no conflict among the various licensing deals negotiated at that moment. For 
instance, a representative of Company 13 reported that "so every month we 
have the business review in which we review all the important negotiation 
ongoing". Members of the nested licensing unit tend to develop a sense of 
belonging and do not see the need to further coordinate with other groups 
within the organization. A representative of Company 11 claimed that "For 
licensing out it is entirely controlled by us. so, we are looking through the 
portfolio, finding what we think are good opportunities for licensing or indeed 
any other way for getting value from the portfolio so we might consider 
selling patents in some cases. We decide what we would like to focus on for 
licensing, get the right people to be involved, investigate the products we think 
could need the license, investigate the patents we think cover those products 
and then approach the companies and have a negotiation". 
On the contrary, when licensing is not managed through a nested 
licensing unit but rather through ad-hoc teams, cases demonstrate that 
coordination with other groups within the organization is widely adopted. 
Members of the ad-hoc licensing team need to frame the decision to license 
technology by integrating their opinion with the heads of the other groups. 
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For example, the VP of the IP unit of Company 2 reported "If we are talking 
about licensing out activity we are talking about the Head of IP department 
and myself, we are really responsible people. […] and so together with the 
business owners we create a big picture". This step is necessary to coordinate 
different interests in the organization. Shared coordination is also achieved 
by the selection of the spokesman from the business units or the board. This 
measure guarantees that interests of licensing are aligned with those of the 
other units and that the technology licensing framework is shared across the 
organization. The Head of IP unit of Company 10 commented "The 
governance in this situation is as for the strategy, with the president of 
Company 10 and the CEO and president of the Holding. […] they could also 
see whether the negotiation makes...it is their decision whether in this context 
is the right thing to do with that particular company we want to out license 
to. So, we are consolidating all the interests in the group." 
Collectively these data suggest that internal coordinating mechanisms 
are important to align interests and to develop a cohesive framework to 
license technology. Existing literature focused on the presence of economic 
incentives to align different motivations within the organization to manage 
technology licensing (A. Arora et al., 2013). The data analysis reveals that 
internal coordination is a complementary mechanism to align different 
organizational interests. However, cases reveal a dichotomy between stand-
alone and shared coordinating mechanisms depending upon the design of a 
nested licensing unit. When a nested licensing unit is in charge of technology 
licensing, stand-alone internal coordinating mechanisms are in place to align 
the interests of the licensing unit. With the design of a nested licensing unit, 
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the organization assigns specific priorities to technology licensing. Given the 
dominance of licensing in the organization’s objectives, the main purpose of 
the members involved is making sure that there is no conflict of interest in 
licensing as a separate function. Thus, stand-alone coordinating mechanisms 
are applied in the nested licensing unit to guarantee internal consistency. 
When technology licensing does not assume core strategic relevance through 
the establishment of a nested unit in the IP department, the scope of licensing 
must be weighted with a plethora of other stakes embedded in the 
organization. Therefore, coordinating mechanisms to license technology are 
shared with other units to guarantee consistency of actions in a broader sense.  
 
3.4.4. Supportive Parallel Structure 
 
The data analysis revealed that coordinating mechanisms benefit from 
a supportive parallel structure. A supportive parallel structure is a system of 
ancillary processes organized to facilitate the management of technology 
licensing. Business units, scientists, technical engineers and members of the 
legal department are involved in a series of complimentary and supportive 
tasks during the licensing process. Support usually refers to technicalities 
outside the main competence of members involved in the licensing process. 
For instance, members of the finance department could provide accurate 
figures of revenues, scientists could contribute in understanding the 
underlying technology and the legal department could provide assistance in 
drafting a licensing contract. Interestingly, the existence of a supportive 
parallel structure emerged across all cases independently of the design of a 
nested licensing function. For instance, a representative of Company1 
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reported "when you prepare an agreement, you prepare something you try to 
insert the conditions and so on, you are helped by you lawyer here and then", 
while a licensing manager of Company 11 commented "Then you have a 
range of support functions. I mentioned the testing and measuring ones: an 
example on some patents covering mobile phone: if you make a phone call 
they must be using these patents because to make a phone call it has to do 
this this this, it is written in a standard and we have a  patent covering that. 
So, sometime you can do without measuring but some other times patents 
have some specific requirements and so for example something we are doing 
now has to do with touch screens for iPhone or smartphone and patents have 
certain requirements for the speed and lag between the time when you touch 
and they react, and so on, so you need to have people set up and testing 
schemes". Help is generally provided through internal meetings and is 
finalized to generate a better understanding of possibilities, drawbacks and 
convenience of the deal. Hence, the supportive architecture works in parallel 
to internal coordinating mechanisms and provides useful hints on items that 
need to be discussed in meetings to coordinate actions and conflicting 
interests. This finding is coherent with previous research on the architecture 
of coordination between R&D and productive subunits (Engelen & Brettel, 
2012) and on the use of integrated distributed work through modularized 
processes (Phanish Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006; Srikanth & Puranam, 
2011). Therefore, a supportive parallel structure is a general facilitating 
mechanism that allows coordination with the other members of the 
organization involved in the licensing process.  
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3.4.5. Hierarchical enforcement 
 
During the interviews, hierarchical enforcement emerged as a salient 
and recurrent trait of the governance of licensing decision-making. 
Hierarchical enforcement is the endorsement of the decision-making process 
and associated outcome by a higher organizational layer. Through 
hierarchical enforcement, members of the organization with a higher 
decisional power validate the directions and decisional framework created by 
members directly involved in the licensing deal. Cases clustered around two 
types of hierarchical enforcement. 
On one side, hierarchical enforcement is taken as preliminary at the 
start of every licensing negotiation. Ex-ante hierarchical enforcement is 
associated with the existence of a nested licensing unit. Members of the 
nested licensing unit negotiate the technology agreement within a general 
template established ex-ante by an internal steering committee, where 
members of the executive management, the head of the IP department and the 
head of licensing discuss the objectives and main expectations. For instance, 
a representative of Company 3 reported that "we got the template”, while a 
representative of Company 4 claimed "As part of the whole business process 
and preparation we look at those companies and we think at what we should 
strive for and what should this agreement cover. So, they do have those 
frameworks into which they negotiate”. Potential conflicts of interest among 
foreseeable licensing programs are discussed upfront and conciliated with the 
main interests of the organization. This would guarantee that the member of 
the licensing unit in charge to negotiate the licensing deal can proceed and 
establish the agreement. A representative of Company 11 reported that "Is in 
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the management role to handle that because obviously you can end up with a 
conflict of interest, because in going after another company to get money for 
a patent there is a risk that other companies decide that actually they quite 
like money from Company 11 for their patents and so that does need to be 
handled; the high level of the businesses are aware of the activities that are 
going on and we do and we try to have at least some liaison to make sure that 
nothing too unfortunate happens." 
On the other side, hierarchical enforcement is present all along the 
licensing process through the creation of a progressive understanding of the 
benefits of the agreement. Both managers at the business and corporate level 
are involved in the discussion. Members of the IP unit involved in the 
licensing deal need to provide a general framework for the negotiation and a 
set of recommendations to facilitate a progressive cognition on the licensing. 
For instance, the Head of IP of Company 6 commented "It is a joint decision 
within the business and the IP. I would come out with recommendation for 
the R&D and the sales on what we can get out of that and they need to agree 
on that proposal, otherwise we cannot settle it." During the progressive sense-
making of licensing, members of the IP unit need to consult with the various 
heads of other units that might be affected by the agreement, for example the 
R&D or the business units, to understand the degree of acceptance of the deal. 
For instance, the VP of the IP unit of Company 7 reported "All the decisions 
have to be approved at their early stage because we are not able to contact 
any party prior to be sure that all the top management is aware of what will 
happen; and especially we have to inform them about the potential 
consequences of the licensing program.” Once gone through the various 
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phases of the negotiation, the executive board or the reporting executive of 
the IP department should provide the final endorsement. For instance, 
representative of Company 15 claimed "So in the first meeting we exchange 
expectations and then we can start negotiating and, at the end of the day, it is 
of course a legal department that signs the license agreement." 
The dichotomy between the types of hierarchical enforcement is 
interconnected with the evidence of two distinct forms of coordinating 
mechanisms. In fact, cases that present stand-alone coordinating mechanisms 
have their decisions enforced ex-ante by a steering committee located on a 
higher level with respect to the nested licensing unit. Vice versa, shared 
coordinating mechanisms occur when on-going hierarchical enforcement 
takes place in the decision making. It is possible finding a rationale to this 
distinction among cases. When ex-ante hierarchical enforcement is adopted 
to justify technology licensing, members of the organization at corporate level 
discuss main conflicts and share opinions before the start of the licensing 
program. Once members of the nested licensing unit start the negotiation, they 
do not need to seek additional understanding or confirmation from other parts 
of the organization, because potential disagreements have been already 
discussed at a higher organizational level. Therefore, members of the nested 
licensing unit can coordinate among themselves through stand-alone 
mechanisms. When the consensus on the license agreement is created 
progressively, different parts of the organization need to understand to what 
extend they might benefit and opinions must be shared with a wider audience 
than simply the internal members of the IP unit. Because of a need of wider 
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participation in the progressive sense-making, shared coordinating 
mechanisms are convenient instruments to align interests.  
 
3.4.6. Licensing Negotiating Capabilities  
 
During the analysis it emerged that cases can be grouped according to 
the intersection of the management of information flow and internal 
coordinating mechanisms. Cases where information flow is managed through 
an internalized channel govern the decision making through stand-alone 
coordinating mechanisms. In those cases, members of the licensing unit 
qualify themselves as ‘negotiators’ with a specific set of capabilities. First of 
all, negotiators need to be able to make sense of the underlying technology 
and have a solid technical knowledge. Then negotiators need to be able to 
draft a licensing contract and understand the technicalities of the law under 
different jurisdictions. Finally, negotiators need to be able to make sense of 
the economic convenience of the agreement and have a business oriented 
mind-set. To accomplish all these heterogeneous tasks, negotiators are very 
often patent attorneys with a scientific and legal background as well as 
specific training in finance and accounting. Thanks to their comprehensive 
know-how, negotiators absorb relevant information transferred through 
internalized channels and stand-alone coordinating mechanisms nested in the 
licensing unit. In this way, negotiators demonstrate a capability to make sense 
of technology licensing from an internal perspective. The Head of the 
licensing unit of Company 13 reported that “I am a licensing negotiator, so 
my job is to be charge of the negotiation, this is a lot of skills, soft business 
skills, because it is business to business sales, you know, then technical skills 
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because you have to understand the technology, legal because you need to 
know the legal side of patents and also you have to think about the agreement 
at the end, cultural skills, because most of the time we discussed in Asia, 
Japan, Korea Honk Kong and Taiwan and you really get in touch with 
different cultures, so we need also this kind of skills and also more and more 
economics skills, because when you negotiate first you have to recognize that 
you have valuable patents and then the negotiation is about the price, so you 
need to build up some economic models with NPV and it leverages the skills 
that you need to have ". Having acquired and integrated the relevant 
knowledge, the main scope of negotiators is to actively scan for potential 
licensees and convince them of the relevance of the technology. Negotiators 
need to be able to explain how the licensed technology matches with the 
licensee’s technological portfolio and to guide the licensee in the financial 
evaluation. In order to successfully perform their role, negotiators need to 
understand the market, communicate relevant information externally and 
interact with third parties involved in the negotiation. For instance, the VP of 
the licensing unit of Company 8 commented “you need to be a convincing 
person in order to do out-licensing.” In line with this statement, the analysis 
reveals that negotiators need to have also the capability to make sense of 
technology licensing from an external perspective and to be convincing. In 
summary, negotiators highlight inside-out licensing negotiating capabilities, 
which are the capabilities to absorb relevant internal information and convey 
such information to the licensee in order to convince it about the validity of 
the technology and to create a customer link. 
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Evidence from the cases further revealed another configuration of the 
management of information flow, governance of decision making and 
licensing negotiating capabilities. When information flow is managed 
through an externalized network with respect to the IP unit, coordinating 
mechanisms are shared with other units and members of IP unit are selected 
ad-hoc to be part of the licensing team. In this configuration, members 
involved in the licensing process are active brokers with third parties but they 
are not part of the final decision. Furthermore, the head of IP unit fulfils two 
main roles. First, he or she is in in charge of managing the external relations 
and of creating reliable long-term relationships. The head of IP department 
serves as the first point of contact for external third parties during the 
licensing process. In this role, the head of IP department highlights valuable 
externally-oriented capabilities to connect the licensee with the organization. 
Second, the head of the IP unit needs to synthetize external and internal 
information and draft all the preparatory work for the internal discussions. 
For instance, a representative of Company 9 commented on this point "His 
job is finding potential licensees and negotiate potential offers then he goes 
to the division and they start discussing among themselves about the strategy 
and what they want to achieve. Then they turn back to him and tell him if they 
agreed or not and what they did evaluate." In that regards, the head of IP 
becomes a depository for internal and external information that she or he 
needs to transfer internally during meetings and for other internal documents 
to promote the internal decision-making. From the studied cases it emerges 
that the member of the IP unit covering this role needs to be able to make 
sense of the licensing process from an internal perspective and to support 
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internal decision-making. Combining the external and internal characteristics, 
the analysis reveals that the head of the IP department acts as a broker in the 
technology licensing process and she or he needs to possess outside-in 
licensing capabilities, which are the capabilities of connecting with the 
licensees and transferring relevant information in the internal decision 
making-process to facilitate discussion on the feasibility of the agreement.  
 
3.5. Discussion and Future Research 
 
The case-based study adopts the IP unit perspective and helps to shed 
light on how technology licensing can be managed. Its results complement 
previous research on the organizational design of technology licensing (A. 
Arora et al., 2013; Pitkethly, 2001) and thereby answer a call (Arora & 
Gambardella, 2010; Conti, Gambardella, & Novelli, 2013) for a more detailed 
explanation of organizational antecedents of the market for technologies by 
providing an analysis of the micro dynamics that occur in the IP departments 
during the licensing process. 
The main purpose of this study was to better understand how IP units 
can manage the technology licensing process. Research into the role of in-
house IP units in the licensing process is scarce, so I followed an open and 
theory-grounded approach on 15 cases to elicit the main conceptual 
categories. Hence, this study provides a starting point for such a theoretical 
development by observing, defining and explicating the presence of two 
configurations of micro-practices through which IP units can manage 
technology licensing. If the licensing activity is assumed as a separate 
function with respect to patenting and organized through a nested licensing 
Chapter 3 
136 
 
unit, then technology licensing is managed through internalized information 
flow and stand-alone coordinating mechanisms. Negotiators are in charge of 
managing the process and they need to prove inside-out licensing capabilities, 
which are the abilities of absorbing internal knowledge and of conveying 
relevant information externally to convince the licensee of the validity of the 
technology. If autonomy of licensing with respect to the patenting function is 
not acknowledged, in-house IP units do not dedicate specific resources to 
licensing, which is managed through ad-hoc teams that rely on externalized 
information and shared coordinating mechanisms. In this configuration of 
practices, the management of the licensing process is contingent on the 
emergence of outside-in licensing negotiating capabilities, which are the 
competences of absorbing external information and of conveying all relevant 
information internally to support the internal decision making. 
This study expands previous research that considered the 
centralization and decentralization of decision making in the management of 
technology licensing (A. Arora et al., 2013). The model represented in this 
paper focuses on the organizational design of technology licensing with an 
emphasis on the micro-practices adopted by the IP unit. A closer inspection 
of the micro-practices of the IP unit can improve our understanding of the 
micro-behaviour and of the capabilities that inform technology licensing 
process substantially. The focus on the licensor as the possessor of unique 
competences, for instance to transfer knowledge (Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013), 
is short-sighted , because firms are by their very nature a collection of 
individuals, who are the original source of knowledge and information. A 
deeper analysis of the micro organizational behaviour can cast light on the 
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matching between individual and organizational goals and on the role of 
specific actors in acquiring certain competences that then are aggregated at 
firm level. Disentangling the complexity of the technology licensing process 
at the individual level permits delineating who interacts with whom, who has 
the ultimate decision rights, and so forth. These dimensions of micro-
organizational behaviour are important antecedents of decision-making 
outcomes (Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007; Stinchombe, 1990) and they might 
remain latent and un-explained if scholars focus solely on the organizational 
structure of decision making (Barney & Felin, 2013; Felin & Foss, 2010). 
Therefore, a turn on the micro-practices and the IP unit as a combination of 
individuals permits to disentangle the micro-organizational factors associated 
with capability development in technology licensing decision making. This 
approach is also in line with a recent interest into the micro-foundations of 
management and a focus on how cognition and motivations of decision 
makers impact organizational learning, knowledge and competitive 
performance (Barney & Felin, 2013; Foss & Lindenberg, 2013; Greve, 2013).  
In a related fashion, the paper contributes by linking market for 
technology literature with research on cognitive frames and interpersonal 
politics in decision making (Kaplan, 2008; Snow et al., 1986). Any 
representation of the decision to license technology can be understood as a 
negotiated outcome resulting from diverse internal cognitive frames. In fact, 
different coalitions of interests and views lead to the final decision through 
framing practices in particular context. This suggest that the decision to 
license technology is the result of contrasting interests and internal frictions, 
which find reconciliation through the emergence of a dominant logic. 
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Through the focus on cognitive frames the present study portrays the broader 
dynamics of internal negotiating and the role of cognitive and political models 
in technology licensing. Future studies, maybe lab experiments, might 
explore to what degree differences in frames affect the management of 
information and direct both authority and legitimacy in the decision making. 
We need to understand better how individuals involved in technology 
licensing deploy frames depending on the firm’s strategy and other contextual 
elements. Such research would reinforce our comprehension of the 
microfoundation of cognition under uncertainty in the strategic decision 
making process. 
Finally, this study provides novel and fine-grained insights into the 
processes through which the licensor manages the information flow to 
decrease information asymmetry with respect to the licensee and to the 
competitive scenario. Information asymmetry is a core topic in the market for 
technology and licensing literature and scholars so far assumed that the 
licensor can reduce information asymmetry by the virtue of close 
relationships with the business units, since these have a better understanding 
of the market (Gallini & Winter, 1985; Gallini & Wright, 1990; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1986). In contrast, my cases highlight that the licensor can obtain 
accurate information on the licensee through an internal network that may 
well be detached from the business units and singularly managed by the IP 
unit through an internal competitive analysis.  
The study provides also a non-core and indirect empirical contribution 
to a body of existing research that characterized the organizational traits of 
in-house IP units (Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010; D. 
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Somaya et al., 2007). Indeed, previous research on organizational traits of IP 
departments focused on knowledge proximity of IP members with respect to 
scientists involved in innovation and on the cross-specialized capabilities that 
reside in IP department to obtain rapid patent protection (Reitzig and 
Puranam, 2009). Along these lines, Reitzig and Wagner (2010) depicted the 
knowledge required by IP departments to lower costs related to patent 
prosecution. The present research contributes by providing a qualitative 
model for the role of IP units to manage information flow and coordinating 
mechanisms in technology licensing. The study is set apart from previous 
anecdotal qualitative evidence of technology licensing (Davis, 2008; Phelps 
& Kline, 2009). Instead of focusing on a single industry or indeed on a single 
case study, this study analyses 15 cases spanning the healthcare, 
pharmaceutical, ICT and manufacturing industries and identifies common 
patterns across these sectors. Therefore, the research offers a high degree of 
generalizability of the findings.  
From a normative perspective the findings can help managers 
involved in technology licensing to focus on, to review and to better employ 
internal dynamics that impact the licensing process. Corporations can 
benchmark their licensing practices according to two critical organizational 
aspects, information flow and coordinating mechanisms, in order to develop 
the necessary capabilities. Furthermore, findings from this research could 
highlight areas of attention for organizations that are considering a re-
structuring of their patenting function and want to leverage their IP strategies 
through IP monetization via licensing. Indeed, those organizations could 
reflect on the IP staff profiles they may require if they want to start a licensing 
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program and on the internal process and dynamics that a dedicated licensing 
structure may require to work effectively. 
It is worth mentioning some limitations that affect the present 
research. First, this study focuses on the process of technology licensing, but 
does not provide any recommendation related to the final outcome of the 
decision making –i.e. whether there is a most efficient configuration of micro-
practices among those portrayed in the model for licensing out technology. 
Second, the research focuses on the outbound licensing process and does not 
take inbound licensing of new technologies into account. Finally, in order to 
preserve the parsimoniousness of the model, this study refrains from taking 
into consideration patent characteristics, the nature of the counterpart 
involved in the licensing process or the presence of contingent elements, like 
patent pools or standards, all of which could impact the type of information 
available and the ways through which the licensee and licensor might 
communicate (Joshi & Nerkar, 2011). In turn, this means that all these aspects 
could open the door to further research potentially based on larger and 
quantitative evidence. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
 
This study gives insight into the technology licensing process and the 
role of the IP unit. It provides a novel contribution to the theoretical 
developments in market for technology literature, offering a micro-
foundation of practices and of capabilities that are core to technology 
licensing management. The comparison of cases shows that depending on the 
organizational design of the IP unit and the establishment of a nested licensing 
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unit, the management of information flow and the governance of decision 
making can be organized in two dichotomous systems from which two 
opposing capabilities emerge. When a nested licensing unit is in charge of 
technology licensing, information flow is internalized in the IP unit and 
members involved align their actions through stand-alone coordinating 
mechanisms. This leads to the emergence of inside-out licensing negotiating 
capabilities, which are capabilities to convince external partners of the 
validity and value of the technology. In the absence of a nested licensing unit, 
licensing is internally orchestrated through an external flow of information, 
shared coordination mechanisms and outside-in negotiating capabilities, 
which are the capabilities to convince members of the same organization of 
the value of the license agreement and to moderate the various internal 
debates related to the agreement. The proposed theoretical framework 
expands current explanations on the organization of technology licensing 
decision making by looking at the internal perspective of the IP unit. The 
research disaggregates the antecedents of licensing negotiating capabilities 
and clarifies the relationship between the micro practices of technology 
licensing and internal political influences and power. 
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Chapter 4 Licensing price and indemnification clauses on 
intellectual property rights: An empirical investigation of 
double side moral hazard 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This study examines the role of indemnification clauses on intellectual 
property (IP) rights in the case of licensing deals. I propose that 
indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights operate as signals to 
share the risk and reduce moral hazard in licensing contracts. Building on 
market for technology literature and contract theory, I suggest that the 
inclusion of IP indemnification clauses in technology licensing explains the 
prevalence of payment schemes based on a combination of lump sum and 
royalty rate. Furthermore, the effect is amplified when the licensee and 
licensor operate in distant technological domains. Predictions are tested on 
data from the pharmaceutical industry and we discuss implications for the 
optimal design of licensing contracts.  
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4.1. Introduction 
 
Despite the extraordinary proliferation of technology licensing 
contracts in the last two decades (Ashish Arora & Gambardella, 2010b; 
WIPO, 2012), technology licensing deals remain highly uncertain in their 
process due to moral hazard between the licensee and licensor (Anton & Yao, 
2002; Kamien & Tauman, 2002; Katz & Shapiro, 1985, 1986). Particularly, 
due to unpredictability of technological development and uncertainty about 
intellectual property (IP) rights enforcement, contracting parties could 
experience moral hazard leading to a more volatile payment structure, which 
in turn requires more intense monitoring effort and exposes to higher risk 
(Anton & Yao, 2002; Zuniga & Guellec, 2009).  
A seemingly straightforward option to mitigate moral hazard consists 
in the selection of the optimal payment structure that balances conflicting 
interests and decreases monitoring efforts (Beggs, 1992; Choi, 2001; Gallini 
& Wright, 1990; Kamien, Oren, & Tauman, 1992; Kamien & Tauman, 2002). 
In the ideal situation that contracting parties are symmetrically informed, 
lump sum has been defined as the optimal payment scheme that balances 
interests and leads to an efficient use of technology (Gallini & Winter, 1985; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Scotchmer, 2004). However, licensing contracts have 
been proven to suffer from opportunistic behaviour (Choi, 2001), which in 
turn prevents deals from being complete (Ashish Arora, 1995). Under these 
conditions, the inclusion of a lump sum is the most efficient payment structure 
because the licensor benefits from an easily verifiable and immediate 
payment, avoiding the monitoring of the licensee in the future (Sen & 
Tauman, 2007). However, empirical evidence has demonstrated that royalties 
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are frequently adopted as payment structure when one-sided moral hazard 
emerges (Mendi, 2005). The theoretical justification in this case stems from 
the fact that royalties can be seen as ‘hostages’ that the licensee pays to the 
licensor if the latter fully collaborates in transferring technology and know-
how (Choi, 2001; Macho-Stadler, Martinez-Giralt, & Pérez-Castrillo, 1996). 
Finally, contractual parties can agree to structure payments through a 
combination of lump sum and royalties. From a theoretical point of view, this 
type of payment structure originates from double-sided moral hazard 
(Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, 1995) and is the attempt to balance risks and 
opportunistic behaviour through a shared remuneration.  
The selection of payment structure does not operate in isolation, as 
other instruments have been created to decrease uncertainty on IP rights 
validity in licensing agreements. Indeed, another available strategy rests on 
including warranties and indemnification clauses within the main agreement 
(Furlotti, 2007; Grossman, 1981; Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007). Warranties and 
indemnification clauses are promises to take responsibility for losses suffered 
by the counterparty due to scant product quality (Courville & Hausman, 1979; 
Lutz, 1989). Thus, warranties and indemnification clauses enforce contracts 
and protect negotiating parties in situations where it is costly to verify and 
communicate ex-ante complete information on the qualities of underlying 
goods, services or technologies included in the contract (Dyer, 1997; 
Grossman, 1981).  
In the case of a licensing agreement, indemnification clauses on 
intellectual property rights provide a useful tool to overcome opportunistic 
behaviour of contracting parties (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007). Through the 
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inclusion of the clause, the indemnifier ‘promises’ to financially compensate 
the prosecuted parties in the case of patent infringement (Hagedoorn & 
Hesen, 2007; Vukowich, 1968). Thus, an IP indemnification clause serves as 
a screening device for selecting committed licensors with strong and reliable 
IP rights. In fact, only licensors with strong IP rights would agree to 
indemnify the licensee, given the financial burden related to patent litigation 
(A. Fosfuri & Giarratana, 2010; Galasso et al., 2013). This means that, as the 
licensee knows that only certain types of licensors are willing to agree to an 
indemnification clause, the licensee might not only be keen to do without the 
royalty as a hostage mechanism but also reward licensor commitment and 
thus include a lump sum in the payment scheme. Hence, by sharing litigation 
risk and disclosing the level of commitment of parties, IP indemnification 
clauses create a situation of double-sided moral hazard that finds its 
correlative in the selection of the pricing scheme.  
Despite its relevance, the use of indemnification clauses on 
intellectual property rights in licensing contracts has received limited 
attention by scholars. So far, contributions are limited to offer a theoretical 
justification for the use of IP indemnification clauses (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 
2007; Ramsay, 2003; Vukowich, 1968). Furthermore, practitioners4 assert 
contrasting opinions on the use of IP warranties and indemnification clauses. 
For instance, one focus group participant claimed “(We) never use (them). 
                                                     
4
 Researcher collected explorative data on the use of IP warranties and indemnification 
through a web focus group hosted by Licensing Executive Society: 11 practitioners 
intervened in the discussion on the use warranties and indemnification clauses in licensing 
contracts by describing their understanding on these legal instruments and providing 
examples from practice. Practitioners that attended the focus group were legal and business 
counsels in private practice or organizations. Furthermore, researcher personally interviewed 
three licensing senior managers working in the biotech and pharmaceutical companies. 
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We explicitly provide no warranty. Licensees’ lawyers only raise it try to flush 
out any known potential problems”, while another participant stated “To say 
warranties regarding validity and enforceability in negotiated IP licenses 
never occur is too strong. They are not uncommon”. That is to say, from an 
empirical standpoint we need to shed light on the use of IP indemnification 
clauses as tools to shape opportunistic behavior and moral hazard among 
parties. To this end, the present research aims at depicting how the choice of 
payment structure, particularly of two-part tariff – i.e. the combination of 
royalty and lump-sum- is made under the inclusion of IP indemnities and in 
dependence of double-sided moral hazard in technology licensing contracts. 
My main assumption is that as a demonstrable signal of both patent 
quality and contract parties’ future commitment, IP indemnification clauses 
mitigate information asymmetry for both the licensor and the licensee and 
decrease uncertainty about the exact transferred rights. Thus, IP 
indemnification clauses mitigate moral hazard and should be positively 
correlated with the use of two-part payment structure, which has been shown 
to be an efficient contractual feature in shared contracts (Bhattacharyya & 
Lafontaine, 1995).  
To empirically test my assumptions, I undertook an econometric 
investigation on 151 licensing contracts extracted from the Recap dataset in 
the pharmaceutical industry over the period 1984-2005. I integrate 
information on licensing contracts and their payment structures with 
secondary data on patents disclosed in the deals and financial information on 
the licensees and licensors. The research implements a multinomial logit 
model to correlate pricing schemes with the use of IP indemnification clauses, 
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controlling for technological characteristics of the deals. Results confirm a 
positive relationship between the inclusion of IP warranties and the selection 
of a payment scheme based on lump sum and royalties. I also found evidence 
that this relationship is amplified when contractual parties do not have the 
same expertise and technological overlap is limited.  
 The contributions of my research are threefold. First, I provide 
empirical evidence on double-sided moral hazard and its association with 
pricing schemes in licensing contracts. Indeed, contributions on licensing 
pricing scheme have largely been theoretical and sought to explain incentives 
on innovation and competition in the market (Gallini & Winter, 1985; 
Kamien & Tauman, 2002; Katz & Shapiro, 1986; Sen & Tauman, 2007). In 
contrast, empirical research on licensing pricing schemes still remains a 
limited explored field (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Cebrian, 2009; Mendi, 
2005; Sakakibara, 2010; Vishwasrao, 2007). Following recent studies by 
Cebrian (2009) and Sakakibara (2010), my study consequently aims at 
providing evidence of determinants of pricing schemes. Previous research has 
found support for one-side moral hazard and the use of either royalties or 
lump sum payment schemes (Cebrian, 2009; Mendi, 2005; Vishwasrao, 
2007). Instead, to the best of my knowledge, my study is the first that 
proposes that contractual features in licensing agreements correlate with the 
selection of two-part payment scheme and double-sided moral hazard. Thus, 
this paper answers a call for more empirical evidence on double-sided moral 
hazard in licensing contracts (Cebrian, 2009; Choi, 2001; Vishwasrao, 2007).  
Second, the research expands the economic literature on the design of 
licensing contracts and the use of clauses as contractual features to model 
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moral hazard (Keld Laursen et al., 2013; Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Deepak 
Somaya et al., 2010). In that respect, my study sheds light on indemnification 
clauses on intellectual property rights. These clauses might assume a crucial 
role in moderating the effect of patent litigation risk and thereby promoting 
the sharing of technology in a context where contractual parties might 
otherwise refrain from participating in the market for technologies (Clarkson 
& Toh, 2010; Galasso et al., 2013; Shane & Somaya, 2007; Deepak Somaya, 
2003).  
Third, the research is relevant for its practical implications on licensing 
practices, since it aims at corroborating through a systematic study previous 
anecdotal evidence on the best practices to optimally draft indemnification 
and warranties in license agreements (Doshi & Thomson, 2007; Horwitz, 
2007; Ramsay, 2003). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section reviews previous 
theoretical and empirical contributions and develops research hypotheses on 
the use of indemnification clauses and their correlation with pricing schemes. 
After that, I describe the research design and methodology. I then present the 
findings and discuss the implications for future research and repercussions 
for practitioners.  
 
4.2. Pricing schemes and contractual provisions in technology 
licensing 
 
Licensing contracts regulate the transfer of technology and know-how 
from the licensor to the licensee. Due to both the nature of technology and 
negotiating parties, those contracts are intrinsically uncertain. Licensed 
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technology might evolve and lead to unexpected future implementations, 
exposing licensing parties to the risk of rapid obsolescence or unforeseen 
additional investments (Ashish Arora & Gambardella, 2010a). Furthermore, 
both the licensee and the licensor can be exposed to the risk of moral hazard 
if one of the counterparts possesses more relevant information or if it is not 
possible to monitor the appropriate degree of effort the two parties would 
have to provide for the duration of the agreement (Ashish Arora, 1995). On 
the one hand, the technology might still be too immature to enter into the 
market, requiring the licensee to continue technological exploration and 
development. On the other hand, the licensor might risk losing control of its 
proprietary technology and needs to apply instruments in the licensing deal 
to monitor the licensee’s technological development and economic returns on 
invention (Keld Laursen et al., 2013; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
Alternatively, the licensor might under or over-estimate the 
commercialization capabilities of the licensee and its ability to disseminate 
knowledge from the licensed technologies. Therefore, the licensee might take 
advantage of the situation because there are no tools to align its interests with 
the licensor (Deepak Somaya et al., 2010). As a result, negotiating parties 
might experience difficulties in the formal agreement, slowing the overall 
negotiation or preventing the success of the technology partnership (Shane & 
Somaya, 2007). 
Literature on the economics of licensing has often acknowledged the 
design of pricing schemes as an effective mechanism to align interests and 
lessen moral hazard. In general, the licensing price could be arranged through 
three main types of arrangements: lump-sum, royalty-based and two-part 
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tariff, which is disposed through a combination of the previous two schemes 
(Kamien et al., 1992; Kamien & Tauman, 2002; Katz & Shapiro, 1986; 
Vishwasrao, 2007). Formal models demonstrated the efficiency of lump sum 
respect to royalties in case of perfect information (Gallini & Wright, 1990; 
Kamien & Tauman, 2002). By accepting a fixed amount, the licensor 
immediately secures the payment and avoids any type of opportunistic 
behavior from the licensee concerning future sums. Furthermore, the licensee 
is more willing to opt for a lump sum to not expose itself to increasing 
royalties during the duration of the contract. Indeed, royalty increases the 
marginal cost of the licensee of using the new technology and decreases the 
total amount the licensee is willing to pay to the licensor (Kamien et al., 1992; 
Macho-Stadler et al., 1996). However, licensing contracts inherently suffer 
from incompleteness and opportunistic behavior and empirical evidence 
demonstrated that licensing parties often select royalties as payment scheme 
(Anand & Khanna, 2000b; Cebrian, 2009). The theoretical rationale for 
selecting royalties in licensing contracts stems from the fact that the licensee 
might wish to bind the licensor to provide training and know how upon the 
payment of the royalties (Beggs, 1992; Choi, 2001; Mendi, 2005). In fact, the 
licensor would not have any incentive in sharing know-how, knowledge and 
capabilities with the licensee once signed the contract and secured lump sum. 
Instead, the prospects of obtaining royalties ex post could modify the 
incentives of the licensors, which could be more committed in keeping an on-
going relationship with the licensee. Therefore, the selection of lump sum or 
royalties as payment mechanisms could prevent the aftermath of one-sided 
moral hazard from either the licensor or the licensee slant (Cebrian, 2009). 
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Alternatively, the negotiating parties could opt for a two-part tariff to turn 
opposing interests into double-sided moral hazard. In fact, the licensor owns 
the licensed technology, which is easily observable for both parties. Yet, the 
use of the technology requires effort from the licensee, which is not easily 
observable for the licensor, and potentially the transmission of additional 
knowledge, which depends on the degree of licensor’s commitment. Thus, 
both parties are subject to reciprocal moral hazard. Literature postulated that 
when parties might incur in double-sided moral hazard, a payment scheme 
based on a two-part tariff is the optimal outcome as a way to share incentives 
(Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, 1995; Reid, 1977). Indeed, through a two-part 
tariff parties share the cost of monitoring, the residual shirking and the 
expected penalty costs (P. Agrawal, 2002). On one side, by adding a lump 
sum to royalties, the licensor partly covers the initial costs of monitoring and 
will maintain a certain degree of commitment to permit the licensee to exploit 
the technology and pay the royalties. On the other side, through the 
imposition of the royalties the licensee needs to reveal the produced outcome, 
which can be monitored by the licensor. Furthermore, a combination of lump 
sum and royalties could be beneficial for the licensee in order to negotiate a 
larger initial amount and decrease the royalty rate, deflating therefore its 
marginal costs. In sum, contracts based on payments that include both fixed 
fees and royalties are assumed to balance the economic risk over the time 
among parties (Choi, 2001; Sen & Tauman, 2007), but empirical evidence 
that confirms the relationship is still missing (Cebrian, 2009).  
Another solution to overcome uncertainty and moral hazard in 
licensing transactions consists of the inclusion of provisions and clauses 
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(Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007). Indeed, by including provisions and clauses in 
the design of a licensing agreement, the negotiating parties aim at limiting 
moral hazard and adding relevant information to the contract. A more 
complete contract decreases the risk of moral hazard, improves the quality 
and the amount of information shared between parts, and allows more 
flexibility in the remuneration (Furlotti, 2007).  
A first stream of scholars that analysed the uses of clauses in licensing 
contracts to mitigate moral hazard focused on limitations on the use of the 
technology imposed by exclusivity and grant back clauses. Indeed, Somaya 
and colleagues provided empirical evidence that exclusivity clauses are 
adopted as formal safeguards to protect the licensee’s investments on 
complementary assets and to facilitate contractibility of early stage 
technologies (Deepak Somaya et al., 2010). Within exclusivity clauses, 
geographical or product restrictions may be included to lower the risk of the 
licensor of working exclusively with the licensee. Furthermore, licensor and 
license could monitor moral hazard on the future use and development of 
technology through the use of grant back clauses (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
Indeed, a grant back clause is an obligation to return to the licensor inventive 
upgrades of the technology. Grant back clauses are generally included in 
contracts, in which the licensee and the licensor share a common 
technological background. Moreover, technological uncertainty increases the 
odds of including grant back clause in the contract, particularly when the 
licensed technology is core for the licensee (Keld Laursen et al., 2013). Grant 
back clauses clearly shift incentives to the licensor’s side and lower the 
probability that the licensee acts opportunistically with the licensed 
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technology, decreasing therefore the chances of moral hazard. However, 
empirical research showed that the inclusion of grant back clauses has 
detrimental effects on the licensee’s future inventive efforts. Since a licensee 
cannot fully appropriate value from future developments of innovation, it is 
less likely that it would invest energy, time and financial resources in 
improving the licensed technology (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
A second literature stream focused on contractual features that 
achieve enforcement of rights among parties as an option to overcome moral 
hazard (Furlotti, 2007; Grossman, 1981). With enforcement clauses, parties 
are guaranteed that courts would easily verify the fulfilment of contractual 
obligations whenever specified contingencies would occur. As a result, 
enforcement clauses decrease uncertainty about the proper execution of 
contracts and allocation of rights among parts. The inclusion of enforcement 
clauses decreases contract incompleteness, making sure that counterparts 
would have enough specifications to prove opportunistic behaviour in case 
certain condition would happen. In this category we can find clauses related 
to termination rights and indemnities (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007). Research 
found that in the biotech field those enforcing clauses coupled with access to 
intellectual property rights achieve higher payoffs compared to cases that 
omit the formal option (Lerner & Malmendier, 2010; Lerner & Merges, 
1998). An explanation for these findings relies on the fact that through the 
inclusion of termination rights negotiating parties overcome problems related 
to technological uncertainty and clearly allocate decision rights. Another 
important type of enforcement clauses to model moral hazard refers to 
indemnities. Indemnification clauses act as an ex ante risk allocation 
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mechanism, through which negotiating parties display the reciprocal 
knowledge on a particular state of affairs of a product and carry the risk of 
misrepresentation (Grossman, 1981; Lutz, 1989). Indemnities are therefore 
promises by one party to take responsibility for the loss the other parties 
would suffer if contingent circumstances were to happen.  
With particular reference to licensing practice, indemnification 
clauses on intellectual property rights are important instruments that parties 
choose to negotiate to decrease one-sided moral hazard and signal 
commitment to the deal. Indemnification clauses against patent infringements 
are warranties that cover the licensee and licensor in case the patent(s) would 
be sued in a court for violation of the exclusivity of the registered invention. 
Such challenge occurs increasingly in different technological fields, with a 
strong impact on the organizations’ budget (Galasso et al., 2013; Reitzig et 
al., 2007).  
Following the previous argument, the event of patent litigation is an 
unforeseeable and distressing circumstance for the licensee. Although the 
duty of a thorough examination of a patent’s validity lies with the licensee, it 
is fair to assume that the licensor has a better understanding of the degree of 
freedom granted by the patent(s) in the relevant technological space, given 
the upfront effort of registering the exclusivity of rights. However, a strong 
licensor that agrees to include in the contract an indemnity against IP 
infringement signals both the quality of the licensed patents and a high degree 
of commitment. Given the risk and economic exposure that patent litigation 
can cause, it is likely that only a contracting party well informed about the 
strength and validity of the licensed IP might agree to share the risk of taking 
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part in the plaintiff. Effectively, the introduction of the IP indemnity shifts 
risk between the parties. Thus, the inclusion of an intellectual property 
indemnification clause permits both to monitor contractual partners’ 
commitment ex ante and to enforce specific rights in case contingent events 
occur ex post. As a result, the inclusion of IP indemnity turns the risk of one-
sided opportunistic behaviour into double-sided moral hazard, which is 
reflected in the selection of prices. Indeed, the licensor would be willing to 
accept to share part of the indemnification of the risk if it might receive a less 
volatile payment with respect to royalties and monetize with the inclusion of 
a lump sum to reduce the financial exposure that the contract gives rise to. 
This scenario is coherent with literature on double-sided moral hazard and the 
adoption of two-part tariffs (P. Agrawal, 2002; Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, 
1995). Therefore, I postulate the following hypothesis. 
 
H1: With the inclusion of intellectual property rights indemnification 
clause it is more likely selecting a payment scheme based on lump sum and 
royalties.  
 
Indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights might be 
bundled with an indemnity on products and offer the most extensive insurance 
on future negative events (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 2007; Ramsay, 2003). 
Indemnification clauses on products protect the insured parties against 
economic and reputational damages due to faulty products launched in the 
markets. The combination of those two types of indemnification clauses is 
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particularly relevant for early stage technologies, which still do not present a 
clear path in terms of fields of application or future evolutions of the 
technology.  
While indemnification clauses on intellectual property right are a 
screening device to select partners with a strong patents portfolio, 
indemnification clauses against product liability weeds out licensees with the 
intentions of developing risky products. Furthermore, a product 
indemnification clause induces the licensee to be careful when developing 
products as it carries the cost of a faulty product itself. In this scenario both 
the licensee and the licensor share the risk of negative events happening in 
the future. Following previous arguments, it is still fair to assume that the 
licensee and licensor would opt for a two-part tariff, which permits them to 
regulate and align different interests. Yet, the inclusion of the indemnification 
clause in the design of the agreement is the outcome of a rational exercise 
where negotiating parties consider i) the cost of specifying either unilateral 
or reciprocal duties, ii) the likelihood of the verification of contingent events, 
iii) the chance that the counterpart might act opportunistically in the future 
and eventually iv) the costs to be incurred in case certain provisions would be 
left out of the agreement (Crocker & Reynolds, 1993). Of course, the 
inclusion of indemnification clauses that consider both products and 
intellectual property rights infringements is more costly and increases the 
initial effort of negotiating the terms. Indeed, the bundle of clauses requires 
that negotiating parties properly forecast the likelihood of the occurrence of 
the negative events –i.e. a plaintiff for patent infringements and product 
liability- and design a comprehensive contract. By extending the scope of 
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indemnification and adding additional information on future commitment, 
negotiating parties might find it optimal to select a more efficient payment 
scheme such as lump sum. It is therefore possible to assume that combining 
the IP and products indemnity clauses to guarantee the highest insurance 
coverage would have a marginal decreasing effect on the odds of selecting a 
two-part tariff. In other words, the magnitude of the bundle of clauses on the 
selection of a two-part tariff would be inferior respect to the effect of the 
provision of the IP indemnity only. This leads to my second hypothesis. 
 
H2: The inclusion of an indemnification clause for both intellectual 
property rights and products has decreasing marginal effects on the 
likelihood of selecting a payment scheme based on lump sum and royalties. 
 
4.3. Licensing price, IP indemnification clauses and technological 
relatedness 
 
Previous research on the use of clauses in technology licensing 
agreements demonstrates that the adoption of certain obligations correlates 
with technological relatedness and common expertise between the licensor 
and the licensee (Keld Laursen et al., 2013; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). On 
one side, the licensor should be more advanced on the technological expertise 
as the originator of the licensed technology. Indeed, the licensor should 
possess a more in-depth technological understanding that guarantees an 
increasing ability of judging potential opportunities and threats (Andrea 
Fosfuri, 2006; Kim et al., 2006). Generally, the licensor would benefit from 
a favorable information asymmetry, except for the case in which uncertainty 
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about technological future development is very high. On the other side, 
research reports an improvement in the transfer of knowledge and in the 
absorption of know how if the licensee already masters some technological 
background related to the licensed technology (Ceccagnoli, Higgins, & 
Palermo, 2013; Ceccagnoli & Jiang, 2013). The rationale here is that the 
existence of similarities in the knowledge base decreases information 
asymmetry on previous investments and requires capabilities to license in the 
technology, and helps to disentangle uncertainty about future technological 
patterns. Indeed, firms with similar knowledge background tend to show 
similarities in skills, cognitive structures and frameworks all of which reduce 
the searching costs for potential technological partner and the screening for 
technology (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Katila & Ahuja, 2002; Zander & Kogut, 
1995). Previous empirical research demonstrated that dissimilarities in 
partners’ technological specialization are detrimental to the establishment of 
the license contract, whereas if partners have developed technological 
expertise in the same fields, mutual learning would be more likely and it is 
less necessary developing structured formal arrangements to coordinate 
actions (Colombo, 2003).  
Technological relatedness between licensing partners is correlated 
with the selection of payment scheme. When technological competences are 
aligned and there is a common understanding of capabilities and skills 
necessary to develop the licensed technology, information asymmetry 
between negotiating parties is lower and there is less risk that opportunistic 
behavior takes place (Beggs, 1992). Therefore, we might imagine that when 
technological diversity is very high between licensing partners, a royalty 
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payment method would be selected. This method would allow the licensee to 
share future risks with the licensor –i.e. if future commercialization would be 
unsuccessful for the licensee, the licensor would receive just a small outcome 
based on the royalty percentage- and the licensor to induce the counterpart to 
commit into the commercialization process of licensed technology to sustain 
positive profits in front of the royalty costs. However, information asymmetry 
among parts might be manipulated with the inclusion of clauses. Clauses can 
be generally inserted to decrease information asymmetry and allow flexibility 
and adjustments in case specified contingencies would occur (Crocker & 
Masten, 1988; Crocker & Reynolds, 1993; Furlotti, 2007; Hagedoorn & 
Hesen, 2007). Indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights absolves 
to the specific function of signaling to the contracting parties future 
commitment in the case in which the patent licensed in the deal would be sued 
by a third party. Therefore, IP indemnification clauses decrease ex ante 
information asymmetry and re-assure the licensor and licensee about potential 
support in the case of the aforementioned event. We might assume that if the 
licensee and licensor operate in different technological streams and the 
licensed patent would be sued for infringement, the licensee would find 
herself in a difficult position. Indeed, the licensee might not have all the 
technical knowledge in the field where the patent has been registered and it 
might be difficult for the licensee sustaining the allegations of infringement 
on its own. Particularly under these circumstances, it would be beneficial for 
the licensee to have the support and technical knowledge of the licensor under 
the circumstances of patent litigation. When information asymmetry is high 
due to technological diversity, indemnification clauses would allow sharing 
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future risks to face the event of patent litigation. However, the licensor would 
be more prone to support the licensee in the case of patent litigation if it would 
be able to anticipate some profits at the time of the licensing through a lump 
sum. Thus, the inclusion of the clause as a risk-sharing mechanism is reflected 
in pricing, as negotiating parties would select a two-part price as more 
efficient pricing scheme that would allow to internalize the risk of 
contingencies and rely on double-sided moral hazard (Cebrian, 2009; Furlotti, 
2007; Gallini & Wright, 1990; Lyons, 1996). As a result, in case of high 
technological diversity, parties who include the IP indemnification clause in 
the contract would more likely opt for a combination of lump sum and 
royalties as the preferred payment method instead of pure royalties system. I 
therefore posit that: 
 
H3: When licensing contract includes an IP indemnification clause 
and technological relatedness is low, licensing negotiating parties will opt 
for a payment scheme based on lump sum and royalties.  
 
4.4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.4.1. Data 
 
The research hypotheses are tested on a dataset based on the coding 
of 1830 agreements in the pharmaceutical industry over the time period 1985-
2004. Licensing data were retrieved from the ReCap database. A number of 
considerations prompted me to choose to explore the research question 
through ReCap database. Firstly, the dataset has been extensively used in the 
alliance and licensing literature, making this research comparable with 
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previous findings (Schilling, 2009). Secondly, the dataset offers detailed 
information on the contractual specifications, the technology involved and the 
parts, which subscribed the deal. Particularly, I focused on contracts that 
satisfied the following requirements: i) the contract is a license; ii) 
information on patents and payment scheme is available; iii) the negotiating 
parties involved are not under the same ownership chain –therefore, we 
excluded cross-group deals; iv) only unilateral agreements were selected, 
excluding cross-licensing deals; v) contracts with universities and public 
institutions were excluded. At the end of this process, I had selected 151 
contracts to use for my analysis.  
The pharmaceutical industry is an interesting setting in which to test my 
initial hypotheses because licensing is at the core of large, medium and small 
firms’ innovation strategies (Gunther McGrath & Nerkar, 2004; Schilling, 
2009). Indeed, in the pharmaceutical industry it is very common that small 
biotech firms generate innovation that is subsequently licensed out to larger 
organizations, which eventually bring a technology into the market thanks to 
larger scale capabilities. Since the 1980s, the boost of biotechnology and drug 
discovery in the pharmaceutical industry increased the need for a vertical 
division of innovation that led to a surge of the market for technology and 
knowledge (A. Fosfuri & Giarratana, 2010). Hence, the selected industry is 
often exposed to arm’s length transactions, in which pricing is a crucial 
determinant for the licensor to recover initial investment from innovation. 
Given the frequency and the professionalization of technology licensing in 
the pharmaceutical industry, my investigation also has profound practical 
relevance. 
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I combined patent data of available licensing contracts in the ReCap 
dataset with additional information available through NBER Patent dataset 
(Hall et al., 2001). This step allowed me to build several measures to 
characterize technological features of the contracts. Here, it is worth pointing 
out that the use of patent data is a sufficient yet imperfect proxy of innovation 
at firm level. For example, some firms from the contracts might be innovators 
in their area, but not listed as assignees on patents in the NBER dataset. As a 
result, my approach missed to include those firms in the analysis. I am aware 
of these imperfections, but take solace from the fact that other studies in the 
field of market for technology literature faced similar problems (A. A. 
Ziedonis, 2007). 
Finally I retrieved financial information and firm’s size measures on both the 
licensee and licensor from the Compustat database.  
 
4.4.2. Variables 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable pay_scheme is a three level categorical 
variable indicating the pricing mechanisms selected by the parties. Similarly 
to previous research (Vishwasrao, 2007), I grouped each agreement into one 
of those following categories: contracts with lump sum, royalties or ones with 
both lump sum and royalties. The category lump sum includes up-front fees, 
milestones payment and minimum annual royalties. Royalty category 
comprises royalties on net sales, royalties on gross sales and licensee’s profit 
share. The third category, i.e. two-part tariff, incorporates deals that combine 
both fixed and outcome-based payment schemes. 
Chapter 4 
163 
 
 
Independent variables 
The presence of IP indemnification clauses is captured by two 
dichotomous variables, namely IP indemnification and indemnification 
bundle. The first dummy dichotomous variable (ip_ind) is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the contract includes a warranty only against patent 
infringements. The second dichotomous variable (indm_bundle) assumes 
values equal 1 if the indemnification clause on intellectual property rights is 
associated to the indemnification clause on faulty products that could derive 
from the licensed technology. I also created a dichotomous variable 
(prod_only) to monitor when contracts include indemnifications on products 
derive from licensed technology, which might be proved invalid or useless 
during technological development, damaging the downstream 
commercialization. 
The other explanatory variable is technological distance (tech_dist). I 
started measuring technological relatedness between licensing partners by 
looking at the distribution of patents across three digits USPTO patent classes 
in the five years previous licensing agreement and measuring the degree of 
technological overlap (Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Jaffe, 1986). 
Therefore, I calculate the following measure 
�݁ܿℎ݊݋݈݋݃݅ܿ�݈ ݎ݈݁�ݐ݁݀݊݁ݏݏ = ܨ௜ܨ௝′√ሺܨ௜ܨ௜′ሻሺܨ௝ܨ௝′ሻ 
Where the multidimensional vector Fi=(F1i, FSi) represents the number of 
patents assigned to firm i from class 1 to S. The variable ranges from 0 to 1, 
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where value close to 1 indicating the highest degree of technological overlap. 
Based on the measure of technological relatedness, I defined technological 
distance (tech_dist) as follows  
�݁ܿℎ݊݋݈݋݃݅ܿ�݈ ݀݅ݏݐ�݊ܿ݁ = 1 − ܨ௜ܨ௝′√ሺܨ௜ܨ௜′ሻሺܨ௝ܨ௝′ሻ 
The variable ranges from 0 to 1, where value close to 1 indicating the highest 
degree of technological distance. 
 
Controls 
 
In order to account for other effects, I include a number of controls that past 
research demonstrated to affect licensing process and the selection of pricing 
options. 
 
Patents and technology specialization measures 
I control for patents’ generality for both the licensee and licensor. Based on 
previous literature (Hall et al., 2001), generality is defined at patent level as  ܩ݁݊݁ݎ�݈݅ݐݕ௜ = 1 − ∑ ݏ௜௝ଶ௡೔௝  
Where sij denotes the percentage of citations received by paten i that belong 
to patent class j, out of ni patent classes. Generality is a measure for 
innovation based on citations obtained from patents in other technological 
classes. If the index is high, it is possible assuming that the patent had a 
widespread impact. At patent portfolio level, this measure permits us to 
acknowledge whether the licensee (see_generality) and licensor 
(sor_generality) were influential innovators in a variety of fields.  
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I control for technological specialization by calculating the Herfindhal index 
for the total number of patents in the firm J’s patent portfolio accumulated 
during 5 years before the license agreement. For the licensor, the measure 
(sor_herf) can be operationalized as follow.  ݈݅ܿ݁݊ݏ݋ݎ ݐ݁ܿℎ݊݋݈݋݃݅ܿ�݈ ݏ݌݁ܿ݅�݈݅ݖ�ݐ݅݋݊ = ∑ ሺ�௜௝�௜ ሻଶ௝=ଵ  
An equal operationalization has been used to monitor licensee’s technological 
specialization (see_herf). 
 
State of technological development 
A potential cause of moral hazard is the degree of exploitation of the 
technology from on the licensee’s perspective depending upon technology 
maturity (K. Laursen et al., 2010; Leone & Reichstein, 2012). I build the 
variable early_tech in order to control at which stage of the development the 
drug or technology has been licensed out. Indeed, the stages of a drug 
development can be described into discovery, clinical trials and regulatory 
approvals. The discovery phase includes preclinical trials, in which the 
compound is tested to assessing safety on animal testing and biological 
efficacy of the molecule. In the next stage, clinical trials, the compound is 
tested on humans to show that the benefits of the drug out-weight the potential 
risks. In the last stage, the technology is under scrutiny to the authorities to 
obtain approval for market commercialization. I coded the dichotomous 
variable early_tech equal 1 if the technology was licensed during the first 
discovery phase. 
 
Other obligations in the contract 
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The number of other obligations stated in the contract is another important 
dimension that needs to be controlled. Indeed, the higher the number of 
contractual clauses included in a licensing deal, the higher is the information 
available and the lower is the risk of moral hazard (Lerner & Malmendier, 
2010; Ryall & Sampson, 2009). For each licensing agreement it was possible 
retrieving information whether the parties drafted additional clauses such as 
grant back, exclusivity and technology furnishing clause. Informed by 
previous research (Leone & Reichstein, 2012; Deepak Somaya et al., 2010) 
and general prescriptions from the business practice (Ramsay, 2003), I 
created a variable other_obb that counts the number of aforementioned 
additional clauses inserted in the agreement to control for degree of 
completeness of licensing contracts. 
 
Trust 
Previous studies found that transactions do not always occur as stand-alone 
events, yet they could be contextualized into on-going relationships (Cebrian, 
2009; Kim et al., 2006). To operationalize this construct, the research would 
control though the variable count_inter how many previous negotiation 
reported in the dataset the licensee and licensor have been established before 
the licensing agreement. 
 
Bargaining power  
Differences in bargaining power among parts might produce different effects 
on the pricing outcome. The paper controls for potential issues related 
through bargaining power through two constructs. First, I measured the 
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company size by counting the average number of employees of both licensee 
(see_emp) and licensor (sor_emp) during five years before the license 
agreement. These two measures control for different exploitation of market 
for technology by large and small-medium firms (Gambardella et al., 2007; 
Joshua S Gans & Stern, 2003). Second, allocation of rights between the 
licensee and the licensor might reflect bargaining power (Deepak Somaya et 
al., 2010). Thus, the research controls with a dichotomous variables (ins_sor) 
if the indemnified part is the licensor. The idea behind is that the indemnified 
party transfers part of the risk to the indemnifier. In a normal case we might 
expect the licensee be in the indemnified party. However, if the licensor is the 
indemnified party, we might expect that this latter has higher bargaining 
power in the relationship with the licensee. 
4.4.3. Methodology 
 
The observed outcome is a multi-categorical variable that codes three 
different payment schemes: lump sum, royalties and a combination of the 
previous two ones. Thus, I adopted a multinomial logistic model to estimate 
the likelihood of selecting a payment scheme, given the presence of 
indemnification clauses and technological features in the agreement. I used 
lump sum payment as the baseline category and then estimated two 
parameters for each explanatory variable. Therefore, if we define Pr(Yi) as 
the probability of selecting a payment scheme, we can formalize the 
econometric model as  
 Prሺ�௜ = ݆|��ሻ = exp ሺ�೔ఉ೔ೕሻ∑ ௘௫௣ ሺ�೔ఉ೔�ሻ��=1               ݆ = 1, … , �          ሺ1ሻ  
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Where J=3 categories and in the sum in the denominator the index l 
takes the values 1, 2, and 3 to produce the three required terms. In this 
particular specification, I selected j equal 1 as the reference category –i.e. 
lump sum- so that the econometric model allows me to estimate the 
coefficients �௜,ଶ and �௜,ଷ. On one side, the coefficient �௜,ଶ describes how the 
independent variable xi influences the probability of selecting a royalty based 
payment respect to the baseline option –i.e. lump sum. On the other side, the 
second coefficient �௜,ଷ expresses the likelihood of selecting a two-tariff 
scheme instead of a lump sum. I also estimated models where the baseline 
category is royalty payment, in order to control for consistency in the results 
of two-tariff scheme respect to the likelihood of selecting either a lump sum 
or a royalty-based payment. 
I complement the analysis of coefficients with the estimation of 
average marginal effects. Indeed, interpretation of regression tables of non-
linear models can be overwhelming, particularly when the models contain 
interaction effects and categorical variables (Wooldridge, 2004). Therefore, 
to improve the interpretation of the results and coherently with recent research 
on the “observed value” approach (Hanmer & Ozan Kalkan, 2013), I report 
the marginal effects of each covariates, using the values actually taken on by 
each observation and then computing the average. The benefit of using 
average marginal effects in nonlinear models is providing an understanding 
of the magnitude of the effect, while estimated coefficients would provide 
information on the direction of the relationship (Cameron & Trivedi, 2009; 
Hanmer & Ozan Kalkan, 2013).  
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4.5. Results 
 
The sample consists of 151 contracts on licensing contracts 
established in the pharmaceutical industry between 1985 and 2004.  
Graphs 4.1 to 4.3 provide a descriptive understanding of the distribution of 
the payment schemes.  
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Graph 4.1: Distribution of payment scheme when indemnification clauses are 
not included 
 
 Note: (1) Lump sum; (2) Royalties; (3) Lump sum and royalties 
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Graph 4.2: Distribution of payment scheme when IP indemnification clauses 
are included 
 
Note: (1) Lump sum; (2) Royalties; (3) Lump sum and royalties 
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Graph 4.3: Distribution of payment scheme when both IP and product 
indemnities are both included 
 
Note: (1) Lump sum; (2) Royalties; (3) Lump sum and royalties 
 
As graph 4.1 shows, for a subsample of contracts where the intellectual 
property rights indemnification clauses were not included in the agreement, 
the distribution of payment scheme is clustered on royalties, coherently with 
other empirical findings (Cebrian, 2009; Mendi, 2005). However, graphs 4.2 
and 4.3 show clearly that the distribution of payment schemes shifts towards 
a combination of lump sum and royalties when I consider contracts that 
included an IP indemnification clause and a combination of this latter and 
products indemnity. The aforementioned graphs therefore provide a visual 
representation of hypothesised effect on the selection of two-part tariff as 
payment scheme because of double-sided moral hazard; however, through 
graphical representation it is not possible obtaining a clear understanding of 
the magnitude.  
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Thus, I estimated the likelihood of selecting two-part payment scheme 
respect to lump sum and royalties using a multinomial logistic regression 
model for the 151 contracts in our sample. I run regression models at 
technology level, clustering errors at contract level on 226 observations. 
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the data and some descriptive statistics. 
Table 4.2 reports correlates of variables included in the analysis. 
 
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
pay_scheme 226 2.389381 0.765171 1 3 
ip_only 226 0.017699 0.132148 0 1 
prod_only 226 0.477876 0.500619 0 1 
indm_bundle 226 0.362832 0.481884 0 1 
tech_dist 226 0.720857 0.275723 0.014421 1 
count_inter 226 376.5708 574.6744 0 1560 
early_tech 226 0.376106 0.485483 0 1 
other_obb 226 1.486726 1.116463 0 4 
sor_emp 226 16.37381 54.79823 0.015 269.465 
sor_herf 226 0.55126 0.236035 0 0.974599 
sor_generality 226 0.697859 0.206714 0 1 
ins_sor 226 0.323009 0.468664 0 1 
see_herf 226 0.661113 0.309109 0 0.968343 
see_generality 226 0.635683 0.289346 0 1 
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Table 4.2: correlations 
  ip_only prod_onl
y 
indm_bundl
e 
tech_dis
t 
count_inte
r 
early_tec
h 
other_ob
b 
sor_em
p 
sor_her
f 
sor_generalit
y 
ins_so
r 
see_her
f 
see_genelit
y 
ip_only 1 
            
prod_only -
0.1284 
1 
           
indm_bundle -
0.1013 
-0.7219 1 
          
tech_dist -
0.0713 
-0.081 0.1198 1 
         
count_inter -
0.0871 
0.356 -0.1814 0.5122 1 
        
early_tech -
0.1042 
0.2995 -0.187 0.0942 0.512 1 
       
other_obb -
0.0285 
-0.0761 0.1494 -0.1919 -0.5135 -0.5278 1 
      
sor_emp -
0.0401 
-0.1862 0.2198 0.2223 -0.1647 -0.2286 -0.0669 1 
     
sor_herf 0.0387 -0.2125 -0.0269 -0.0395 -0.5016 -0.2585 0.0389 0.4832 1 
    
sor_generality 0.0339 -0.3278 0.2916 0.3857 0.066 -0.0404 -0.1893 0.2914 0.2422 1 
   
ins_sor -
0.0927 
0.5515 -0.3441 0.0189 0.5908 0.4404 -0.4802 -0.0988 -0.1561 -0.0314 1 
  
see_herf 0.0208 0.1418 -0.3108 -0.0795 0.2825 0.0493 -0.0076 -0.5318 -0.4936 -0.1223 0.1463 1 
 
see_generalit
y 
0.0061 -0.1467 0.0183 0.0147 0.044 0.0173 0.079 -0.0368 -0.029 -0.0133 0.021 -0.0138 1 
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Correlations among variables are below the threshold r=0.7 (Cohen, Cohen, 
West, & Aiken, 2003), suggesting that multi-collinearity does not affect 
estimation.  
The results of the multinomial logistic model are reported in tables 4.3.1 
(baseline payment scheme: lump sum), 4.3.2 (average marginal effects), 4.4.1 
(interaction effect with technological distance, baseline payment scheme: 
lump sum) and 4.4.2 (average marginal effects of the interaction models). As 
baseline for our estimates I selected lump sum payment, because it would be 
the most efficient payment scheme that parties would ideally select if no 
moral hazard would exist and with perfect information (Kamien et al., 1992; 
Katz & Shapiro, 1985). In the Appendix I reported results obtained by using 
royalty as baseline payment scheme. I found supporting confirmatory 
evidence for those additional models.  
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Table 4.3.1: multinomial logit (baseline payment scheme: lump sum) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
lump sum lump sum lump sum 
 
royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part 
count_inter 0.0260 0.0220 0.0199 0.0159 0.0204 0.0163 
 
(0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0192) (0.0191) 
       
early_tech -5.143** -3.947** -5.287** -4.219** -4.854** -4.107** 
 
(1.9581) (1.2261) (1.8311) (1.1578) (1.4422) (1.1095) 
       
other_obb -0.5483 0.5870 -0.1037 1.0153 -0.3495 0.6527 
 
(0.8945) (0.6962) (1.0995) (0.9148) (0.7716) (0.6947) 
       
sor_emp -0.0025 -0.0045 0.0004 -0.0057 0.0000 -0.0065 
 
(0.0198) (0.0084) (0.0216) (0.0073) (0.0141) (0.0069) 
       
sor_herf -2.9702 -6.2205* -4.3196 -7.0920* -5.8077 -5.7321* 
 
(6.7354) (2.9605) (7.4647) (3.2372) (5.0908) (2.7254) 
       
sor_generality 3.2415 0.7081 2.9812 1.0624 2.8676 0.7795 
 
(7.8594) (2.5510) (8.2604) (2.7621) (6.1697) (2.3007) 
       
ins_sor 3.5980* 3.5329** 4.1572+ 4.0472+ 2.9543+ 3.4478** 
 
(1.7077) (1.2994) (2.4807) (2.3125) (1.7056) (1.3102) 
       
see_herf 10.7842 7.0731* 10.6741 6.6667* 8.7866 7.2025* 
 
(7.9660) (3.4058) (8.7804) (3.0967) (5.9385) (3.0150) 
       
see_generality -1.2283 -6.0637+ -0.8692 -6.1474* -1.2072 -6.0915+ 
 
(6.0567) (3.5044) (6.4267) (2.8235) (5.6933) (3.3682) 
       
ip_only -1.2237 13.2449** 
    
 
(2.7509) (2.0887) 
    
       
prod_only 
  
-1.7587 -1.6350 
  
   
(2.1164) (2.0337) 
  
       
indm_bundle 
    
-1.2822 1.0937 
     
(1.5739) (1.1714) 
       
_cons -5.3986 4.9277 -4.4784 5.8112+ -1.5771 4.3526 
 
(10.7493) (3.5073) (11.9170) (3.2696) (9.3262) (3.2647) 
"N" 226 226 226 226 226 226 
ll -72.8331 -72.8331 -72.6709 -72.6709 -69.3322 -69.3322 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4.3.2: average marginal effect when baseline payment is lump sum 
 
 
AME1 AME2 AME3 
 
Lump sum Lump sum Lump sum 
 
royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part 
count_inter 
0.00035
7 0.000422 
0.00032
2 0.000218 
0.000327
+ 0.000245 
 
(1.59) (0.62) (1.59) (0.32) (1.73) (0.45) 
       
early_tech -0.0927 -0.0497 -0.0851 -0.0585 -0.0655 -0.0768 
 
(-0.96) (-0.46) (-0.87) (-0.54) (-0.97) (-0.96) 
       
other_obb -0.0671+ 0.0820* -0.0652+ 0.0937* -0.0544+ 0.0709* 
 
(-1.93) (2.12) (-1.72) (2.14) (-1.85) (2.11) 
       
sor_emp 
0.00010
1 
-
0.000248 
0.00036
0 
-
0.000522 0.000345 
-
0.000530 
 
(0.10) (-0.26) (0.31) (-0.48) (0.45) (-0.71) 
       
sor_herf 0.170 -0.370 0.141 -0.363 -0.0356 -0.158 
 
(0.44) (-1.02) (0.33) (-0.89) (-0.13) (-0.61) 
       
sor_generalit
y 0.160 -0.123 0.124 -0.0807 0.125 -0.0874 
 
(0.33) (-0.26) (0.24) (-0.16) (0.34) (-0.24) 
       
ins_sor 0.0210 0.102 0.0247 0.109 -0.00978 0.123+ 
 
(0.28) (1.16) (0.30) (1.01) (-0.15) (1.66) 
       
see_herf 0.263 
-
0.000156 0.279 -0.0417 0.131 0.120 
 
(0.70) (-0.00) (0.65) (-0.10) (0.48) (0.48) 
       
see_generalit
y 0.269 -0.455+ 0.301 -0.480 0.249 -0.428+ 
 
(1.03) (-1.78) (0.97) (-1.59) (0.99) (-1.71) 
       
ip_only -0.828* 1.217** 
    
 
(-2.10) (3.11) 
    
       
prod_only 
  
-0.0149 -0.0395 
  
   
(-0.29) (-0.50) 
  
       
indm_bundle 
    
-0.131+ 0.155* 
     
(-1.70) (1.98) 
       
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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As shown in Model 1 in table 4.3.1, the inclusion of an 
indemnification clause on IP has a positive and significant effect on the 
likelihood of selecting a two-part tariff (βip_only= 13.24, p<0.01), confirming 
hypothesis 1 and the presence of double-sided moral hazard. Through the 
comparison with Model 2 and Model 3 in table 4.3.1, it is possible noting that 
the positive effect is associated with the specific inclusion of indemnities on 
intellectual property rights. In fact, it is interesting observing that when the 
contracts include products indemnification clauses, parties are more prone 
towards a lump sum and less likely of selecting a two-part tariff (βprod_only= -
1.64), although results are not fully supported by statistical significance. On 
the opposite side, the sign of the relationship become positive when 
indemnification clauses cover both products and intellectual property rights 
(βbundle= -1.09), confirming the correlation between IP indemnities and two-
part tariff in support of double-sided moral hazard. I computed the average 
marginal effects of the multinomial logistic regression to tease out the 
magnitude of the effect of IP indemnification clauses when used alone and in 
association with product indemnities. Results are available on table 4.3.2. The 
average marginal effect of the inclusion of IP indemnification clauses is 
positive when contracts include IP indemnities as well as the bundle of 
indemnification clauses. However, the average marginal effect on the odds of 
selecting a two-part tariff is larger when IP indemnities are adopted as stand-
alone clauses (AMEip_only=1.21, p<0.01). Indeed, what table 3.2 suggests is 
that at margins the effect of IP indemnification clause is decreasing when they 
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are associated with products indemnities (AMEindm_bundle=0.15, p<0.05). Thus 
also hypothesis 2 is confirmed.  
In table 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 I tested the effects of technological distance 
and IP indemnification clauses jointly on the selection of pricing scheme. 
First I evaluated the direct effect of technological distance on pricing scheme 
and I then added the interaction with indemnification clauses.  
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Table 4.4.1 multinomial logit (baseline payment scheme: lump sum) and technological distance is a moderator  
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 
lump sum lump sum lump sum lump sum lump sum lump sum 
 
royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part royalty two-part 
count_inter 0.0268 0.0228 0.0205 0.0168 0.0215 0.0176 0.0260 0.0220 0.0239 0.0201 0.0208 0.0165 
 
(0.0245) (0.0246) (0.0249) (0.0250) (0.0201) (0.0201) (0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0229) (0.0229) (0.0186) (0.0185) 
early_tech -5.2654** -4.0988** -5.2934** -4.2608** -4.9361** -4.1959** -5.1424** -3.9470** -5.2009** -4.1270** -5.1150** -4.0651** 
 
(1.8650) (1.2750) (1.7740) (1.1712) (1.4563) (1.1599) (1.9581) (1.2260) (1.8072) (1.1090) (1.5702) (1.1218) 
other_obb -0.5328 0.6017 -0.1047 1.0224 -0.3279 0.6736 -0.5484 0.5869 -0.4874 0.6337 -0.3351 0.5752 
 
(0.9232) (0.7176) (1.1372) (0.9678) (0.7833) (0.7117) (0.8945) (0.6961) (0.8595) (0.6920) (0.8379) (0.6996) 
sor_emp -0.0030 -0.0047 -0.0013 -0.0053 -0.0011 -0.0061 -0.0025 -0.0045 0.0007 -0.0062 0.0016 -0.0074 
 
(0.0220) (0.0081) (0.0246) (0.0072) (0.0157) (0.0069) (0.0198) (0.0084) (0.0200) (0.0080) (0.0144) (0.0080) 
sor_herf -2.1505 -5.4045* -3.9608 -6.8324 -4.9437 -4.9503* -2.9703 -6.2205* -3.4384 -6.0091* -5.6141 -5.6473* 
 
(6.5738) (2.6509) (7.5903) (4.2145) (4.6545) (2.3916) (6.7353) (2.9603) (6.2819) (2.9134) (4.9363) (2.6181) 
sor_generality 3.1932 0.7976 2.6007 1.0441 2.6607 0.7079 3.2421 0.7086 2.8273 0.9218 2.8590 0.5977 
 
(8.0770) (2.3487) (7.7156) (2.7569) (5.7942) (2.1978) (7.8595) (2.5508) (6.9611) (2.3470) (6.7438) (2.2891) 
ins_sor 3.4119 3.3229* 4.3110 3.9589 2.9471 3.2504* 3.5979* 3.5328** 3.5048* 3.5810* 3.1541 3.6262* 
 
(2.4461) (1.3767) (3.3527) (2.7728) (2.2808) (1.3971) (1.7076) (1.2993) (1.7442) (1.4196) (1.9336) (1.4613) 
see_herf 10.9001 7.2134* 10.7794 6.7768* 8.9735 7.3864* 10.7833 7.0722* 10.9568 6.9734* 9.3853 7.1806* 
 
(7.9253) (3.5368) (8.7181) (3.4005) (5.9902) (3.2552) (7.9656) (3.4050) (7.9566) (3.2134) (6.9968) (3.2076) 
see_generality -1.4041 -6.2470+ -0.9817 -6.2808* -1.3923 -6.2983+ -1.2279 -6.0633+ -0.8594 -6.2193+ -1.2153 -5.9548+ 
 
(6.1481) (3.5792) (6.7082) (3.1066) (5.8366) (3.4643) (6.0563) (3.5037) (6.4313) (3.2975) (5.7503) (3.2621) 
tech_dist -0.8564 -1.0337 0.4312 -0.4248 -0.4764 -1.0696 
      
 
(4.1327) (2.0361) (4.0156) (2.5150) (3.4100) (1.9431) 
      
ip_only -1.6306 12.7632** 
          
 
(2.6810) (2.2905) 
          
prod_only 
  
-1.7590 -1.5726 
        
   
(2.4467) (2.3783) 
        
indm_bundle 
    
-1.3143 1.0601 
      
     
(1.6350) (1.2227) 
      
ip_only#tech_dist 
      
-2.9129 27.4024** 
    
       
(6.1792) (4.6734) 
    
prod_only#tech_dist 
        
0.2285 -0.4515 
  
         
(2.0260) (1.6942) 
  
indm_bundle#tech_dist 
          
-1.4302 1.1194 
           
(2.8803) (2.2100) 
_cons -5.1936 5.1381 -4.7033 5.9233+ -1.6330 4.6482 -5.3986 4.9276 -5.2092 5.0546 -2.1836 4.5832 
 
(10.4860) (3.4520) (11.5648) (3.3286) (9.0860) (3.4107) (10.7491) (3.5069) (11.0388) (3.2181) (10.6526) (3.3483) 
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 226 
ll -72.7117 -72.7117 -72.5462 -72.5462 -69.1361 -69.1361 -72.8331 -72.8331 -73.2956 -73.2956 -71.3310 -71.3310 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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Table 4.4.2 average marginal effect when baseline payment is lump sum and 
technological distance is a moderator 
 
AME7 AME8 AME9 
 
Lump sum Lump sum Lump sum 
 
royalty two-part royalty 
two-
part royalty 
two-
part 
count_inter 0.000357 0.000422 
0.0003
35 
0.0003
78 
0.00033
5+ 
0.0002
51 
 
(1.59) (0.62) (1.64) (0.58) (1.77) (0.45) 
       
early_tech -0.0927 -0.0497 
-
0.0865 -0.0613 -0.0824 -0.0620 
 
(-0.96) (-0.46) (-0.91) (-0.58) (-1.06) (-0.70) 
       
other_obb -0.0671+ 0.0820* 
-
0.0668
* 
0.0833
* -0.0514 
0.0666
+ 
 
(-1.93) (2.12) (-2.15) (2.38) (-1.44) (1.68) 
       
sor_emp 0.000101 -0.000248 
0.0004
01 
-
0.0005
81 
0.00049
8 
-
0.0007
06 
 
(0.10) (-0.26) (0.38) (-0.58) (0.62) (-0.88) 
       
sor_herf 0.170 -0.370 0.131 -0.327 -0.0256 -0.168 
 
(0.44) (-1.02) (0.37) (-0.96) (-0.10) (-0.67) 
       
sor_generality 0.160 -0.123 0.123 -0.0821 0.138 -0.106 
 
(0.33) (-0.26) (0.29) (-0.20) (0.34) (-0.27) 
       
ins_sor 0.0210 0.102 0.0123 0.111 -0.0104 0.132 
 
(0.28) (1.16) (0.17) (1.22) (-0.13) (1.49) 
       
see_herf 0.263 -0.000163 0.281 -0.0210 0.166 0.0904 
 
(0.70) (-0.00) (0.75) (-0.06) (0.49) (0.28) 
       
see_generality 0.269 -0.455+ 0.304 -0.494+ 0.253 -0.434 
 
(1.03) (-1.78) (1.03) (-1.72) (0.92) (-1.60) 
       
tech_dist 
-
0.0000001
33 
0.000000
231 0.0102 -0.0159 
-
0.0388+ 
0.0491
+ 
 
(-1.06) (1.07) (0.42) (-0.48) (-1.89) (1.76) 
       
ip_only#tech_dist -1.177* 1.689** 
    
 
(-2.06) (2.95) 
    
       
prod_only#tech_d
ist 
  
0.0271 -0.0349 
  
   
(0.48) (-0.56) 
  
       
indm_bundle#tec
h_dist 
    
-0.0949 0.111 
     
(-1.28) (1.40) 
       
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
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In Models 4 to 6 in table 4.4.1 I tested direct effect of technological 
distance (tech_dist) on pricing scheme. The sign of the relationship between 
technological distance (βtech_dist) and the selection of two-part tariff pricing 
scheme is negative although not statistically significant, as shown in Models 
4 to 6. Instead, when technological distance and the inclusion of IP 
indemnities are considered jointly, the coefficient is positive and statically 
significant (βip_only#tech_dist=27.4, p<0.01, Model 7). Also the average marginal 
effects for the moderating effect of technological distance in table 4.4.2 are 
positive and statistically significant (AMEip_only#tech_dist=1.69, p<0.01, AME 
7). Interestingly, the average marginal effect of IP indemnification clauses 
when associated with technological distance between the negotiating parties 
is higher respect to the case described in AME 1 (see table 4.3.2). It suggests 
that when negotiating parties might suffer from information asymmetry due 
to a lack of technological understanding, the inclusion of IP indemnities 
balances the risks and strongly shifts the odds into a shared-based payment 
scheme such as two-part tariff. Finally, the coefficient for the interaction 
between technological distance and the bundle of IP and product clauses in 
table 4.1 is positive although not statistically significant 
(βindm_bundle#tech_dist=1.12, Model 9) and the same results are shown also for the 
average marginal effects in table 4.4.2 (AMEindm_bundle#tech_dist=0.11, AME 9). 
I can conclude that hypothesis 3 is supported for the inclusion of indemnities 
on IP only, but I could not find evidence to extend my reasoning to the 
inclusion of the indemnification on both IP and products when the licensor 
and licensee are technologically distant.  
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4.5.1 Additional analysis 
 
The inclusion of an indemnification clause is a complex negotiating 
mechanism that could be influenced by additional aspects not considered in 
the regression analysis. Particularly, the introduction of a contractual clause 
could be directed by the financial stability of contracting parties (Lerner & 
Merges, 1998) and their patenting expertise (Leone & Reichstein, 2012). 
These variables are not directly correlated with the selection of the payment 
scheme, yet they might influence the choice of including an indemnification 
clause in the first instance and they might cause endogeneity in the estimates. 
In order to ensure that my findings are not biased by endogeneity, I tested the 
hypotheses using a structural equation model that consider the effect of 
financial stability of contracting parties and their patenting expertise as 
antecedents of the choice of including an indemnification clause on 
intellectual property rights.  
Structural equations are suitable models to test endogeneity and reverse 
causality when dependent variables in the simultaneous equations are 
categorical or dichotomous and linear instrumental models would not fit the 
estimations (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, & Pickles, 2004; Skondral & Rabe-
Hesketh, 2005).  
I measured financial exposure of contracting parties as the ratio between debts 
and activities as reported in the balance sheet of both the licensee 
(debt_index_see) and licensor (debt_index_sor) for the five years before the 
licensing deal (Lerner & Malmendier, 2010; Lerner & Merges, 1998). 
Following previous research (K. Laursen et al., 2010), I measured patenting 
experience as the lag between the license year and the year of issue of first 
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patent for every contracting party. I computed the measure for both the 
licensor (sor_pat_exp) and licensee (see_pat_exp). The structure of equations 
is formed by two levels. In the first equation, the model aims at estimating 
the likelihood of drafting an IP indemnification clause (ip_only) in the 
contract, given the financial stability and (debt_index_sor) and patent 
expertise (sor_pat_exp) when the licensor’s perspective is considered. Being 
the dependent variable a dichotomous one, the first equation accommodates 
logit estimation. The second equation simultaneously calculates the 
probabilities of selecting a payment scheme through a multinomial logistic 
model, given incorporated results from the first equation and the control 
variables explained in the methods section. The formalization of the structure 
of equations for the variable ip_only follows here below. 
 
{ Pr(݅݌௢௡�௬ = 1|�) = exp ሺ�೔ఊ೔ሻଵ+exp ሺ�೔ఊ೔ሻPrሺ݌�ݕ_ݏܿℎ݁݉݁ = ݆|��ሻ = exp ሺ�೔ఉ೔ೕሻଵ+∑ ௘௫௣ ሺ�೔ఉ೔�ሻ��=1               ݆ = 1, … , � (2) 
 
Where zi=(debt_index_sor, sor_pat_exp) for the logit equation, while for the 
multinomial logit equation xi contains the covariates (tech_dist, count_inter, 
early_tech, other_obb, ins_sor, sor_emp, sor_herf, sor_generality, see_her 
see_generality) and ip_only as estimated in the first regression, J=3 categories 
and in the sum in the denominator the index l takes the values 1, 2, and 3 to 
produce the three required terms. I run structural equation models also for the 
variables prod_only and indm_bundle and I consider both the licensor and 
licensee sides. 
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I performed the analysis using gsem function in STATA14. Models with 
results are available from the author. In order to understand whether the 
inclusion of the instruments is significant for the analysis, it is necessary 
comparing results from structural equations –i.e. the full form- with those 
obtained through the simplified multinomial logistic function –i.e restricted 
form- discussed in the results session. I performed the LM test on both full 
and restricted forms calculated for the variables ip_only, prod_only and 
indm_bundle and I could not reject the null hypothesis, meaning that the 
inclusion of the instruments is not significant and should make little if no 
difference to maximize the value of the likelihood function. In addition, for 
both the full and restricted forms I checked the Akaike information and 
Bayesian information criterion as test for goodness-of-fit. The test 
highlighted that the reduced form presents better measures of fit and 
complexity –i.e. lower AIV and BIC- respect to the full forms. Overall, 
structural equations do not provide a better specification and multinomial 
logit model should be preferred as parsimonious form because it 
demonstrated to fit better with the scope of estimation. Thus, I conclude that 
endogeneity is not an issue in the models.  
 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Research develops an econometric investigation on licensing 
contracts in the biotech industry through a multinomial logistic model to 
correlate licensing price schemes with indemnification clauses on intellectual 
property rights, controlling for technological features of contracting parties.  
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I propose that the selection of pricing scheme in technology licensing 
deals could rely on the existence of double-sided moral hazard induced 
through the use of IP indemnification clauses. Building on licensing literature 
and contract theory, I suggest that the inclusion of indemnities on intellectual 
property rights increases the odds of selecting a two-part tariff as payment 
scheme, because negotiating parties are bounded by double-sided moral 
hazard. Given the risks and strong financial exposure of patent litigation, the 
inclusion of an IP indemnity is a signal of future commitment of the 
negotiating parties and a flag on the quality of patents included in the contract. 
With the introduction of an indemnity on intellectual property rights 
negotiating parties share the risk of patent litigation and so they are more 
likely to opt for a pricing scheme that reflects the sharing of future 
responsibilities. Thus, negotiating parties would be more likely to opt for a 
pricing scheme such as a two-part tariff to justify double-sided moral hazard. 
Yet, the marginal effect on the selection of two-part tariff is weakened when 
IP indemnities are associated to product liability indemnification clauses. The 
rationale behind is that by enlarging the scope of insurance, licensing 
contracts become more complete but costly to draft. Furthermore, the 
inclusion of IP indemnification clauses is a useful tool when contracting 
parties are not technological related and the licensee might suffer from 
information asymmetries on the potential risks associated to the applicability 
of the license technology. Again, through their signalling effects, IP 
indemnification clauses might equilibrate the risks taken by the licensor and 
licensee, who might be more willing to reflect their proportion of risk with a 
shared pricing scheme. From a theoretical perspective, my empirical analysis 
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complements and connects previous theoretical studies on the design of 
licensing contracts and pricing scheme (Choi, 2001; Gallini & Wright, 1990; 
Sen & Tauman, 2007) with contributions on double-sided moral hazard (P. 
Agrawal, 2002; Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine, 1995). In fact, my arguments 
extend the debate on tools available to control and assign risks between 
negotiating parties. Particularly, my focus on IP indemnification clauses as 
insurance mechanisms to signal future commitment and the quality of the 
underlying patent portfolio is novel in the literature. I foresee that this opening 
into indemnification clauses and contractual tools could further extend 
literature on licensing design. For instance, future research could investigate 
what are the antecedents of the IP indemnification clauses on both the licensee 
and licensor side. This empirical investigation would provide an 
understanding for instance on the technical instances that influence the 
inclusion of indemnities in the licensing contracts. Another avenue that could 
be explored would be the correlation between IP indemnification clauses and 
litigation cases handled by either the licensee or the licensor. Given the 
increasing relevance of patent litigation and the rise of NPE entities (A. 
Fosfuri & Giarratana, 2010; Galasso et al., 2013; Reitzig et al., 2007), 
indemnification clauses on intellectual property rights can be used as tools 
that parties agree to include in the contract to equilibrate the ex-post risk of 
infringement and show commitment in the future stages of the relationship. 
Exploring the correlation between the use of IP indemnities and likelihood of 
patent litigation can help at teasing out whether previous experience in 
successful litigation cases would build up specific signaling capabilities and 
improve the efficiency in licensing contracts.  
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From a managerial perspective, my research contributes in shedding 
lights on the optimal drafting of contracts, with a particular focus on licensing 
deals. In fact, our investigation demonstrates that indemnification clauses 
could be a useful and flexible tool to overcome information asymmetry. Yet, 
negotiating parties should optimally balance their insurance mechanisms in 
the drafting of the contract and reflect on how the inclusion of additional 
clauses impact incentives and the risk of opportunistic behaviour as reflected 
in the pricing scheme. 
As a major limitation, the model focuses solely on the biotechnology 
field, and it does not control for industry variance. Yet, it is fair to say that 
biotech is one of the industry, in which licensing occurs with highest 
frequency (Anand & Khanna, 2000a), thus results have a distinguished 
practical implication. I believe that future research might address this lacuna 
and investigate the relationship in other industries, too.  
Concluding, contributions of the present research are threefold. First, 
the research contributes by providing empirical evidence on licensing 
practices and licensing pricing options, which still remains a limited explored 
research area (Anand & Khanna, 2000a; Sakakibara, 2010; Vishwasrao, 
2007). Particularly, the paper answers to a call for more evidence on double-
sided moral hazard in licensing (Cebrian, 2009; Choi, 2001) and links 
licensing literature to contract theories on the use of indemnities as tools to 
share the risks. Second, the research expands the economic literature on the 
design of licensing contract when negotiating parties are not technologically 
aligned and might suffer from information asymmetries (Leone & Reichstein, 
2012; Somaya et al., 2010). Third, the research has relevance for its practical 
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implications, since it aims at corroborating through a systematic study 
previous anecdotal evidence on the best practices to optimally draft license 
agreements (Ramsay, 2003). 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 
 
Rooted into market for technologies theory and organizational 
economics, my dissertation aims at looking at organizational practices that 
constitute optimal coordination strategies in the case of patenting process and 
licensing mechanism. This dissertation as a whole contributes to the growing 
literature on the strategic management of patents as exemplar of intellectual 
property rights. Generally speaking, it provides empirical and theoretical 
insights into the organization of patent-related activities and capabilities. By 
adopting the IP department perspective, the dissertation explores the 
organizational design of patent-based activities and their intersection with the 
organizational structure to substantiate value appropriation from innovation. 
Through an organizational framework, the dissertation examines the 
conceptual interdependence between patent-related capabilities and the 
organizational design of patenting practices, and it provides a complementary 
explanation respect to RBV theory. Additionally, the dissertation focuses on 
the micro-practices and capabilities that generate in the technology licensing 
process. It builds a framework where the organizational design of licensing 
connects with the internal information flow and coordinating mechanisms and 
leads to the emergence of heterogeneous licensing negotiating capabilities. 
This dissertation also provides an overview of licensing practices related to 
the way that contractual clauses can be used to alter behavioural opportunisms 
and lower moral hazard in licensing deals.  
The thesis provides also an empirical contribution in the field of the 
strategic management of patents, because it triangulates qualitative and 
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quantitative evidence on the practices and mechanisms through which firms 
organize their patenting and licensing activities. Thanks to this 
comprehensive empirical approach, the research integrates rich and fine-
grained evidence from case studies with a systematic test of secondary data 
obtained from large dataset. 
The findings of this dissertation also have managerial implications. 
With reference to the activities necessary to register and maintain patent 
protection, this dissertation offers managers a reference framework to 
consider how different combinations of vertical and horizontal mechanisms 
permit to achieve fast patent grant achievement and so appropriate value from 
innovation. The findings call attention to the fact that it is does not exist a 
unique solution to generate value from patent-related activities, but firms 
need to consider carefully the complex bundle of structure and patent-related 
practices. Another important managerial insight refers to the organization of 
technology licensing process. Managers can develop either inside-out or 
outside-in licensing negotiating capabilities, depending on the organizational 
design of the licensing function and the combination of internal information 
flow and coordinating mechanisms. A final insight for manager derives from 
the third paper of the dissertation. In technology licensing, the licensee and 
licensor might consider the introduction of contractual clauses such as the 
indemnification clauses against patent infringement to avoid behavioural risk 
and lower moral hazard. Furthermore, managers can consider the introduction 
of contractual mechanisms to signal the quality of the licensed technology 
and the degree of commitment of the counterparty. 
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This dissertation opens the doors to several new research 
opportunities. First, the dissertation focuses mostly on activities related to the 
domain of patent rights and licensing. Future research can instead focus on 
the organizational dimensions and capabilities related to patent enforcement. 
This research could complement the emerging studies on nonmarket 
strategies. For instance, future research can explore how firms organize ad-
hoc patent-related capabilities to support patent litigation in different 
jurisdictions through teams that to coordinate their actions with patenting and 
licensing functions. This line of research is relevant to understand the 
importance of the members involved in patent-related activities, their 
background and their activities in isolation or in teams. Another interesting 
research area would be understanding the relationship between a certain 
patent strategy –i.e. proprietary, defensive and leveraging strategy- the 
complexity of the organization of IP department –e.g. centralized and 
decentralized units, different functions, multiple geographical locations- and 
firms’ performance. This research stream would give us a better 
understanding on patent strategies and patenting behaviour of firms. Future 
research can also expand our knowledge on the cognitive frames of members 
involved in technology licensing negotiation, maybe trough lab experiments. 
In pursuing this research avenue, researchers can explore if there is a 
particular type of cognitive frame that leads to successful results in 
technology licensing. Finally, the dissertation opens future lines of inquiry on 
the contractual design of technology licensing. For example, future research 
can investigate the ex-post value of IP indemnification clauses and tests 
whether patents associated with an IP indemnification clause are less likely 
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to be disputed in court. In other words, it would be interesting understanding 
if the inclusion of the IP indemnity clauses is a sufficient signal to forecast 
limited disruptions due to patent litigation. The urgency of this research is 
justified by the increasing costs that firms need to face for patents 
infringement. Finally, contract theory clearly illustrates that clauses do not 
operate in isolation but need to be understood as a bundle. Instead, literature 
on the optimal design of technology licensing considered so far the effect of 
single clauses –e.g. exclusivity, grant-back, IP indemnification clauses- to 
lessen behavioural risk. A promising line of inquiry is understanding how the 
bundle of clauses in technology licensing contracts operate to decrease moral 
hazard between the licensee and the licensor. I believe that these future 
research opportunities might further expand our understanding of patent 
strategies and the strategic management of patents. 
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Appendix  
Appendix Chapter Two: Explanation of Simplifying Assumptions and 
Limited Diversity 
 
In this section we document the theories and insights that guided us 
in the selection of simplifying assumptions in order to obtain the intermediate 
solutions in our QCA analysis. First, we have included centralization in the 
R&D structure as a sufficient condition for fast grant achievement, because 
previous research has shown that organizations with a centralized R&D 
functions  tend to be more effective in appropriating value from innovation 
and patenting processes (Agrawal, 2006; Arora et al., 2014; Kogut & Zander, 
1996; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Reitzig & Wagner, 2010), since co-location 
of members fosters sharing of knowledge and improves the coordination 
through vertical architectures. Second, we included cross-functionality as a 
sufficient condition for fast grant achievement, because sub-units have been 
shown to integrate knowledge and capabilities to appropriate value from 
innovation through cross-functional involvement (Leiponen & Helfat, 2011; 
D. J. Miller et al., 2007; Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Zander & Kogut, 1995). 
Third, in the analysis of sufficient conditions for configurations leading to the 
low patent grant achievement, we included the presence of coordination by 
plan and cross-functionality as horizontal mechanism and the absence of 
centralization of R&D. This was based on the theory and empirical 
knowledge that coordination can be better achieved through mechanisms that 
allow the formation of a common ground better than formal plans. The 
positive effect of coordination through informal mechanisms instead of 
planning is particularly evident in case of distributed work and cross-
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functional teams (Srikanth & Puranam, 2011). However, communication 
through plan instead of feedback might prevent the synergic development of 
a common cognitive and creative ground to process inventive activities (A. 
Agrawal, 2006; Argyres & Silverman, 2004; Kogut & Zander, 1996). Thus, 
a high degree of planning as coordination mechanism might be detrimental in 
case of cross-functionality among units, as those latter might be constrained 
in the way they transfer knowledge, discouraging on-going communication 
and creating interdependencies based on standardized and formal practices. 
Finally, in the case of IP patenting when the organization lacks vertical 
architectures to coordinate the process, the overall outcome might be below 
the expectations (Reitzig & Wagner, 2010).
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Appendix Chapter Three: Additional supportive evidence  
Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order theme Selected quotes 
Management of 
information flow 
and knowledge 
Internalized information 
flow (cases with a 
nested licensing unit) 
“It is quite closely connected with the patent organization: licensing people need to have 
information on what they are licensing. They need information when they negotiate and 
they are at the meetings with other companies, they also need information on patents 
and technology that they are licensing. (Company 4); 
"It can come from everywhere in the company but by and large I would say it occurs 
within our centralized teams in intellectual property law and license dep. " (Company 5) 
 
Externalized 
information flow (cases 
without a nested 
licensing unit) 
"During the meetings when we check the patent portfolio we check especially with the 
scientists and with the labs what are the patents , the list of patents that are used to 
protect the products that are on the market or will be on the market. (Company 7)" 
"Looking for the licensor...it is, when we know (from) the engineers, who present during 
these gates process the corporate functions with the...detailed plan for what they want to 
introduce with the product and we make a freedom to operate analysis and during this 
freedom to operate analysis we may come across to patents that might be relevant and in 
that context" (Company 10) 
Support through a 
parallel structure 
Support through internal 
parallel structure (cases 
with a nested licensing 
unit) 
“We have technical resources supporting the negotiation team as required” (Company 8)  
Well for the patent discussion we need the patent guy who can explain easily in 
understandable terms something which is by essence quite complicated, because the 
patent is by definition quite complicated because technology is complicated, so you 
need someone who could explain you know in understandable term that's on the patent 
side" (Company 13)   
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Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order theme Selected quotes 
Support through a 
parallel structure 
Support through internal 
parallel structure (cases 
without a nested 
licensing unit) 
“When we have a license agreement it is recorded by the legal department and we deal 
with the agreement; for the accounting part we have the secretary of our R&D head who 
is collecting the income money." (Company 15)  
"We often work across. For the R&D is mostly a matter of how we structure the 
ownership. They do not care on how we structure the license. They are interested in the 
portfolio. They have a very good understating of the competitors of the portfolio through 
normal publications reports and they have a very, very key role in looking at the 
portfolio." (Company 14) 
Coordinating 
mechanisms 
Stand-alone 
coordinating 
mechanisms (cases with 
a nested licensing unit) 
“We have in-house licensing teams, so we know our licensing contracts and questions 
on our licensing contracts are direct we internally advice our businesses when they have 
questions concerning licensees and otherwise we focus on making deals. (Company 8)  
"We have a global licensing group who look at global opportunities, then particular 
regional group that look for licensing opportunities within their region and then 
particular organization that look for licensing of particular technology if we have a 
subject matter expertise they look for licensing within that subject matter expertise." 
(Company 12) 
 
Shared coordinating 
mechanisms (cases 
without a nested 
licensing unit) 
“They have an internal database and they control who is in charge for that project and 
they send him or her an email for asking him what he think about the licensing and 
monetize and sell. And we can ask him if he can provide to the licensee some data, if 
there are any data available and let him know what the offer is. Then they ask to this 
person to go back to his manager in a senior position and ask for his advice in case he 
would take it or not. (Company 9)  
"It would be the legal head or our CEO." (Company 15)"  
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Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order theme Selected quotes 
Hierarchical 
Enforcement 
Ex-ante hierarchical 
enforcement (cases with 
a nested licensing unit) 
“We are a unit, the patent licensing is independent, so I mean we make the decision to 
launch or not the licensing program (Company 13)  
"But with the exception of those senior managers, who are familiar with the overall 
scope of activity, we have relatively limited knowledge by individual patent attorneys 
on the full scope of global licensing deals and certainly not sufficient detailed 
knowledge to be able to know if there is a conflict or not." (Company 12) 
 
On-going hierarchical 
enforcement (cases 
without a nested 
licensing unit) 
“It is...head of the licensing and the business development department, the head of the 
research centre, which is involved, or the head of the department that might be involved 
in the operations. It is mainly top level, so the heads of the departments that are involved 
in the operations and -I would say- the prospective marketing people also, because we 
need to discuss about the potential market and sometime it could be a new market too, 
we need to get all the opinions." (Company 7)  
"We consult with the R&D and we consult with the business leaders. We want to 
understand what input the grant of the license would have on development plan, would 
have on competitors and also we want to get a sense of whether there would be 
enthusiasm on the license from an R&D perspective...we need to have discussions, we 
need to understand what are the concerns, how important they are, why they are 
interested in blocking a license. It depends on the credibility of the resistance, and what 
are the benefits of the license" (Company 14) 
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Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order theme Selected quotes 
Inside-out 
Negotiating 
Capabilities 
To convince other 
companies because of 
higher  business, 
technical and legal 
understanding (cases 
with a nested licensing 
unit) 
“We have this unit called ‘Licensing’, they are about 10 people. First of all, they have 
geographical and not technology responsibility. Concerning the backgrounds, they are 
strong negotiators. Some of them have also patent technical background but some have 
more business background. Overall, all of them are strong in negotiation.” (Company 4)  
"The out-licensing activities have been normally associated with products better being 
taken commercial, and therefore they are essentially complete in their R&D activity. 
Going up to regulatory approval, therefore the patent attorneys who have assisted these 
kind of licensing activities have been those who have relative high degree of 
understanding of fundamental commercial business activity and have competence in 
contract law and contract drafting, and so that's the kind of basic legal and technical 
competences that are...demonstrated...contained in the patent attorneys who help in out-
licensing activity. So, those are normally senior people. " (Company 12) 
Outside-in 
Negotiating 
Capabilities 
To facilitate and support 
the internal discussion 
(cases without a nested 
licensing unit) 
He is a direct boss of the Head of IP and from his presentation you know there is was 
the decision that the legal department has the lead for all the IP topic in Company 2  and 
he prepares every…if there is any direct decision from him he is preparing slides to pass 
to the decision board set and IP Steering IP Committee Meeting (Company 2) 
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Aggregate 
dimensions 
Second order theme Selected quotes 
 
To identify other 
companies (cases 
without a nested 
licensing unit) 
“What I was talking about is licensing to engine builders and in this case these 
companies have long term relations. If you look at our licensees, the relationship exists 
since 50 years or more and therefore we expect there is a market" (Company 1) "I am in 
charge of the licensing activities and partnerships, it means that our top-up priority is to 
identify technology outside." (Company 7)  
"Part of our strategy is composed by a series of columns...which contain various 
activity, one of the columns is 'relations management' and relation management is part 
of my job: I know my competitors, I know the people responsible for IP in these 
companies and I have numerous meeting with them on annual basis and during these 
meetings we can discuss outstanding potential conflicts that could be handled through 
licensing" (Company 10) 
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Appendix Chapter Four: baseline payment scheme royalties  
Table 4.5.1 multinomial logit (baseline payment scheme royalties) 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
 
royalty royalty royalty 
 
lump 
sum 
two-part lump 
sum 
two-part lump 
sum 
two-part 
count_inter -0.0260 -0.0041+ -0.0199 -0.0041+ -0.0204 -0.0041 
 
(0.0241) (0.0022) (0.0232) (0.0024) (0.0192) (0.0027) 
       
early_tech 5.1426** 1.1954 5.2872** 1.0685 4.8536** 0.7464 
 
(1.9581) (1.6739) (1.8311) (1.6613) (1.4422) (1.1860) 
       
other_obb 0.5483 1.1352+ 0.1037 1.1190+ 0.3495 1.0021* 
 
(0.8945) (0.5794) (1.0995) (0.6430) (0.7716) (0.4258) 
       
sor_emp 0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0062 -0.0000 -0.0066 
 
(0.0198) (0.0167) (0.0216) (0.0195) (0.0141) (0.0130) 
       
sor_herf 2.9702 -3.2503 4.3196 -2.7724 5.8077 0.0756 
 
(6.7354) (6.2675) (7.4647) (6.9458) (5.0908) (4.6982) 
       
sor_generality -3.2415 -2.5334 -2.9812 -1.9188 -2.8676 -2.0881 
 
(7.8594) (7.8042) (8.2604) (8.2580) (6.1697) (6.2899) 
       
ins_sor -3.5980* -0.0651 -4.1572+ -0.1100 -2.9543+ 0.4934 
 
(1.7077) (1.2952) (2.4807) (1.4134) (1.7056) (1.2745) 
       
see_herf -10.7842 -3.7111 -10.6741 -4.0074 -8.7866 -1.5841 
 
(7.9660) (6.8838) (8.7804) (7.8434) (5.9385) (4.9981) 
       
see_generality 1.2283 -4.8354 0.8692 -5.2782 1.2072 -4.8843 
 
(6.0567) (4.7731) (6.4267) (5.6509) (5.6933) (4.5856) 
       
ip_only 1.2237 14.4687** 
    
 
(2.7509) (2.0850) 
    
       
prod_only 
  
1.7587 0.1238 
  
   
(2.1164) (0.8735) 
  
       
indm_bundle 
    
1.2822 2.3759+ 
     
(1.5739) (1.3330) 
       
_cons 5.3986 10.3263 4.4784 10.2896 1.5771 5.9297 
 
(10.7493) (10.1547) (11.9170) (11.4369) (9.3262) (8.9921) 
       
N 226 226 226 226 226 226 
ll -72.8331 -72.8331 -72.6709 -72.6709 -69.3322 -69.3322 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.01 
Appendix 
202 
Table 4.5.2 multinomial logit and technological distance as moderator (baseline payment scheme royalties) 
 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 16 Model 17 
 
royalty royalty royalty royalty royalty royalty 
 
lump sum two-part lump sum two-part lump sum two-part lump sum two-part lump sum two-part lump sum two-part 
count_inter -0.0268 -0.0040 -0.0205 -0.0037 -0.0215 -0.0039 -0.0260 -0.0041+ -0.0239 -0.0038+ -0.0208 -0.0043 
 
(0.0245) (0.0027) (0.0249) (0.0027) (0.0201) (0.0032) (0.0241) (0.0022) (0.0229) (0.0021) (0.0186) (0.0027) 
early_tech 5.2654** 1.1665 5.2934** 1.0326 4.9361** 0.7402 5.1424** 1.1954 5.2009** 1.0739 5.1150** 1.0499 
 
(1.8650) (1.5778) (1.7740) (1.6017) (1.4563) (1.2416) (1.9581) (1.6739) (1.8072) (1.5719) (1.5702) (1.2740) 
other_obb 0.5328 1.1345* 0.1047 1.1271+ 0.3279 1.0015* 0.5484 1.1352+ 0.4874 1.1211* 0.3351 0.9103+ 
 
(0.9232) (0.5716) (1.1372) (0.6059) (0.7833) (0.4188) (0.8945) (0.5794) (0.8595) (0.5206) (0.8379) (0.5404) 
sor_emp 0.0030 -0.0017 0.0013 -0.0040 0.0011 -0.0051 0.0025 -0.0020 -0.0007 -0.0069 -0.0016 -0.0090 
 
(0.0220) (0.0201) (0.0246) (0.0235) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0198) (0.0167) (0.0200) (0.0177) (0.0144) (0.0130) 
sor_herf 2.1505 -3.2541 3.9608 -2.8715 4.9437 -0.0066 2.9703 -3.2502 3.4384 -2.5708 5.6141 -0.0332 
 
(6.5738) (6.2572) (7.5903) (6.6572) (4.6545) (4.4887) (6.7353) (6.2675) (6.2819) (5.8139) (4.9363) (4.3939) 
sor_generality -3.1932 -2.3956 -2.6007 -1.5566 -2.6607 -1.9529 -3.2421 -2.5334 -2.8273 -1.9055 -2.8590 -2.2613 
 
(8.0770) (8.0673) (7.7156) (7.6379) (5.7942) (5.9780) (7.8595) (7.8041) (6.9611) (6.9179) (6.7438) (6.7445) 
ins_sor -3.4119 -0.0890 -4.3110 -0.3521 -2.9471 0.3033 -3.5979* -0.0651 -3.5048* 0.0762 -3.1541 0.4721 
 
(2.4461) (1.8783) (3.3527) (1.9057) (2.2808) (1.7819) (1.7076) (1.2952) (1.7442) (1.2867) (1.9336) (1.4617) 
see_herf -10.9001 -3.6867 -10.7794 -4.0026 -8.9735 -1.5871 -10.7833 -3.7111 -10.9568 -3.9834 -9.3853 -2.2048 
 
(7.9253) (6.8654) (8.7181) (7.7751) (5.9902) (4.9137) (7.9656) (6.8838) (7.9566) (6.9537) (6.9968) (6.0221) 
see_generality 1.4041 -4.8429 0.9817 -5.2991 1.3923 -4.9060 1.2279 -4.8354 0.8594 -5.3599 1.2153 -4.7395 
 
(6.1481) (4.6494) (6.7082) (5.6542) (5.8366) (4.5034) (6.0563) (4.7731) (6.4313) (5.3922) (5.7503) (4.7842) 
tech_dist 0.8564 -0.1773 -0.4312 -0.8560 0.4764 -0.5932 
      
 
(4.1327) (3.6927) (4.0156) (3.1606) (3.4100) (2.9514) 
      
ip_only 1.6306 14.3938** 
          
 
(2.6810) (1.6607) 
          
prod_only 
  
1.7590 0.1864 
        
   
(2.4467) (0.8216) 
        
indm_bundle 
    
1.3143 2.3745+ 
      
     
(1.6350) (1.3276) 
      
1.ip_only#c.tech_dist 
      
2.9129 30.3153** 
    
       
(6.1792) (4.6768) 
    
1.prod_only#c.tech_dist 
        
-0.2285 -0.6800 
  
         
(2.0260) (1.2349) 
  
1.indm_bundle#c.tech_dist 
          
1.4302 2.5496 
           
(2.8803) (2.1698) 
_cons 5.1936 10.3316 4.7033 10.6266 1.6330 6.2812 5.3986 10.3262 5.2092 10.2638 2.1836 6.7668 
 
(10.4860) (9.7762) (11.5648) (10.9200) (9.0860) (8.4858) (10.7491) (10.1548) (11.0388) (10.5822) (10.6526) (10.3001) 
N 226 
 
226 
 
226 
 
226 
 
226 
 
226 
 
ll -72.7117 
 
-72.5462 
 
-69.1361 
 
-72.8331 
 
-73.2956 
 
-71.3310 
 
Notes: standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.10, *p<0.05, ** p<0.0
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